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ABSTRACT
Education in Germany has historically been a matter for
the individual states rather than the central government.
In Prussia in the 1920s, elementary education was segre
gated by religious denomination, while the upper grades
were divided according to occupational specialty. The
Social Democratic Party was the only party which proposed
to change the system, calling for the secularization and
integration of the schools.

When it unexpectedly found

itself in power in November 191B, the party's commitment to
its program was tested.

While the leadership continued to

affirm its support for educational
1920s,

reform throughout the

it did little to introduce any changes.

Admittedly,

the Social Democrats did not rule alone;

they had to share power with middle-class parties.

Main

taining good relations with its coalition partners natur
ally entailed compromise.

A greater obstacle to educa

tional reform, however, was the lack of consensus within
the party.

Intra-party disagreement did not concern merely

peripheral details,

but reveals profoundly different views

on the proper role of religion in modern society and the
place of the individual.
Since party platforms tell us little about actual
socialist attitudes towards education, we must turn to
educators in the party.

Kurt Lowenstein believed that

religion was an anachronism in the modern age;

he called

for the complete secularization of education by completely
excluding religion from the schools.
the party, Paul Qestreich,

Another educator in

focussed on the problem of inte

grating the post-elementary schools in order to ensure that
all students Mere afforded equal opportunities.

Not all

socialists, however, either rejected religion or insisted
on the complete uniformity in the upper levels of the
schools.

Adolf Grimme represents this group of more mode

rate socialists.

All three reformers developed arguments

to support their positions.
The leadership of the party declined to choose among
these very different programs.

Lack of coordination by the

party's leadership meant that nothing Mas done to reform
Prussian schools, Mhich remained essentially as they had
been in Imperial Germany.

Inactivity in educational reform

is an indication of Weimar Social Democracy's inability to
define concretely its goals and act decisively.

v

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Marxist ideology is commonly viewed as one which re
stricts the freedom of the individual
the interests of the group.

in favor of advancing

Certainly there is much evi

dence to support this contention.

Marx's theories centered

around the struggle of socio-economic classes;

according

to him, individuals merely represented their class.

Fur—

thermore, Marx insisted that class struggle, not the deeds
of great individuals, was the driving force of history.
Without doubt, Marx was hostile to individualism as the
concept is generally understood.
It is also commonly believed that Marxist ideology is
hostile to religion.

There is Marx's famous and oft-quoted

statement that "[religion] is the opium of the people".A
According to him, religion was merely a tool used by capi
talist oppressors to buttress their power and keep the
masses docile and obedient.
was certainly harsh.

Marx's criticism of religion

But although his ideology is

essentially hostile to religion and restrictive of the
freedom of the individual, one cannot automatically apply
these judgments to Marx's followers.

AKarl Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Rig h t ; Introduction", The Marx-Engels
Reader. e d . Robert C. Tucker (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2d
e d . 1978), p . 53.

1

2
Marxist ideology Mas an expression of opposition to the
existing system in general.

Its applicability to specific

practical problems of the day Mas untested until the middle
to late nineteenth century and the advent of socialist po
litical parties which professed adherence to Marx's prin
ciples of scientific socialism.
political arena,

Once Marxists entered the

they were confronted with the difficulties

encountered in any attempt to translate a theory into prac
tice.

As long as the fledgling parties were excluded from

political power, abstract considerations concerning the
place of religion and the role of the individual in modern
society became secondary issues, of only theoretical inter
est.

More pressing was the immediate problem of deter

mining the proper attitude to adopt towards the state.

The

debate within the movement on the issue of collaboration
illustrates the problem of trying to unite theory with
practice.
Before the First World War European socialists were
divided on the question of whether Marxist parties should
remain in apposition to their respective governments or
whether they should collaborate with them whenever pos
sible,

in order to advance the interests of the workers.2

The strongest Marxist party at this time was the Social
Democratic Party of Germany

York:

(Sozialdemokratische Partei

“James Joll, The Second International.
Praeger, 1956), pp. 77, B 2 , B5-105.

18B9-1914 (New

Deutschlands or SPD).

While German socialists did not go

so far as to advocate revolution,

they did insist that

Marxists must remain in opposition to their respective
governments,

thus maintaining ideological purity.

Never

theless, several historians have pointed out that the SPD
was less hostile to the state than its belligerent rhetoric
seemed to indicate.
The anomaly can be accounted for by the increasing
importance of German trade unions, which steadily grew in
membership around the turn of the century.3

Union leaders

were more interested in pragmatic problems concerning wages
and hours than in abstract theoretical debates about
Marxist ideology.

The strength of the unions vis-a-vis the

SPD was demonstrated in August 1914, when union leaders,
without consulting the party leadership,

reached an agree

ment with the Imperial government to support the war
effort.*
zations'

For union leaders,

preservation of their organi

apparatus and treasury was more important than

trying to follow Marx's abstract prescriptions for revolu
tion .
Despite these changes, most party theoreticians refused
to acknowledge the widening gap between Marxist ideology

3John A. Moses, Trade Unionism in Germany from Bis
marck to Hitler 1869-1935. vol. 1, 1B69-191B (London:
George Prior Publishers, 1982).
*Richard N. Hunt, German Social Democracy 191B-I933
(New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 159, 180.

and the SPD's behavior.

While party programs and official

statements continued to express animosity for the existing
system,

the party's leadership was,

in fact, more accommo

dating and amendable to compromise.

Ideological purists

had persuaded the majority at the 1903 party conference to
pass a resolution condemning the ideas of the revisionist
Eduard Bernstein.5' Bernstein had attempted to close the
gap between the theory and practice of socialism by re
vising the theory to correspond more closely to the
reality.

Nevertheless, despite the party's repudiation of

revisionism and its insistence on maintaining a confronta
tional attitude towards the state,

the SPD hesitated only

briefly before following the unions'

lead and supporting

the war effort in 1914.
Revisions to the ideology were acceptable only when
circumstances seemed to refute the validity of Marxist
theories.

The workers'

patriotic enthusiasm for the

nation's war effort is a case in point.

Marx's expectation

that the workers of the world would unite and refuse to
fight one another if war broke out was disappointed.A
Class solidarity proved ephemeral ;
more patent force.

York:

nationalism was the

German socialist theoreticians insisted

“‘Peter Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism (New
Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 266.

^TRoman Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism. Karl Marx
Versus Friederich List (New York:
Oxford University Press,
19B8), p. 4.

that worker support for this war of defense was compatible
with Marxist ideology.

By focussing on the Russian enemy,

socialists could claim that Marxism would only suffer an
irreversible set-back if the tsarist authoritarian state
triumphed.
This argument became less persuasive as the war dragged
on.

Initial solidarity in the workers'

and tensions in the SPD mounted.

movement evaporated

A vocal minority rejected

continued col 1aboration with the government.

These members

insisted that the party should revert to its true nature— a
party of opposition.

The positions of the two factions

were irreconci1iable, eventually leading to a split in the
party."7. On the eve of German defeat and the birth of the
Weimar Republic, when unity was most needed,

the largest

and strongest party in the nation divided.
By New Year's Day 1919,
parties in Germany.

there were three Marxist

Although the SPD was the strongest

party in the land, it was unable to lead the nation in its
hour of need primarily because the party had difficulty
conceiving of itself as the ruler of the nation instead of
the opposition.

The issue of whether to collaborate with

’'C.E. Schorske, German Social Democracy 1905-1917
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1955).
Schorske
maintained that the war only brought the conflict between
reformists and the opposition out into the open;
the
controversy had been brewing long before the war.
See
Arthur Rosenberg, The Birth of the German Republic 1871191B (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1931) for the
opposing viewpoint.

the state, a problem that had plagued the movement from the
time of its inception,

became acute when the socialists

found that they were the state.®

Marxist ideology provided

no guidance in this unprecedented situation.

Nevertheless,

the leadership of the SPD was unable to consider the possi
bility that the creed that had long given its members hope
and comfort in their times of tribulation no longer offered
any answers,
Russian Communists were untroubled by these problems—
they had always opposed the tsar's authoritarian state.
When they assumed power in 1917, they immediately set about
the task of translating Marxist theory into practice;
violence was an inevitable part of the process.
German socialists shrank in horror before Bolshevik
excesses.

Having already proven its readiness during the

®See Schorske and Hunt;
also Evelyn Anderson, Hammer
or Anvil, the Story of the German Working Class Movement
(New York:
Oriole Editions, 1945);
Joseph A. Berlau,
German Social Democracy 1914-1921 (New York:
Octogan
Books, 1949); and Franz Borkenau, World Communism. A
History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor:
Univ
ersity of Michigan Press, 193B).
Although not an historian
specifically of the socialist movement, the foremost expert
on the Weimar Republic, Karl Dietrich Bracher, held a
similar view of the SPD.
See his book Die Auflosuna der
Weimarer Republik:
Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtvei—
falls in der Demokratie (Villingen:
Ring Verlag, 1955)
These works are all classics.
For a more recent work that
focusses on SPD shortcomomings see Donna Harsch, German
Social Democracy and .the Rise of Nazism (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1993).
Harsch
criticized the party for shirking its responsibility by
merely reacting to events, rather than exerting the
leadership that the nation needed.

war to collaborate with liberals and Catholics,

the SPD did

not hesitate to continue to do so in 1919 in order to
create a new form of government for Germany.
the Weimar Republic,

The result:

famous for its political instability.

In the brief fourteen years of the Republic's existence,
twenty different cabinets, with an average life span of
eight and a half months, attempted to rule the nation.9
Although it had helped to create the Republic,

the SPD

joined national cabinets only sporadically throughout this
period.

Lack of positive and pragmatic programs made oppo

sition more agreeable than being in power.
The situation was different in Prussia,
largest state.

the nation's

Prussian governments were more stable be

cause the SPD was willing to participate in its governments
throughout the period from the November Revolution of 1918
to July 1932, when Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen dis
solved the state's government.

Since the Social Democrats

did not command a majority alone,

they were obligated to

share power with liberals and Catholics.

The American

historian Dietrich Orlow maintained that the commitment of
these three groups to the successful

realization of dem

ocracy in Prussia made that state the "rock of democracy",

9Bracher,

p. 75.

a model for the federal

level to e m u l a t e . I n

his view,

the three groups' commitment to democracy was a positive
achievement.
Now that the issue of collaboration was settled,
socialists needed to define mare precisely their position
on issues that went beyond the immediate interests of its
constituency of blue-collar workers.
was education.

One of these areas

Although pre-war party platforms had called

for sweeping educational reform,

the S P D 's willingness to

implement its programs had not been tested.

Elementary

schools were segregated by religious denomination and
included religious instruction in the curricula, while
post-elementary schools were segregated according to
occupational speciality.

Now that the SPD was in power,

socialist educators were eager to implement changes.
Around the turn of the century,

the Prussian educa

tional system was not very different from those of other
European states.

Although British and French governments

steadily curtailed the power of the established churches
over education throughout the nineteenth century, religion

i0Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia 191B-1925.
The
Unlikely Rock of Democracy (Pittsburgh:
University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1986);
vol. 2, Weimar Prussia 1925-1933.
The Illusion of Strength (Pittsburgh:
University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1991).
A coalition of the SPD, Democrats, and the Catholic
Center was in power from 1919 to 1921, and then again from
1925 to 1932.
From 1921 to 1925, the coalition was joined
by another liberal party, the German People’s Party.

was not entirely excluded from the schools;

in England, a

non-denominational religious instruction became standard,
while in France,

parents who favored religious education

could send their children to private parochial schools.
Regarding the upper levels, both states made attempts
following the First World War to open the middle and high
schools to less privileged children by providing financial
assistance.
however,

Fiscal instability of the post-war period,

limited these measures.11

Until 1917, education in Russia resembled the pattern
in the West.

The Communists instituted sweeping changes,

determined to eliminate all vestiges of tsarist authoritar
ianism.

The nation's new leaders believed that a radicall

restructured educational system could serve to educate the
new generation in values more appropriate for a modern
socialist society.

In order to accomplish this goal sev

eral measures were implemented:

religious instruction,

which had been used to teach obedience to the tsar, was
banned;

church schools were closed;

grades, entrance

examinations, and corporal punishment were all abolished;
students were given equality with teachers;

and practical

rather than theoretical studies were emphasized.

“ Gerald L. Gutek, A History of the Western
Educational Experience (Prospect Heights, Illinois:
Waveland Press 1972, 1987), pp. 290-314.

10
By the end of the 1920s, undisciplined and poorlyeducated students led to a reconsideration of these
innovations;

the goals of Stalin's ambitious five-year

plans could not be met unless workers,
scientists were properly trained.

technicians, and

In 1927 university

entrance examinations were re-introduced and in 1932 the
teachers' authority to award grades was restored.

Profes

sions of loyalty to the new regime and its ideology were
now prerequisites ^For advancement. 12
Prussian socialists declined to follow the Russian
example.

Dedicated to the implementation of democracy,

socialists in Prussia continued to share power with the
Catholics and liberals.

Two German historians of educa

tion, Wolfgang Wittwer and Christoph Fiihr, argued that the
Social Democrats declined to aggressively pursue educa
tional reform because the issue threatened relations
between the coalition partners.13
intact was the socialists'

Keeping the coalition

priority.

This argument

emphasizes obstacles external to the SPD which inhibited

1=Gutek, pp. 336-350.
13Wolfgang W. Wittwer, Die sozialdemokratische
Schulpolitik in der Weimarer Republik.
Ein Beitrao zur
politischen Schu1oeschichte im Reich und in PreuBen
(Berlin:
Colloquium Oerlag, 1980) and Christoph Fiihr, Zur
Schulpolitik der Weimarer Republik:
die Zusammenarbeit von
Reich und Landern im Reichsschu1ausschuB (1919-1923) und im
Ausschu(3 fiir Unterrichtswesen (1924-1933): Darstel lung und
Que11e n . (Weinheim:
Beltz Verlag, 2d e d . 1972).

11
the party from trying to enact its program.

The unspoken

assumption is that the party had a program.
The S P D 's party programs and its press gave the impres
sion that the party desire implementation of a secular and
integrated school system.

Such repeated public affirma

tions only antagonized its coalition partners, especially
the Catholics, and bred mistrust that threatened the sta
bility of the coalition.

If the SPD truly had no intention

of pursuing school reform legislation, what purpose could
it serve to assert that it did?

Two German historians of

socialism, Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, shifted
the focus of the debate away from coalition politics
towards the problem of electoral po1itics.x*

They argued

that even though the SPD collaborated with middle-class
parties,

it could not forego use of the Marxist language of

opposition without losing its working-c1ass voters to the
Communist Party.
Applied to the sphere of education,

this thesis results

in the argument that the SPD continued to avow its support
for a secular,

integrated school system because the party

believed that this was what its voters wanted.

The avail

able evidence indicates, however, that the majority of
parents,

including those in the working class, did not

14Susanne Miller and Heinrich Potthoff, ft History of
German Social Democracy From 1B48 to the Present, trans.
J.A. Underwood (Leamington Spa:
Berg Publishers, 1986).

12
support the secularization of education;
what integration meant.10

most were unsure

This dissertation cannot under

take to explore parents' motives in depth;

the problem is

primarily to explain the puzzling behavior of the party
leadership.

Why would the SPD continue to call for far—

reaching educational reform that had little appeal for its
voters and strained relations with the Center?

Was the

leadership of the SPD so poor that it was unaware of the
wishes of its own electorate?
A more likely reason for its ostensibly inexplicable
behavior is that the leadership was too distracted by more
pressing problems to give educational reform serious con
sideration.

Adhering to party slogans,

the party leader

ship either did not notice or did not care that it lacked a
clearly defined program.

Educators in the party were fru

strated that the party gave educational reform such scant
attention.

They sought to develop specific educational

programs which reflected Marxist ideology as they under—

10Most children, including those of working class
families, were enrolled in denominational (Catholic or
Protestant) schools.
PreuBische Statistik (Amtliches
Quellenwerk) 272.
Das Schulwesen in PreuBen 1921 im
Staate. in den Provinzen und Reaierunqsbezirken. e d .
PreuBischen Statistischen Landesamte in Berlin. (Berlin:
Verlag des PreuBischen Statistischen Landesamtes, 1924),
p. B. In 1921 there were only fifty-five secular schools
enrolling 0.5 percent of all Prussian school children.
An
updated study showed that by 1929 there were 256 secular
schools (which by this time were referred to as "collection
schools", for technical reasons) with 0.76 percent of all
school children.
Although an increase is indicated, it was
still less than one percent.

13
stood it.

The issues of religion and individualism which

had previously been abstract theoretical questions now
resurfaced as concrete practical problems that needed to be
addressed.
Cultural critics from all points on the political
spectrum were agitated by these problems.
academics and apolitical

Conservative

left-leaning intellectuals have

both received the attention of scholars.16
ridiculed the spectacle of Weimar politics;

These groups
they believed

that the realms of politics and culture were mutually
exclusive.

Politica11y-active cultural critics in the SPD,

however, have attracted less notice.
Socialist cultural critics shared the contemporary
belief that Germany’s glorious cultural heritage was endan
gered in the modern world.
scorned politics,

however,

They differed from those who
in that they believed, that the

revival of culture depended on economic recovery and polit
ical reform.

Since formal education is central in the

transmission of culture to youth, reform of the schools was
mandatory for cultural rejuvenation and national revival.

itFritz K. Ringer, The Decline of the German
Mandarins.
The German Academic Community. 1870-1933
(Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969) deals with
right-wing academics;
Peter Gay, Weimar Culture.
The
Outsider as Insider (New York:
Harper and Row, 1968) and
Walter Laqueur, Weimar, ft Cultural History 1918-1933
(London:
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974) deal with
apolitical left-wing intellectuals.

14
Three prominent Social Democratic reformers— Kurt
Lowenstein, Paul Oestreich, and Adolf Grimme— concentrated
on different aspects of education.
from current pedagogical theory,

Although they borrowed

they did not participate

in academic debate and research on education. 17

They were

more likely to refer to theologians, sociologists, and
philosophers than to other educators in their arguments.
The experience of the war had politicized all three of
them— they felt it was their civic duty to participate
actively in public life and share in solving the nation’s
problems.

They believed that the application of Marxist

principles to the practical problem of educational reform
was the key to creating a new society.
Kurt Lowenstein tirelessly pursued realization of the
party plank calling for the sec u 1arization of education.
By this he meant not only the integration of Catholic and
Protestant elementary schools,

but removal of religious

instruction and all references to religion— prayers, reli
gious songs, and Biblical reading passages— from the
schools.

Only the complete secularization of education, he

thought, could eliminate the public power of the estab
lished churches, a prerequisite for German recovery.

17For more information on educational theory see
Jurgen Qelkers, Reformoadaaoaik. Eine Kritische D o q menaeschichte (Munich:
Juventa Verlag, 1989) and Wolfgang
Scheibe, Die Reformoagaaoaische Beweouno 1900-1932.
Eine
einfiihrende Darstelluna (Weinheim:
Verlag Julius Beltz,
1969).

15
Lowenstein's position supports the prevailing view that
both Marxist ideology and its proponents were hostile to
religion.
Paul Oestreich attempted to clearly define the
socialist position on integration.

He strove for nothing

less than the complete integration of the numerous postelementary schools— the people's school,

the middle school,

and the numerous high schools— into one common school for
all.

A flexible curriculum offering electives would allow

some freedom of choice.

Students deemed to be "gifted",

however, would not be segregated from other students.
Instead, by educating all the nation's youth together,
whole society would benefit,

the

rather than merely promoting

the rise of favored individuals.

Oestreich's emphasis on

the collective reinforces the view that Marxist ideology
and its adherents were more solicitious of group welfare
than of individual freedom.
Adolf Grimme, a religious socialist, viewed the sec
ularization and integration of education very differently
from Lowenstein and Oestreich.

Although Grimme ostensibly

supported the secular school type, he believed that a
religion purified of corruption had a place in the schools.
As education minister at the end of the period

(1930-1932),

he criticized the increasing competition among the differ—
ent types of schools for special privileges for their
graduates.

He did not, however, contemplate integration on

16
the lines Oestreich had s u g g e s t e d . G r i m m e ' s

interpreta

tion of religion and the role of the individual shows that
Marxist ideology is not necessarily incompatible with
religion or individualism.
The leadership of the SPD, already limited by the
necessity of conducting coalition politics, was unable to
choose among these profoundly different school reform
plans.

Lacking a unified vision,

the party drifted.

The

reluctance of the Social Democratic leadership to decide on
a common educational reform plan reflected the party's
inability to define its attitudes towards religion and the
place of the individual in modern society.

The SPD failed

to offer a positive program because it could not surrender
its identity as an opposition party.
Chapters two and three will examine the politics of
educational reform.

The following three chapters will deal

with the theoretical arguments that Lowenstein, Oestreich,
and Grimme constructed to lend substance to the socialist
educational ideals of secu1arization and integration.

The

final chapter will return to political issues, in order to
assess the impact the Social Democrats had on the schools.

iSThe special "privileges" they wanted were simply
jobs, which were becoming scarce with the onset of the
Great Depression.
With rising unemployment, they hoped to
reserve certain positions for their graduates.

CHAPTER TWO
THE POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM
IN IMPERIAL GERMANY
In order to understand the politics of educational
reform in Weimar Prussia, we need to understand the origins
of the confessional segregation of elementary education and
the occupational segregation of secondary schools.

The

state became more active in educational issues in the early
part of the 1800s;

as the century progressed, education

became an increasingly important political issue.
This chapter will address the following questions:

How

did the state's elementary schools come to be divided by
religion?

How did the secondary schools come to be divided

by occupational preparation?

What were the positions of

the middle-class political parties on education?
the Social Democrats'

What was

attitude toward the public schools?

Toward the state?
The issues of the proper relationship between the es
tablished churches and the schools and the role of religion
in the elementary schools were debated by politicians in
the Wilhelmian period.

Concern with post-elementary

education was restricted primarily to professional
educators, although there were political aspects as well.
This chapter will deal with both problems up to the time of
the fall of the Hohenzollerns and the assumption by the SPD
of the reins of power.

17

IB
RELIGIOUS SEGREGATION OF PRUSSIAN ELEMENTARY EDUCATION TO
1871.
Prussia '5 Civil Code of 1794 defined education as a
duty of the state.

The state found it convenient,

however,

to delegate daily administrative tasks to the churches,
both Catholic and Protestant.

The natural result was a

confessionally segregated school system.1
controlled not only religious education,

The churches
but also handled

non-religious aspects of elementary education as well.
These tasks included the inspection of school buildings and
property, as well as the hiring and supervision of
teachers.

This informal agreement between throne and

altar(s) benefitted both parties;

the churches wielded

considerable power over elementary education, while the
state was spared the cost of establishing an educational
bureaucracy.=
The state, however, did not completely relinquish its
control over educational matters to the churches.

To cor

rect the problem of poorly trained teachers, the state

xSince Catholic and Protestant populations before -1871
tended to be segregated regionally, segregation of the
schools posed few problems.
Marjorie Lamberti, State.
Society, and the Elementary School in Imperial Germany (New
York:
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 21.
\amberti,
pp. 16, 37;
Thomas Alexander, The
Prussian Elementary Schools (New York:
MacMillan, 1918),
pp. 24-26;
Anthony J. La Vopa, Prussian Schoo1teachers.
Profession and Office. 1763-1848 (Chapel Hill:
University
of North Carolina Press, 1980), p. 36.
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opened the first teachers'
1806.

training institute or Seminar in

This measure was followed in 1B26 by a ministerial

decree requiring prospective teachers to take a state
licensing examination, a test based on training in the
Seminar, before assuming teaching duties.3

These initia

tives had the effect of markedly improving the quality of
elementary teachers.

The Seminaren, like the elementary

schools, were confessionally segregated.4
There was an unexpected consequence of these reform
measures.
training,

Since teachers now received professional
they became more conscious and protective of

their identity as a distinct occupational group.

They

began to resent supervision by clergymen who had not shared
their pedagogical training.5
erally well-educated,

Although pastors were gen

often university trained,

teachers

felt that a pastor’s qualifications were inapplicable to
the supervision of education.6

Teachers were not opposed

to religion or the inclusion of religious instruction in
the curriculumj

their desire to be free of church control

was based strictly on professional interests.

Tla Vopa, pp. 53-54.
4Wittwer, p. 175.
“Lamberti,

pp. 16, 27;

*La Vopa, p. 101.

La Vopa, pp. 58, 101-104.
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The reform era from 1806 to 1B19 might have been an
auspicious time for teachers to agitate for abolition of
church domination of education.

The teachers' sense of

professional solidarity and common purpose had not yet
sufficiently developed at this time, however.

By 1819, the

beginning of the era of reaction, the state had jDecome hos
tile to any perceived attack on the established churches—
the churches were now viewed as indispensable partners in
the attempt to return Prussia to pre-Napo1eonic days.7
state ignored teachers'

The

pleas for the professionalization

of educational administration.
In the Revolution of 1848, elementary teachers,
other professional groups,
their grievances.

like

formulated a program stating

One of their chief demands was for the

abolition of church inspection and supervision of the
schools.®

They repeated their position that professional

qualifications, not confessional orientation, should be the
decisive factor in appointing school officials.
revolution collapsed,

When the

the teachers' wishes were ignored.

While the Constitution of 1B50 affirmed state authority
over education,

it also provided that confessional rela

tionships would be taken into account in establishing

^Gordon A. Craig, Europe. 1815-1914 (Hinsdale,
Illinois:
Dryden Press, third edition, 1972), p. 48.
eLamberti,

p. 27.
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elementary schools.*1’ Prussian elementary education
continued to be divided by denomination and dominated by
the established churches.

Failing to win the support of

the state, teachers who strove for an end to church control
of education would have to find another champion for their
interests.
OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION OF PRUSSIAN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
TO 1871
Prussia's defeat by Napoleon at Jena in 1806 initiated
a period of intense self-criticism on the part of the
state.

Perhaps if outmoded institutions were reformed,

the

potential strength of the nation's individuals could be
actualized.

This would increase the power of the state so

that the French occupiers could be repelled.

The renowned

philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte gave eloquent expression
to these ideas in his Addresses to the German Nation,
delivered in Berlin in the winter of 1B07-1B08.
In the Addresses Fichte blamed Prussia's defeat on the
state's failure to educate all of its members.10

Fichte

believed that by allowing church domination of the schools

**1bid . , p. 13.
10J . G. Fichte, Werke. Funfter Band (Leipzig:
Fritz
Eckardt Verlag, 1910), p. 3B5.
While Frederick the Great
had encouraged the spread of religiously-oriented education
in order to produce moral, orderly, and obedient subjects,
he did not want the masses to receive too much education
because they might then aspire to rise above their assigned
station in life.
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the state had neglected to instill a sense of patriotism in
m

youth.11

The nation would be invigorated, Fichte insisted,

by a well-educated citizenry;

individual freedom and ser

vice to the state could harmoniously co-exist because the
interests of the individual complemented those of the
state.1=
Fichte borrowed extensively from the ideas of a contem
porary,

the Swiss educational reformer Johann Heinrich

Pestalozzi.

Pestalozzi criticized the contemporary educa

tional practice of emphasizing the development of one skill
to the neglect of other subjects.

An all-around cultiva

tion of intelligence, morality, and physical fitness pro
vided a better education, he thought.13,

Fichte linked

Pestalozzian principles of education to the national ideal
of Prussian rejuvenation.14
Wilhelm von Humboldt, Minister of Education and Reli
gion, was receptive to these ideas.

He introduced the

classical curriculum into the Gymnasium;

practical career

preparation would take place after the student completed

11Gutek, pp. 187-1B8.
1=?John S. Brubacher, A History of the Problems of
Education (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1947, 1966), pp. 58-61.
13F.H. Hayward, The Educational Ideas of Pestalozzi
and Frobel (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1904,
1979), p. 18.
14Gutek, pp. 200, 213.
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his studies. 1SI

Originally intended to educate all of the

nation '5 youth,

the curriculum of the nine year Gymnasium

proved to be so rigorous that only those with leisure could
invest the amount of time necessary to master the demanding
subjects.

Not only did attendance at a Gymnasium necessi

tate a great expenditure of the student's time;

it also

cost money— tuition was charged at private preparatory
schools, as well as the Gymnasium.
workers'

The high fees prevented

children from attending.

When middle schools appeared later in the century,

the

result was a three-tiered system of education, which
roughly corresponded to separate schools for the lower,
middle and upper classes.14’

The majority of the population

received only a basic education in the eight-year
"people's" schools, which were the only schools that were
free.

Changing from one track to another was almost impos

sible, given that the Gymnasium emphasized the study of
Latin and Greek.
The division of students was matched by a division of
the teaching profession.

While elementary teachers were

lsJames C. Albisetti, Secondary School Reform in
Imperial Germany (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,
1983), p. 19.
14,Di f ferent educational tracks originated in the
Middle Ages when clergy received an abstract, other-wor1d 1y
training in a university, the aristocracy trained to fight
and be chivalrous, and craftsmen learned the practical
skills of their trade in the guild system.
Gutek, pp. 69,
298-309.
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trained in state-controlled Seminars, secondary school
teachers attended a university where their preparation
consisted of thorough mastery of three academic fields.
Secondary school teachers liked to think of themselves more
as scholars than educators.17
In the Seminaren, which were separate from the univer
sities, elementary teachers received a less theoretical,
more practica1ly-oriented course of study.

Elementary

teachers aspired to obtain equal pay and status with
secondary school teachers.

To this end, they called for

the attachment of the Seminaren to the universities.
Secondary school teachers resisted this proposal— they
wanted to maintain their sense of exc lusivity.

In

addition, they argued, since few university graduates would
voluntarily choose to teach at the elementary level, the
profession would be impoverished.

This problem could be

avoided by denying elementary teachers admission to univer
sities, precluding the possibility of changing their career
tracks.
As long as the teaching profession was segregated,

the

state's schools would necessarily remain segregated too.

17Konrad Jarausch, The Ltnfree Professions.
German
Lawyers. Teachers, and Engineers. 1900-1950 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 14, 47.
1SIbid., p. 38.

1<?Wittwer, p. 179.
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During the Revolution of 1848, elementary teachers called
for vertical integration of the educational system, com
bining all grades from the elementary school through the
upper grades and leading to the university.30

If the

schools Mere integrated, then teacher training would have
to be unified as well;

elementary teachers would then

enjoy the benefits of a university education.

Their hopes

were dashed when the Constitution of 1850 retained the
standard practice of segregated schools for both students
and teachers.
PRUSSIAN POLITICS BEFORE THE FIRST WORLD WAR— LIBERALS AND
CATHOLICS ON EDUCATION
Elementary teachers found a champion for their inter
ests in the two liberal parties,
National Liberals.

the Progressives and the

These two parties differed on specific

issues but shared a common set of principles.

Among these

was an insistence on separation of church and state and
removal of church domination of the schools.31
confessionally segregated elementary schools,

Instead of
the liberals

proposed that a mixed confessional school was more appro
priate in the modern industrialized and urbanized age.®3

^ L a m b e r t i , p. 27.
=1Bruce B. Frye, Liberal Democrats in the Weimar
Republic.
The History of the German Democratic Party and
the German State Party (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois
University Press, 1985), p. 10.

Lamberti, p. 215.
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While liberals criticized the churches in general, they
were especially hostile to the Catholic Church.
Despite the liberals' opposition to religious segrega
tion, neither party was hostile to religion itself.
Religious instruction was essential,

liberals believed,

because Christianity was such an integral part of Berman
culture.

The nation's youth could not properly appreciate

the great German classics of literature and art without an
understanding of the Christian religion.

Although they

wanted to abolish church control of the schools,

liberals

believed that religion could nevertheless be retained.
Programs of the two parties illustrate the liberals'
desire to check the power of the churches while retaining a
positive attitude towards religion.

The 1878 program of

the Progressive Party called for "independence of the
school from the church" but added the proviso "without
prejudice to the regulation of religious education".=3

The

latter clause indicated that the churches would be allowed
to supervise religious instruction but not other school
affairs.

The program of the National Liberals (1881)

emphasized the rights of the state and its precedence over
the churches, but also stated that,

"[the state] very well

appreciates the great importance of the churches for our

■"“’Wolfgang Treue, Deutsche Parteiprogramme 1861-1961
(Gottingen:
Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1954), "Programm der
Deutschen Freisinnigen Partei", 5. Marz 1B84, p. 75.
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people."3*

They also called for "peaceful relations

between state and church".35

The party just wanted to

ensure the supremacy of the state.

These rights were not

precisely defined nor was the issue of religious instruc
tion in the schools raised.
The liberals did not adopt the elementary teachers'
desire for integration of the different levels of schools
(vertical integration).

The liberals, however, did

champion national standardization of all schools in the
different states of Germany (horizontal integration).

They

were disappointed when education remained under state con
trol after unification.

Until

the nation's schools were

integrated, they believed, national unification would
remain incomplete.2i

Bismarck thought unification was

incomplete too, as long as the Catholics competed with the
state far authority.27

In an attempt to eradicate the

public power of the Catholic Church,
Laws, effective from 1873 to 1878.

he instituted the May
This period is known as

^Ibid., "Programm der Nationalliberalen Partei", 29.
Mai 1881, p . 72.
3=>Ibid. , p. 71.
S6Lamberti, p. 63.
^ T h e Papal Doctrine of Infallibility of 1870 made
Bismarck wonder whether German Catholics would pledge their
first allegiance to the Kaiser or the pope.
Lamberti, p.
41.

28
the Kulturkampf.

The liberals .supported the state against

the Catholics.
The Catholics had established their own party, the
Center,

in response to the exclusion of Catholic Austria

from unified Germany.

The kleindeutsch solution to the

problem of German unification had resulted in a Reich with
a sizeable Catholic minority.

Comprising about one-third

of Germany's population, Catholics feared for the survival
of their religion not only in a predominantly Protestant
Reich, but in the rapidly changing modern world.

To this

end, the Center vociferously defended the traditional prac
tice of confessional segregation and church control of
elementary schools.20
The May Laws restricted the public activity of the
Catholic Church and asserted state authority over clerical
training and appointments. 29

The Church's control of

schools in Polish districts and the Rhineland was curtailed
by replacing clerical school
educators.
however,

inspectors with professional

A lack of money for new state civil servants,

prevented the wholesale dismissal of Catholic

inspectors.

Bismarck's primary intention was not to

promote the professionalization of education— Protestant
supervisors were not removed from their posts— but to

^T reue,
60-61.

"Programm des Zentrums", 30. Juni 1870, pp.

^Craig, p. 344;

Lamberti, p. 50.
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eliminate the Catholic Church as a political and social
* V i

power.*■
When Bismarck called off the persecution in 1878,
clerics who had been dismissed from the schools resumed
their old positions.*1

The chancellor now wanted to return

to the old church-state partnership, in the interest of
upholding the traditional authority of both in the face of
a new threat— the growing socialist movement.

An alliance

of Catholics and conservative Protestants would be useful
in checking the spread of revolutionary ideas.
Party,

The Center

for its part, was eager to demonstrate that

Catholics were loyal citizens.
During the Kul turk<ampf, Protestant clergymen had
opposed the persecution of the Catholics, fearing that the
state might curtail their own privileges as well.

In 1876

the Conservative Party, representative of the Protestant
rural population, publicly stated its opposition to the May
Laws.*3

These statements facilitated an alliance between

Protestant Conservatives and the Catholic Center.
matter of education,
identical.
Christian

In the

the positions of the two parties were

Conservatives regarded the "confessional,
Volksschu]e . . . [as] the most important

“ Lamberti, pp. 47-48, 86-B7.
311bid., p. 107.
“ Treue, "Grundungsaufruf der Deutsch-Konservativen
Partei", 7. Juni 1876, p. 65.
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guarantee against the increasing unruliness of the masses
and the progressive deterioration of all social ties."33
Socialism threatened the existing order;

Conservatives

were ready to close ranks with both the Catholic Church and
the state in battling this pernicious evil.
In 1892 the two parties introduced a bill that legally
established the customary practice of confessional segrega
tion.

The National Liberals and Progressives managed to

defeat the bill.

But in 1906, the same proposal became law

when the National Liberals abandoned the Progressives and
abstained from the vote, allowing the bill to become law.
The custom of confessional segregation of the school system
now enjoyed legal sanction.34
Although the Catholics found it beneficial to co
operate with Protestant Conservatives on religious and
educational

issues,

the Catholics and liberals shared some

common interests as well.
membership,
classes,

As a party defined by religious

the Center consisted of members of all social

including workers.

The party promoted socio

economic reforms that Conservatives resisted.

While the

anti-clericalism of the liberals presented an obstacle to
1ibera1- C a t h d i c cooperation, the two groups could unite on
occasion.

The rapid growth of the socialist movement

331b id .

3*Lamberti, p. 215.
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altered the political scene.

Before considering this new

political force, however, we need to consider developments
in post-elementary education.
The role of religion and the churches in elementary
education was a political issue because of the existence of
the Center Party.

The problem of post-elementary educa

tion, however, was largely restricted to professional
educators, although the issue did have political dimen
sions.

As Germany became industrialized, educational

reformers increasingly criticized as impractical the
humanistic Gymnasium that emphasized study of Greek and
Latin.3®

In the second half of the 19th century,

specialization in education increased.

New educational

institutions emerged to train professionals in technical
subjects excluded from the Gymnasium curriculum.

Two new

types of secondary schools— the Rea 1gymnasium (.which
emphasized mathematics and science) and the Oberrea1schule
(which concentrated on German studies)— challenged the
supremacy of the Gymnasium.
Gymnasium students were accorded special privileges;
they received an exemption from compulsory military service
and were the only graduates admitted to the universities.
Advocates of the new secondary schools demanded equal
rights for their students.

3®Oelkers, p. 2 6 .

They won an influential
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supporter in the person of Kaiser Wilhelm II.

Following

the school conferences of 1890 and 1900, the two new types
of school were awarded parity with the Gymnasium. 361
Wilhelm was especially enthusiastic about the
Oberrealschule with its focus on German language, history,
and literature.37

The Kaiser believed that religious

instruction in the ele-mentary schools and a greater
emphasis on German studies in some secondary schools could
aid in checking the spread of socialist ideas.3®
What position did the Social Democrats take on the
churches,

the state, and the educational system?

GERMAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN OPPOSITION, 1869-1917
The industrialization that rapidly proceeded after
Bismarck's unification of the Reich led to a rapid increase
in numbers of the urban working class, with significant
consequences for the nation's political

life.

Originally

organized into educational societies under the tutelage of
the Progressives, workers soon recognized that their
interests fundamentally conflicted with those of property

“ Ringer, pp. 50-51.
37Gutek, p. 3 2 B .

^Alexander, p. 398;

Albisetti, pp. 180-182.
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owning liberals.3^

The association of the Progressives

with the authoritarian government also led workers to
distrust the liberals.*0

In increasing numbers, workers

joined organizations devoted specifically to advancing
their interests.
□ne of these organizations was the Social Democratic
Workers’ Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei or
SDAP), established at Eisenach on August 0, 1B69.

It was

led by Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel, men close to
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,

theoreticians and would-be

politicians-revolutionaries.41

The new party's program

reflected its dual heritage— both its liberal progressive
patrimony and the scathing critique of that patrimony,
Marxist ideology.

The program began with a statement of

its general principles,

including several radical-sounding

phrases such as "the abolition of all class rule" and

T,,?Frye maintained that differences between liberalism
and socialism (in Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic,
and even today) were greater than their similarities;
the
ideologies of the two were fundamentally irreconci1iable,
even if the two parties could compromise on particular
issues.
For the opposite point of view, see Beverly
Heckart, From Bassermann to Bebel.
The Grand Bloc's Quest
for Reform in the Kaiserreich. 1900-1914 (New Haven:
Yale
University Press, 1974).
*°Miller and Potthoff, p. 24.
I am referring to Marx 's and Engels' activities in
the International Workingmen's Association.
Known as the
First International, it was established in 1864.
During
the International's brief existence, the SDAP was affili
ated with it;
it was dissolved in 1876 because of fac
tional in-fighting.
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"abolition of the existing means of production";

affilia

tion with the International was a further indication of the
party's radical inclinations.42
Other provisions of the program, however, could have
easily been written by a Progressive.

For example, the

fourth principle stated that economic liberation of the
workers "is possible only in a democratic state".

The

program also demanded "universal, equal, direct, and secret
vote to all males over 20 years of age".43

These planks

illustrate that Germany's first socialists were committed
democrats.

In educational matters,

the party called for

"separation of church and state and separation of education
from the church", and "compulsory education in primary
elementary schools and free instruction in all public
educational institutions."44
In 1875,

the SDAP merged with another socialist

group,43 to create the Socialist Workers' Party of Germany
(Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands, or S A P D ).

The

program of the new party, written at its founding congress
in Gotha, resembled the S D A P 's earlier program in its

42Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiter—
partei", Eisenach, 8. August 1869, p. 59.
431b id .
441bid., p. 60.
45Ferdinand Lassalle's General German Workers' Associ
ation .
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emphasis on demands for democracy— the secret ballot, univ
ersal suffrage, civil
tion.^
bined;

liberties, and freedom of associa

The issues of religion and education were com
the program called for "universal and equal educa

tion of the people through the state.
education.
tions.

Universal compulsory

Free instruction in all educational institu

Declaration that religion is a private matter."47

This plank emphasized four points: that education was a
responsibility of the state and that education must be
equal,

free, and secular.

statements of principle;

These demands were intended as
the party had no prospect of

implementing its program, or even of influencing the state
to implement these changes.
As a matter of fact, socialists soon viewed the state
with hostility when Bismarck introduced anti-socialist
legislation in 187B.

Until they expired in 1890, these

laws severely restricted the activity of the party.
S P D 's press was banned,

The

its leaders were harrassed, and

public meetings were prohibited.

Despite these limita

tions, however, every Reichstag election throughout the
period saw a steady increase in votes for the SAPD.
Persecution by the state only increased the party's

46Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Arbeiterpartei” , Botha, Mai 1875, pp. 66-67.

Ibid., p. 67.
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attraction for workers. 1,0

The 1B90 Reichstag election

showed the largest gains yet for the socialist party.
Bismarck's plan to eradicate the workers' movement failed.
When Wilhelm came to the throne in 1B8B, Bismarck's days
were numbered;

the Iron Chancellor resigned in 1B90.

The

new Kaiser then made efforts to conciliate the working
class by letting the anti-socialist law lapse and by
extending social insurance measures first introduced by
Bismarck .***
A legal party again, it adopted a new name at the 1B91
Erfurt Congress.

The term "worker" was dropped from the

name of the party--it was now called the Social Democratic
Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
or SPD).

The delegates adopted a new program as well.

It

contained the usual Marxist statements on the inevitable
demise of capitalism and the certain triumph of the prole
tariat, phrases that property-owning liberals naturally
perceived as radical.

The leadership of the SPD, however,

recognized the psychological appeal of Marxist rhetoric for

ASGary P. Steenson, "Not One M a n 1
. Not One Pen n y 1
."
German Social Democracy. 1865-1914 (Pittsburgh:
University
of Pittsburgh Press, 1981), p. xiv, passim.
4s,These measures included health, accident, disabil
ity, and old-age insurance, passed by the Reichstag 18B31889.
Germany was a pioneer in providing state assistance
for the working class.
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working class voters and employed it to effective electoral
advantage. ®°
One cannot question the sincerity of the party leadei—
ship's belief in Marxist theory;

to be a Social Democrat

in Imperial Germany entailed real hardship, including
harassment by the authorities and ostracism by mainstream
society.

Naturally, committed socialists were gratified

when their message attracted increasing support at the
polls.

The growing popularity of Marxian socialism seemed

to validate the correctness of the theory.

Success

emboldened the party's leaders, encouraging them in their
belief that socialism was the inevitable wave of the
future.

They envisioned successively increasing victories

at the polls.

Democracy would sweep them to powei

would vindicate their sacrifices.

history

Although socialism

remained the final goal, democracy seemed to offer the
winning strategy.

Without openly repudiating revolution,

the party was steadily becoming a party of reform.91
The program's treatment of religion and education
showed the party's preference for the language of opposi
tion.

Point six called for "affirmation of religion as a

private matter.

Abolition of all use of public means on

^ ‘Miller and Potthoff, p. 36.
s:LThe revision of Marxist theory in these years has
received much attention from scholars.
The most important
works are Gay, The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism and
Schorske (see chapter one).
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church or religious goals.

Church and religious

communities are to be considered as private organiza
tions. " 93

Point seven addressed the issue of education:

Secularization of the school.
Compulsory attendance at
public primary schools.
No charges to be made for
instruction, school supplies, and maintenance in public
primary schools, nor in the higher educational institu
tions for those male and female students whose capabi
lities for further training are deemed suitable.33
These planks expressed the S P D 's dissatisfaction with
the existing school system.

Socialist theorists believed

that education should serve to raise the consciousness of
the workers to the necessity of their historical mission,
as outlined by Karl Ma r x .94

Religious instruction and

cultivation of patriotism in the schools presented
obstacles to this mission.

Because the schools did not

serve its purposes, and because it had no power to change
the situation,

the leadership of the SPD tended to be

indifferent to public education.33

Since the schools were

hostile to the socialist movement,

the party developed its

own organizations— clubs for extracurricular activities as

B2Treue, "Programm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei",
Erfurt, 21. Qktober 1B91, p. 76.
331b id . , pp. 76-77.
34Gutek, pp. 248-249.

” Lamberti, p. 198;

Albisetti, p. 61.
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well as educational study groups.86

These clubs often had

links with their middle class counterparts, however;

seg

regation of workers from the rest of German society was
never total. 97

Cetainly workers' children continued to be

educated in the public schools.

Because the SPD had no

power to change the system, discussion of educational
issues was mostly confined to educators in the party.
The leadership of the SPD believed in Marx's prophesy
of the inevitable triumph of the proletariat.

But it

thought that it would be a long time before this came to
pass.

Socialist leaders were surprised to find themselves

in power in November 1918.

How would they attempt to

implement their party programs?

Would they reform the

sc hoo1s?

^W . L . Gutsman, Workers' Culture in Imperial Germany.
Between Tradition and Commitment (New York:
Berg Pub1ishers, 1990).
87Vernon L. Lidtke, The Alternative Culture. Socialist
Labor in Imperial Germany (New York:
Oxford University
Press, 1985).
Lidtke's book was a refutation of the thesis
of negative integration asserted in Guenther Roth's book,
The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany (Totowa, New
Jersey, 1963).

CHAPTER THREE
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND EDUCATIONAL
REFORM, NOVEMBER 191B TO AUGUST 1919
When the Kaiser abdicated in November 1910, the
socialists had a unique opportunity to implement their
programs.

In the early days of the Revolution, Prussian

education was secularized by decree.
democratic procedure,
these decrees.

Intent on adhering to

however, SPD leaders soon rescinded

While the new constitution adopted in

August 1919 partially realized some of the socialists'
objectives,

the constitutional clauses which dealt with

education proved to be difficult to implement.

Events

during the Revolution and immediately afterwards merit
detailed consideration, because decisions made at this time
limited the actions of reformers throughout the 1920s.
THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN POWER, NOVEMBER 1918-FEBRUARY 1919
In October 1918, as the World War was drawing to a
close, the SPD joined the Imperial government.

The mili

tary authorities acknowledged that Germany had lost the
war;

an immediate armistice was necessary.

The military

leadership hoped that a government that included the Social
Democrats might receive more moderate peace terms than
would the old authoritarian government.
Points gave them reason to think so.

Wilson's Fourteen

Accordingly,

the SPD

was invited to join a government which included members of
both the Center and the Progressive Party.
40

It was also
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expected that socialist participation in the cabinet would
mollify the increasingly restive working class and prevent
revolution.
It soon became apparent that not even inclusion of the
SPD in the government could prevent the fall of the monai—
chy.

On November 9, 1918, the last imperial chancellor,

Prince Max of Baden, announced the abdication of the
Kaiser.

Prince Max then transferred the powers of his

office to Friedrich Ebert,

leader of the SPD.

For the

first time in its history,

the party found itself in

power.1
By this time, however,
parties.

there were two socialist

During the War, many party members had begun to

believe that it was time to abandon col 1aboration with the
state.

When the leadership refused, opposition members

meeting at Gotha on April 6, 1917 formed a new socialist
party,

the Independent Social Democratic Party (Unabhangige

lFor a general history of the revolution see Rudolf
Coper, Failure of a Revolution.
Germany in 1918—1919
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1955).
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Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or USPD).=

The

SPD and USPD shared the same goal— realization of a
socialist economy and society.
how to pursue this objective.
parties were good at first.

They differed, however, on
Relations between the two

Early in November, Ebert

replaced the Progressive and Center cabinet ministers he
had inherited from Prince Max with USPD representatives.
Although formation of an a 11-socia1ist government
appeared to herald great social and economic changes,
Ebert's intentions were anything but radical.

He intended

that his government would serve merely to maintain order
until the nation could elect a national assembly to write a
constitution.3

The Independent ministers had other ideas;

they wanted to use the powers of the state to implement

=Qnce the USPD broke away from the parent party, the
correct term for the original party was "Majority Social
Democratic Party" or MSPD.
When the MSPD and USPD reunited
in 1922, the party was briefly referred to as the United
Social Democratic Party or VSPD (Vereinigte or United).
Soon afterwards, however, the "V" was dropped and the party
was once again called the SPD.
In the interest of simpli
city, I will only use the acronyms SPD and USPD.
Also see
David Morgan, The Socialist Left and the German Revolution:
A History of the German Independent Social Democratic Party
1917-1922 (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1975).
3"Ebert Liber die Aufgaben der neuen Regierung", Vorwart5. January 1, 1919.
Even though this article appeared
over a month later, it illustrates Ebert's unwavering atti
tude towards the Revolution and the National Assembly.
Ebert was also worried that the Allies would make good on
their threat to occupy Germany if the govern- ment could
not keep order.
On this point see "Entente gegen deutschen
B o 1schewismus", Vorwarts. January 3, 1919. Use of the term
Bolshevism indicates that the Russian example was uppermost
in everyone's mind.

basic economic and social reforms immediately.

They felt

that the socialists would never again have such a favorable
opportunity to implement their program.

The differences in

approach made the disintegration of SRD-USPD cooperation
inevi table.
A socialist government also took power in Prussia.

The

Independent Social Democrat, Adolph "Ten Commandments"
Hoffmann,'1 along with the Majority Social Democrat, Konrad
Haenisch, assumed control of Prussia's Ministry for Spirit
ual and Instructional Affairs.
things to come,

Giving an indication of

they promptly renamed the ministry;

it was

now known as the "Ministry of Science, Art, and Educa
tion" .5

In accordance with USPD intentions, Hoffmann

proceeded to enact immediately the socialist plank calling
for secularization of education.

On November 27 church

supervision of the schools was abolished.^

Two days later

“Vlittwer, pp. 25, 79.
Hoffmann served in the Prussian
state legislature from 1910 to 1918.
He was notorious as
the author of atheistic pamphlets;
one such tract which
appeared in 1891 lampooned the Ten Commandments, earning
Hoffmann his nickname.
His ascent to power seemed ominous
to pious citizens.
BI will use the terms "Ministry of Education" and
"Education Minister" throughout the rest of the dissertati on .
^Die deutsche Revolution 1918-1919— Dokumente, e d .
Gerhard A. Ritter and Susanne Miller (Frankfurt:
Fischer
Bucherei, 1968), "Verfugung des Preu[3ischen Ministeriums
fur Wissenschaf t , Kunst und Volksbildung Liber die Aufhebung
der Geistlichen Ortschu1aufsicht vom 27. 11. 1918", p. 254.
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the same fate befell compulsory religious instruction.7.
The custom of opening and closing the school day with a
prayer was also abolished.

Prohibiting prayer in the

schools was aimed at protecting the rights of dissidents
(those who had dropped church membership), who had suffered
discrimination before and during the World War.®
Intoxicated by the sudden possession of power, Haenisch
initially agreed with Hoffmann's actions.
ber, however,

By late Decem

the two socialist parties were bitterly

divided over the tempo of change.

The SPD insisted that

reform had to await the convening of a democratically
elected National Assembly.
revoke both decrees.9

This belief led Haenisch to

When the USPD resigned from the

^Ibid., "Erlaf3 des Preuflischen Ministeriums fur
Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung an die Provinzialschulkollegien und Regierungen uber den Religionsunterricht
vom 29. 11. 1918", p. 254.
In the pre-war period, Hoffmann was so opposed to rel
igious instruction in the schools that he had requested his
own children be assigned to the Jewish class, an action
that outraged not only the public, but the Jewish teachers
as well.
See GStA (Berlin) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr.
37, vol. VII, p. 121.
®An example of discrimination against dissidents was
their ineligibility for military promotion during the war.
This question spawned a long debate in the Prussian legis
lature from late 1916 to the middle of 1917.
See GStA
(Berlin) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 37, vol VII, pp.
106-108, 114-116, 118, 121, 127-130, 133-136, 13S-139, 143,
145.
‘’Ritter and Miller, "Anordnung des PreuPischen
Ministers fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung,
Haenisch, uber den Re 1igionsunterricht vom 28. 12. 1918",
p. 261.
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government shortly afterwards,

the prospect of secularizing

the schools disappeared.
Catholics made up one-third of Prussia's population.
The Center Party was dedicated to maintaining the religious
character of elementary education.

In November,

the lead

ership of the party was overtaken by the rapidity of
events;

the party was in disarray.

Hoffmann's decrees

galvanized the Center into action, however.

Catholics in

the Rhineland threatened to secede from Prussia and Germany
if the decrees were enforced.10
The Independents were furious that Haenisch rescinded
the decrees.

The Education Minister defended his action on

several grounds.

First, maintaining Prussian unity was

essential in order to maintain German unity.11

Secondly,

Haenisch insisted that changes could be enacted only after
the proper legislative body, the National Assembly, con
sidered the issues.13

Replying to the charge that he was

10Ibid., "Artikel der Kolnischen Volkszeitung uber
Richtlinien und Arbeitsziele des Preuf3ischen Kultusministeriums vom 7. 12. 191B" , pp. 256-258 and "Entschl ie[3ung
einer Versammlung in Koln gegen die Aufhebung des Religionsunterrichts, 3. 12. 191B", p. 25B.
The SPD accused
the Center of resorting to blackmail in threatening seces
sion, "Das angebliche Schu1kompromiP. Die Expresserpolitik
des Zentrum", Vorwarts. July 6, 1919.
llnKultusminister Haenisch uber den Einheitsstaat",
Vorwarts. July 24, 1919.
1=GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preuflischer Landtag, xf
B 1 , Die Schu1unterha 1tung Allgemein, B d . 1:
1919-24.
11.
April 1919, Ver fassungebende Preuf3ische Landesversamm 1ung .
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pandering to the Catholics' wishes, Haenisch pointed out
that rash action could only lead to a backlash— the Novem
ber decrees had given the Center an issue which had
mobilized its constituency.13

A strong Center Party

delegation in the National Assembly would only hinder the
realization of educational reform on socialist lines.
The SPD's firm adherence to the establishment of demo
cracy should not be viewed solely as a disinterested desire
to empower the people.

The party also believed that it

would benefit electorally from universal suffrage.
Although the Social Democrats had not expected the victory
of the proletariat so soon,

they were now certain that the

triumph would be bloodless— violent revolution appeared
unnecessary because historical necessity had allegedly
swept the socialists into power and historical necessity
would keep them there.

As the natural

leaders of Germany,

socialists would carry out their world historical task of
supervising Germany's transition from capitalism to
socialism.

The party fully expected to receive a majority

of votes when elections were held on January 19, 1919.

13Ibid., xc C2, Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der
Gchule (Konfessions-, Sim u 1tanschu1e ), Ldtg. B d . 1: 191927, Verfassunggebende Preupische Landesversammlung, 12.
April 1919.
14"NeujahrgruP alien Schaffenden", Vorwarts. January
1, 1919.
This article linked the socialists with Luther,
Goethe, Kant, and Nietzsche.
An untitled article, Vorwarts. January 2, 1919, expressed similar sentiments.
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The SPD did well in the elections but failed to secure
a majority.

Not only did it face competition from the

U S P D , but also from a third socialist party, the Communist
Party of Germany (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands or
KPD), which was established on December 30, 1918. i=l

While

the USPD opposed collaboration with non-socialist parties,
the KPD went even further— it advocated the seizure of
power and implied that violence would be necessary in the
process.
When two of the KP D 's most popular leaders, Rosa
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were murdered in January
1919, the Communists accused the SPD of complicity in the
murders.

(There is some controversy about who was res

ponsible for the murders.

What is important,

however,

is

that the KPD believed that the Social Democrats were
responsible.)

At the very least, the SPD's press campaign

contributed to the poisonous atmosphere of hatred and fear
that led to the murders,16

At any rate, from this time on

the Communists remained implacably opposed to the Social
Democrats.

While the USPD and SPD were able to mend

lsFor details on the founding of the KPD see Werner
Angress, Stillborn Revolution;
The Communist Bid for Power
in Germany 1921-1923 (Princeton:
Princeton University
Press, 1963).
16For an example of this see "Die Reichskonferenz des
Spartakusbundes", Vorwarts. January 1, 1919.
The SPD
linked the KPD with the Russian Bolsheviks, whose example
of violent revolution struck fear into the hearts of
orderly citizens.

48
•fences, a KPD-SPD reconciliation proved impossible.

The

KPD presented a constant threat to the SPD's voter base.
Even if the socialist movement had not been fragmented,
the members of all three parties combined did not compose a
majority of the nation's voters.

The SPD hoped that its

opposition to revolution and its readiness to collaborate
with the middle-class parties would eventually win the
loyalty of the n a t i o n . ^

But as long as the SPD feared the

loss of its working-class constituency to one of the other
socialist parties,

it felt obligated to continue speaking

the language of apposition.

Furthermore, as long as the

SPD was bound to Marxist ideology,
the nation at large.

it could not appeal to

It would have to remain a special

interest party.1®
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, FEBRUARY— AUGUST 1919
The newly elected National Assembly met on February 6,
1919 in the city of Weimar, away from the tumultuous capi
tal.

The KPD boycotted the elections,

leaving the field to

17Konrad Haenisch, Staat und Hochschule.
Ein Beitraa
zur nationalen Erziehungsfrage (Berlin:
Verlag fur Politik
und Wirtschaft, 1920).
This is an example of socialist
attempts to broaden the appeal of the party to wider
groups.
ieIn 1918 Max Weber commented that both the Center and
the Social Democrats were special interest parties, and
that they preferred to remain so.
From Max Weber:
Essays
in Sociology, trans. and e d . H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(New York:
Oxford University Press, 1946), "Politics as a
Vocation", p. 112.
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six major political parties.

Two of the six were socialist

parties— the SPD and the USPD, and two were traditionally
liberal parties— the Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei or DDP, successor to the Progressive
Party) and the German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei
or DVP, successor to the National Liberal Party).1^

The

remaining two parties were the Catholic Center Party120
(essentially the same party as in Imperial Germany), and
the National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei
or DNVP,

successor to the Conservative Party).

of seats

each obtained in the assembly was as follows:

USPD, 165 SPD, 75 DDP,
Since no

The number
22

90 Center, 22 D V P , and 43 DNVP.

party managed to secure a majority,

formation

of a

coalition was necessary.

A^The best secondary source on Weimar liberalism is
Larry Eugene Jones, German Liberalism and the Dissolution
of the Weimar Party System. 191B-1953 (Chapel Hill:
Univ
ersity of North Carolina Press, 1988).
2ll’For the Center Party see Herbert Homig, Das
PreuBische Zentrum in der Weimarer Reoublik (Mainz:
Matthias-Grunewa1d , 1979);
Gunther Grunthal, Reichsschuloesetz und Zentrumspartei in der Weimarer Republik
(Dusseldorf:
Freien Universitat Berlin, 1968);
and Ellen
Lovell Evans, The German Center Party 1870-1933:
A Study
in Political Catholicism (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois
University Press, 1981).
=AErnst Rudolf Huber, Deutsche Verfassunqsqeschichte
Seit 1789. Band V, Weltkriea. Revolution und Reichserneuruno 1914-1919 (Stuttgart:
Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1978),
p. 1069.
A few splinter parties also received enough votes
to earn a few seats at the assembly.
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What were the possible combinations?

A return to an

al1-socialist government composed of the U5PD and SPD, as
in November and December 191B, was numerically impossible
because the two parties together fell short of a majority.
A coalition of the USPD, SPD, and DDP was a possibility,
but the DDP refused to join as a junior partner holding
less than a third of the votes, and facing domination by
the other two parties.22
What about an SPD-DDP-DVP coalition?
DVP was a liberal party.
ically possible.
camp.

After all, the

And such a coalition was numei—

But there were tensions in the liberal

The DDP was established in late November by members

of the Progressive Party.

Although they hoped the National

Liberals would join their new party,

they were rather cold

to Gustav Stresemann who had led the National Liberals in
forming their own party,

the DVP. 2:3

Division in the lib

eral camp was similar to the division of the socialists—
both movements were weakened.
5PD coalition with the DNVP was out of the question.
But was a Centei— DVP-DNVP combination possible?

The

Nationalists had defended Catholic religious freedom in
Imperial Germany, giving the two parties a possible basis
of co-operation.

But this coalition was numerically

“"“The DDP felt it had to be careful and not appear to
be too friendly to the socialists.
Frye, p. 71.
^Jones,

pp. 18-20.
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impossible,
majority.

falling several votes short of the necessary
If the DDP joined the group, however, more than

enough votes was secured.

DDP-DVP animosity,

however,

could not be overcome.
Only one possible combination remained— the SPD-DDPCenter, commonly called the Weimar coalition.

This group

was responsible for writing a new constitution for the
German nation.

All three parties were united in their

commitment to the establishment of democracy.24

Although

there was a basis for co-operation in general matters,
could the three compromise on religious and educational
matters when writing the constitution?
The positions of all three parties remained essentially
unchanged from their pre-war programs.

The Center conceded

that school administrators should be professionally trained
educators, but still insisted that confessional segregation
of elementary schools must be maintained.

The Center also

opposed formation of a centralized unitary state;
Catholics were ardent champions of "states'
preference was for regional

the

rights".

Their

(local or state), rather than

federal control of the schools.25

240rlow, vol. 1, pp. 3-10.
=sGStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, Xc C2 Die Konfessionel1e
Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfessions-, Simultanschule),
Ldtg. B d . 1:
1919-27, Verfassunggebende PreuRische Landesversammlung, 16. Sitzung am 11. April 1919.
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Although the DDP was slightly warmer to the churches
than the S P D , the two parties were nevertheless allies on
issues concerning religion and education.

Democrats wanted

to solidify national unity by creating a stronger central
government.

A standardized educational system throughout

the Reich, in which children of all religions were mixed,
was their ideal.

They called their school a "community

school " .
While in theory the SPD still continued to support the
idea of a free, secular, and integrated school,

the party

leadership was practical enough to realize that coalition
with the Center would prevent complete implementation of
its ideal.

Considering the fact that the SPD and DDP

commanded slightly more than two-thirds of the votes in the
Weimar coalition,

it is remarkable that the Center was able

to realize any part of its educational program.

External

events, however, decisively affected negotiations on the
constitution.
When Germany was presented with the Versailles Treaty,
4 -

the DDP left the assembly rather than sign the document.
Without the support of its erstwhile ally, the Social
Democrats were forced to make concessions to the Center.
This resulted in what came to be known as the first school
compromise.

In this compromise,

^ Frye, p. 60-61.

the favored school types

53
of all three parties— the SPD's secular school,

the D D R ’s

community school, and the Center’s confessional school —
were given equal

legal status in the constitution.S7

Before this draft of the constitution could be
ratified,

the DDP returned to the negotiating table and the

education clauses were rewritten.28

A close scrutiny of

these problematical articles is in order.
THE WEIMAR CONSTITUTION
Many observers at the time believed that the constitu
tion produced by the Weimar coalition was one of the most
democratic documents that the world had yet seen.

The

clauses on education and religion seemed to offer a sound
basis for construction of a viable school system.

But

these articles proved to be extremely contradictory and
subject to varied interpretation throughout the 1920s.
This source of partisan strife proved debilitating for the
new democracy.
The third section, consisting of articles 135-141,
dealt with the issue of religion. “

Articles 135 and 136

guaranteed a number of basic freedoms,

27Wittwer,

including the

p. 95.

“ Frye, pp. 80-81.
“ Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reichs vom 11. August
1919. Testausaabe mit ausfuhr1ichem Sachreoister. e d . Karl
Pannier (Leipzig:
Verlag von Philipp Reclam jun., n.d.)
"Dritter Abschnitt.
Religion und Re 1igionsgese11 schaften"
pp. 40-42.
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freedom of belief and conscience.

No citizen could be

required to reveal his or her religious beliefs or be
forced to participate in church ceremonies or to take
religious oaths.

The holding of public office was

independent of an individual's religious confession.
Religious beliefs would only be taken into account if such
beliefs were relevant for the position.
Article 137 flatly stated that "There is no state
church."

The article went on to guarantee the churches'

complete control over their own affairs.

At the same time,

religious societies that had previously enjoyed all the
rights of a public corporation would continue to do so.
The article proceeded to define what this meant— public
corporations were entitled to receive tax monies collected
by the state.

These two provisions meant that the churches

retained all the benefits of the old church-state partner
ship, while at the same time eliminating state interference
in their affairs.

This article added that other societies

which had not previously enjoyed these rights might earn
them if their "constitution and number of members offered
assurance of permanency."

This provision allowed pre

viously banned dissident groups the chance to earn the same
rights as the churches.

The article concluded that if fur

ther regulations were necessary,

the individual states

would be responsible for passing such legislation.
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The remaining articles in this section guaranteed the
churches security oT their property, provided members of
the military free time to fulfill their religious duties,
and permitted religious organizations the right to provide
services in hospitals and prisons as long as they were not
coercive.

Finally, article 139 deserves special mention

because its tortured language so vividly illustrates the
problem of socialist-Catholic co-operation.

This article

stated that "Sunday and state-recognized holidays remain
legally protected as days of rest and spiritual elevation."
The next section, articles 142-150, dealt with educa
tion and the schools.30

These articles generally guaran

teed the free pursuit of knowledge.

Article 143 provided

that "teachers in the public schools have all the rights
and duties of state officials."

This article could be con

strued as standing in contradiction to article 136, which
had stipulated that the confession of state officials was
not a consideration, unless the duties of the office were
dependent on religious membership.
Article 144 stated that the entire school system was
subject to state supervision.

It went on to add that

"School supervision will be exercised by full-time profes
sionally educated officials."

This article reinstated the

decree of November 27, 191B that Haenisch had rescinded.

30 Ibid., pp. 43-46.
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School inspections Mould no longer be performed by local
church officials who lacked pedagogical
teachers' demands of 1848
seemed to be satisfied

training.

for professional

The

supervision

at last.

Article 145 mandated free education for at least eight
years,

to be fallowed by occupational

training

(which was

also free) until the student was eighteen years old.
provision caused little problem.

But Article 146,

This

like

article 143, was the source of numerous problems in the
1920s.

It stipulated that a common elementary school would

provide the basis for the middle and high schools.

The

variety of professions was to be taken into account in
establishing post-elementary institutions.

While complete

integration of the various levels was not achieved,

the

constitution provided that admission to any of the school
types depended on the student's "predisposition and inclin
ation, not the economic and social position or religious
confession of one's parents."
The next paragraph
issue of the character

of the same article

returned to the

of the elementary schools.

Upon

petition, parents were granted the right to secure a school
of their confession or Meltanschauung, as long as "orderly
school administration" was not jeopardized.

Details would

be regulated by the states according to general principles
established by a national
passed.

law.

But this law was never
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The final paragraph of this article required that
national, state, and community means be used to financially
support poor students who were considered suitable to
attend a middle or high school.

Article 147 abolished

private schools intended to segregate wealthy students from
other children.

State approval was necessary for private

schools with legitimate missions.

Private schools would be

permitted if the public school in that area did not provide
for a particular "confession or Weltanschauung
special pedagogical interest."
potential

...

or

This provision had the

to fragment the school system.

The article con

cluded by abolishing private preparatory schools of the
elementary grades.

These schools had been used by the

wealthy to secure rapid and certain admission into the high
schools.
Article 148 showed its SPD-Center authorship in its
provision that "all schools are to. strive to bring about
moral growth, civic character, and personal and profes
sional excellence in the spirit of the German nation and
national reconciliation."

Paragraph two stated that "care

is to be taken that the sensitivities of dissenters not be
injured."

Paragraph three made "civic and work instruc

tion" subjects in the schools.

In addition, every student

would receive a copy of the constitution upon graduation.
Article 149 stated that "Religious instruction is an
ordinary subject of the schools with the exception of
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non-confessional
continued,

(secular) schools."31

The article

"religious instruction will be taught in accord

with the principles of the concerned religious community
without prejudice to the supervisory rights of the state."
The article concluded with the provision that participation
in religious instruction or religious holidays and
ceremonies was completely voluntary for both teachers and
students.

No student could be coerced into taking

religious

instruc- tion, nor could teachers be required to

teach the

subject.

Although the article seems

straightforward, we will see in chapter seven that this
provision

provoked a barrage of letters to the Education

Ministry by local officials con- cerned about the proper
way to interpret and carry out this provision.
Although not in this section, one additional article
touched on the issue of education.

It nullified many of

the guarantees made in the articles just discussed.

This

was article 174, known as the "status quo" article.

It

stated that "until enactment of the national

law foreseen

in article 146, paragraph 2, the existing legal position
would remain in force."33
The National Assembly ratified the constitution on July
31, 1919.

The parties of the Weimar coalition voted for

31Parenthesis in the original.
33 Ibid . , p . 53 .

59
it, while the USPD joined the DVP and DNVP in voting
against ratification.

Having received a majority, the

document went into effect on August 11, 1919.
#

#

#

Although the SPD, DDP, and Center voted to ratify the
constitution, none of them was entirely satisfied with it,
especially the clauses dealing with education and religion.
The Democrats were disappointed that federal control of
education had not been established.

The Center was pleased

with the status quo article because it guaranteed continua
tion of confessional schools, at least for the time being.
Catholics now turned to the task of achieving legal
preference for the confessional school through enactment of
the promised national education law.
Many socialists vehemently objected to the education
clauses.

Haenisch thought contradictions in these articles

would lead to chaos in school administration.

Like the

Democrats, he had hoped for greater federal control of edu
cation,

in order to counteract the particu1aristic influ

ences of religion and region.53
Independent Socialists criticized the SPD for not
getting the secular school clearly established.

Socialist

teachers of both parties had hoped for removal of church

33 "Ku 1tusminister Haenisch gegen das Schu 1kompromi|3 " ,
Vorwarts. July 22, 1919.
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influence from education,'54

In defense, Majority Social

Democrats pointed out that the SPD had done the best it
could, considering that the DDP, its ally against the
Center, had abandoned the negotiations.

Despite this, the

SPD had triumphed by obtaining parity of the secular and
confessional schools. 551
In any event, the SPD did not yet enjoy majority
support at the polls.

Until then, freedom from compulsory

religious instruction and abolition of private preparatory
schools were considerable achievements.56

Now that 6er—

many had adopted a democratic form of government,

the

voters had to learn to accept majority decision, even if
this meant the continuation of confessional schools for the
time being.

The task was now to persuade the voters of the

necessity of the secular school.37
Although the SPD remained formally committed to the
principle of secularizing the elementary schools, members
in the party disagreed on the specific meaning of seculari
zation.

The next chapter will examine the attempts of one

socialist educator to define the term and formulate an

^ " D a s Lehrer gegen das Schu1kompromifl", Vorwarts.
July 19, 1919 and an untitled article, July 21, 1919.
3S"Der Kampf urn die Schule", Vorwarts. July 20, 1919.
“ "Das neue Sc hu 1kompromi fl" , Vorwar ts . July 31, 1919.
37"Das Sc hu 1kompromi 13 in der Nations 1versammlung " ,
Vorwarts. July 19, 1919.
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educational reform plan consistent with the principles of
the larger socialist movement.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE SECULARIZATION OF EDUCATION;
THE REFORM IDEAS OF KURT LOWENSTEIN
Kurt Lowenstein began his political career in the
Independent Social Democratic Party.

He was the socialist

movement's most tireless proponent of the SGcularization of
education.

He objected not only to confessional segrega

tion of the elementary schools, but also to the inclusion
of religious instruction in the schools.

This chapter will

examine the basis for Lowenstein's deep antipathy for the
established churches and the Christian religion.
Lowenstein's ideas were not restricted merely to criti
cizing religion.

Rather,

he sought to develop arugments

which would persuade parents that the secular school, as he
defined it, could best prepare the nation's youth to deal
with their tasks in the modern world.

While his ideas seem

to be a logical interpretation of Marx's criticism of reli
gion, not all socialists agreed with Lowenstein.

A more

serious obstacle to implementation of his ideas, however,
was that Lowenstein was unable to secure the active support
of the party's leadership.
his ideas,

While he was free to publicize

they were to remain unrealized.
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A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Kurt Lowenstein was born May IB, 1B05 in Bleckede, a
small town on the Elbe . 1

His father, a merchant, and his

mother, a milliner raised him in the orthodox Jewish
religion, sending him to a private Jewish Res 1gymnasium.
As a student,
fees.

he worked at odd jobs to help pay the tuition

After completing high school, he studied philosophy,

education, and national economy at several German univer—
sities, graduating in 1911 from the University of Erlangen.
Lowenstein intended to become a rabbi at first;

in 1908,

however, he had a change of heart and abandoned not only
Judaism,

but religion altogether.

Although qualified to

teach in a Gymnasium, he worked as a free-lance journalist
until the outbreak of the World War.
Lowenstein served at the front as an ambulance orderly.
Like many of his generation, he experience a loss of faith
in the established order.=

At the end of the war, his

"’The following biographical information comes from
Nachlass Dr. Kurt Lowenstein. Findbuch. 19B2, pp. 2-6, a
guide written for the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (hereafter
cited as FES) in Bonn, where Lowenstein's papers are
located.
One of his favorite pseudonyms was KerlbwLbwenstein; Kerlbw was a combination of the first syl
lables of his wife's maden name, Kerwel, and his own.
This
pen name expressed his commitment to the idea of the equal
ity of men and women.
Although his intention might be
praiseworthy, use of this name can cause the researcher
some confusion.
For purposes of simplification, only the
name Lowenstein will be used throughout this dissertation.
=Modris
the Birth of
19B9);
Eric
in World War

Eksteins, Rites of Spring;
The Great War and
the Modern Age (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.,
J. Leed, No Man's Land:
Combat and Identity
I (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press,
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conviction that society and economy needed to be completely
transformed led him to join the Independent Social Demo
cratic Party.

Lowenstein represented the USPD at the

National Assembly of 1919.
From 1920 to 1933 he was a member of the Reichstag and
a town councillor for school administration in Berlin.

In

addition to his political and administrative responsibil
ities, Lowenstein also actively participated in the Kinderfreunde, a children's organization dedicated to cultivating
a sense of civic responsibility in youth.

In February

1933, Lowenstein's home was raided by the Nazis, who hated
him because of his race and his politics.

He left Germany

and eventually settled in Paris, where he continued to work
with socialist educational organizations and children's
movements.

On May 8, 1939 he died of a heart attack in

Paris.
Although Lowenstein addressed different aspects of
educational reform, he focussed on eliminating church
domination of the schools.

His ideas on the secularization

of education reflected his prior political affiliations.

1979);
and Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979).
These three books discuss
various aspects of the affects of the war experience.
Wohl
concluded that few generalizations could be made about the
war;
it affected different people with the same kinds of
experiences in different ways— there was no such thing as a
front "generation", he maintained.

LOWENSTEIN AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
Before the war, Lowenstein had vaguely identified with
liberal ideology without becoming politically active or
joining a party.

But the war experience propelled him into

politics— social and economic reform, he believed, were
necessary to ensure that such a catastrophe would never
recur.

Like many of his contemporaries, Lowenstein lost

faith in abstract liberal concepts, which seemed hollow
after the exprerience of witnessing the carnage at the
front.*

He turned to Marxist ideology because it seemed

more concrete— unlike liberalism, Marxism claimed to
account for the social and economic conditions that shaped
the lives of individuals.4*
Lowenstein thought that the concrete realistic nature
of Marxism promoted a positive attitude to life.*

While

previous ideologies were remote from reality, socialism

3Eksteins, p. 256.
AFES 3.3.2., 8, 217, "Die Lage der sozialistischen
Erziehung", Sozialistische Erziehuno. 1, January, 1929.
*Kurt Lowenstein, Das Kind als Trader der werdenden
Gesel1schaft (Vienna:
Jungbrunnen, 1. Auflage 1926;
2.
verbesserte Auflage, 1928),
p. 30.
This is Lowenstein's
most important book.
The best translation for "werdenden
Gesellschaft" is "developing society".
The phrase can be
translated as "future society" as well, but the connotation
of the process of dialectical development is lost, giving
too much import to the final result as apposed to present
reality— Lowenstein mixed the past, present, and future, a
difficult theme to relate.
Another possible translation is
"becoming society" which conveys the notion of change and
reminds one of Nietzsche, but is awkward in English.
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united theory and practice.

Lowenstein embraced Karl

Marx's famous dictum that "the philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways;

the point,

however, is to change it."6
But what could one do to change a world which Marx
himself had asserted was historically determined?

Lowen-

stein thought that belief in historical determinism did not
preclude belief in the ability of the individual to change
things.

He wrote,

"It appears to us that historical events

both in their totality as well as in their individual
phases are neither mechanical nor passive."7' What part,
then, did the individual play in the process?
Lowenstein thought that "past, present, and future
exist simultaneously."3

While unenlightened individuals

acted as representatives of their estate or class and
failed to grasp the necessary direction of historical
change,

those who were armed with the gospel of Marx could

divine the future in the present.

The task of the leaders

of the socialist movement was to share its knowledge of the
necessary direction of history.

As Lowenstein put it, "Dur

task is to accelerate the process in which the conscious
ness becomes ripe and strong enough to become decisive

‘‘’Marx,

"Theses on Feuerbach", p. 145.

^Lowenstein, Das Kind. p. 7.
e Ibid.
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action."*”

Although one could not alter the future, one

could hasten its coming.

Liberal ideology did not offer

such a compelling vision.
Lowenstein's emphasis on the individual's ability to
shape history was not uncommon among socialists— the
Hungarian Communist Georg LukAcs (1885-1971) expressed the
same attitude.

Although he never directly cited LukAcs,iCI

Lowenstein was undoubtedly familiar with his book of 1923,
History and Class Consciousness.

LukAcs believed that the

totality was more important than isolated facts;
could even be deceptive and misleading.'1"1'

facts

By grasping the

totality, one could overcame the limitations of time and
place and anticipate the future.

To overcame time, one

must adopt the standpoint of the proletariat because it was
the only universal class, the only class that could tran
scend its narrow,

"special" interests.

As individuals,

however, proletarians failed to comprehend the totality.

**1bid . , p . 24 .
10The three reformers I discuss in this dissertation
aimed at a mare general audience;
their works lacked foot
notes, so it is often difficult to draw a direct connection
between the reformers' ideas and those of their contempor—
aries.
“ The following discussion draws heavily from Leszek
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism.
Its Origin, Growth,
and Dissolution, vol. 3, The Breakdown, trans. P.S. Falla
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 258-306.
Kolakow
ski 1s discussion of Luk£cs betrays a great deal of anger;
as a socialist, Kolakowski felt that the cause was betrayed
by those who twisted the ideology.

6B

Only the socialist leadership understood the totality;

it

would inform the proletariat of its own best interests.

If

individual workers questioned the validity of the leader
ship's position and attempted to cite facts on their
behalf,

their arguments should be dismissed as misguided

due to their partial and limited understanding of
historical reality.
Lowenstein was not as dismissive of facts as was
Lukics.

Nevertheless,

two men's positions.

there are some similarities in the
In post-war Germany feelings of

insecurity were widespread.

While many Germans tried to

escape the pressing problems of the day by fleeing into a
mythical past, 12 socialists dreamt of a utopian future.
When one could no longer believe in liberal values or in
Christianity, Marxist ideology could serve as a substitute.
With its claim to be based on science, and its promise of
hope for the future, it could serve to still the qualms of
anxiety in the chaotic world of the 1920s.
Both Lowenstein and LukAcs would have done well to heed
the advice of the sociologist Max Weber.

Weber drew a dis

tinction between an ethics of responsibility and an ethics
of ultimate ends.

Although he recognized that serving a

1=Richard Bessel, Germany after the First World War
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 255-2B4.
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goal gave one faith and passion, it could also blind the
devotee.i3
Given his atraction to Marxist ideology, why did Lowenstein choose to join the USPD in 1918 rather than the
Communists?

His choice must be attributed to his firm

belief that consciousness-raising was the proper means of
bringing about change and to his deep-seated aversion to
violence.

Lowenstein insisted that "The best weapon of

humanity is reason.

The irrationality of the masses is the

greatest enemy of socialism." 14

He remarked that he too

had experienced revolutionary excitement in the Republic's
early days.
change;

But he painted out that emotion never hastened

only reason did. 181

The KPD was too emotional and

too eager for violence to suit Lowenstein's tastes.
Why did Lowenstein join the USPD, rather than the
larger and more powerful SPD?

He rejected the SPD because

of its collaboration with the Center Party.
Church had its own gospel;
anathema to Lowenstein.

its religious message was

Political compromise with the

Center made the socialists'
impossible,

task of consciousness-raising

he t h o u g h t . W h e n

13Weber,

The Catholic

the USPD and SPD reunited

"Politics as a Vocation", p. 127.

14Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 140.
1=lIbid.
'1<’FES 3.3.1., 1, "Koalitions- und Ku 1turpo 1i ti k " ,
Frei hei t . June 1, 1920.
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in 1922, about two-thirds of the Independents joined the
Communists, while the other third,
joined the SPD.

including Lowenstein,

He never ceased, however, criticizing the

S P D 's collaboration with the Center.

Why was he so ada

mantly opposed to the established churches?
LOWENSTEIN AND THE ESTABLISHED CHURCHES
While liberals had insisted on the supremacy of state
authority,

both the DDP and the DVP allowed the churches a

public role in the life of the nation.17
socialists opposed this;

The majority of

party programs insisted on the

complete exclusion of the churches from the public sphere.
The Eisenach Program

(1869) had called for "separation of

church and state and separation of education from the
church";10

the Erfurt Program (1891) demanded the

"secularization of the school";19

the Gbrlitz Program

(1921) repeated the old formula "separation of church and
state"; ® :>

and finally,

the Heidelberg Program (1925)

insisted on "separation of church and state, separation of
school and church".

l7Treue, PP . 120, 127.
iBIbid. , P- 60.
^Ibid.

,

P- 77.

=<:’Ibid . , P- 105.
Ibid . , P ■ 109.
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Lowenstein took these platforms seriously.

He criti

cized both the Catholic and the Evangelical churches;

he

viewed the Catholic Church, however, as the greater threat
because of its excellent organization and the pivotal posi
tion of its political representative,

the Center P a r t y . ^

Both churches were nevertheless suspect because of their
long collaboration with the old caste-ridden, capitalist,
authoritarian state. 121

As Lowenstein put it:

Throne and altar were bound closely with one another.
One cannot therefore precisely distinguish who was the
maidservant and who the master in the reciprocity of
the relationship.
The churches posed as guardians of morality and gate
keepers to a spiritual
political:

life;

in fact their real goal was

to recapture the power they had enjoyed in the

old authoritarian state.

Lowenstein found the churches

more despicable than monarchists because the latter were at
least honest about their goals.

The churches'

leadership

pretended to be moral and above politics, when in fact,

'““'FES 3.3.2., 6, 178, "Klerikalismus, Sozial reaktion
und Reichsschulgesetz **, Per K1 assenkampf. October 1, 1927,
pp. 12-13.
=3FES 3.3.1.,
January 12, 1921.

1, “Die Kulturreaktion", F reihei t .

^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 142.
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they were merely hypocrites intent on playing, and winning,
the game of power pol itics.==L
The churches preached the virtue of obedience, but this
was true only in an authoritarian state;

attitudes of sub

servient obedience would handicap citizens in a democratic
state.

The promises of equality contained in the nation's

constitution could only be realized when the power of those
who supported the hierarchical class society was broken.*4’
The established churches had compromised any true spiritu
ality they may have ever possessed by serving the authori
tarian state.
Lowenstein felt that the dishonesty of the churches
betrayed people who remained loyal to the established
churches only because they believed the churches were truly
religious and moral, as the churches claimed.*7

Lowenstein

labored to free people from the yoke of illusions which he
believed the churches deliberately fostered in order to
serve their own political ends.

The new democratic

republic could only thrive if the powers of the old auth
oritarian state were broken.

The established churches were

““3.3.2., 6, 178, "Kleri ka 1ismus , Sozial reaktion und
Reichsschulgesetz", Per Klassenkampf. 1, October 1, 1927,
pp. 12-13 and GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2
B d . XXV, p. 241, USPD speech in the Prussian Landtag,
January 26, 1922.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 37.
^ K u r t Lowenstein, Die weltliche Schule (Bochum:
Graf, 1924), pp. 9, 17.
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inextricably entwined with the old order, an order that was
inimical to the modern secular democratic state, the state
Lowenstein believed to be in accordance with dialectical
historical development.28
Such mistrust of both established churches was wide
spread among socialists.
the churches'

The mistrust was mostly due to

role in supporting the state during the World

War29 and their support of the old ruling classes.30
Pollsters reported that workers’ perceptions of the
Evangelical Church were slightly more negative— the
Catholic Church seemed to be more willing to help the
needy.31

In any case, did condemnation of the behavior of

the churches mean a rejection of religion in general?
SOCIALIST ATTITUDES TD RELIGION
It is necessary to consider party programs again, in
order to determine the official position of the SPD on

301bid., p p . 4 - B .
^ " D i e religiose Wahlperiode.
Zum Wahlaufruf des
Deutschnationalen", Vorwarts. November 6, 1924;
"Bemerkungen iiber das Verhaltnis des Sozialismus zur Religion"
Sozialistische Monatshefte. February 20, 1922;
GStA
(Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1 B d . VIII, pp. 3335, Landtag session of June 20, 191B.
5°"Fur die weltliche Schule", Vorwarts. September 25,
1919, and "Kirche und gese11 schaf11iche Neugesta1tung",
Sozialistische Monatshefte (June 14, 1926):
390-395.
31 "Der Sozialistische Arbeiter und die Religion.
Das
Ergebnis einer Rundfrage in Gro(3-Ber 1in" , Vorwarts. May 1,
1924.
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religion.

The programs at Gotha and Erfurt stated that

"religion is a private matter."3®
elaborated:

The Gorlitz Program

"religion is a private matter, of inner

conviction, not a party or state matter."33

Although the

Heidelberg Program called for a secular school,
silent on religion.

it remained

A wide range of opinion existed in the

socialist movement on the validity and usefulness of reli
gion in the modern world.

Socialists disagreed on whether

religion was necessary for maintenance of public morality.
The issue had arisen even before the end of the war.
On March 14, 1916, the National Liberals in the Prussian
House of Deputies introduced a bill that would have
abolished compulsory religious instruction in the schools.
The intention was to free the children of dissidents, those
who had left the established churches,
Dissidents were dying in the war too,

from compulsion.34
liberals asserted,

and they should have the right to abstain from religious
instruction.33

The proposal opened a debate that lasted

until May 1917, when the bill was finally defeated.

3=Treue,

pp. 67, 76.

331bid . , p. 105.
34GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 37, B d .
VII, p. 107, unidentified newspaper clipping of November
30, 1916, "Zur Dissidentenfrage".
3=iIbid., p. 118, "Die Dissidenten frage" , Ber liner
Moroenpost. January 28, 1917.
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The debate centered around whether a substitute moral
instruction class, in place of confessional
struction, should be required.

religious in

Many socialists opposed the

idea— they argued that children did not learn morality from
books or in special classes.
by watching their elders.

Rather,

they learned morality

Since the capitalist system

forced adults to act immorally, only implementation of a
socialist economy and society could result in a truly moral
society.

Furthermore, since all education built on

morality, no separate classes were necessary.*'*
Lowenstein agreed that morality was not learned in
abstract lessons.

Neither a substitute non-confessional

morality course nor confessional religious instruction
could produce moral citizens.

He wrote,

Religion could not now, nor did it in earlier times,
protect us from moral disinteg ration. . . . The
religious lesson is a very poor means of achieving
morality.3"7.
He went even further, however.
useless in forming a moral sense;

Not only was religion
it actually could

inhibit development of moral character.

The teaching of

Christianity encouraged immorality, Lowenstein believed,

^"Unterricht in Sittlicher Lebenskunde", Vorwarts.
September 4, 1920 and "Sittl1ichkeitsfragen und Lehrer—
innenzolibat" September 24, 1920;
GStA (Merseburg) Rep.
1£9D xf A 1 , B d . 2, 29. November 1919, Hoffmann in Prussian
Land tag.

^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 154.
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because it bred hypocrisy and a cavalier attitude towards
reality.

The Christian focussed too much on the afterlife,

which led to an indifference and passivity towards this
life.38

In his belief that religion fostered illusion and

tried to make one ignore exploitation and abuse Lowenstein
echoed Marx, whose most famous sayings is that religion
"is the opium of the people."39

Marx expounded on this

theme:
The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of
men, is a demand for their real happiness.
The call to
abandon their illusions about their condition is a call
to abandon a condition which requires i 11 usions.*'1'
Lowenstein found Marxism attractive because he believed
it was scientific.

Much of Christian teaching flatly con

tradicted commonly accepted scientific axioms.

Lowenstein

thought that "it is easy to prove that numerous religious
assertions are scientifically impossible and historically
false."41

He added that we must "recognize our supersti

tions and subject them to scholarly explanation".42

^ F E S , 3.3.2., 6, 162, "Weltlicher Oder religoser sozialismus? Vortragsabend des sozialistischen Jugendar—
tells", Schleswio-Holsteinische VoIkszeituno. April 25,
1927.
39Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right: Introduction", p. 54.
'4,:,Ibid.

41Lowenstein, Das Kind. p. 10.
*=Ibid., p. 152.
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Many socialists agreed with Lowenstein.

In the dawning

age of aviation, children could see that the story of
Jesus' ascension to heaven was a patent impossibility.*3
Teaching children to believe something that was so ob
viously untrue could only result in a distorted attitude
toward objective reality.

Old religious forms were dead;

repeating them was hypocritica1.

"Ten Commandments"

Hoffmann added that since adults no longer believed in
religion,

it should not be forced on children.**

Socialists were not the only ones to criticize reli
gion.

Max Weber believed that rationalization was the mark

of the modern age.
world.

This meant the disenchantment of the

Many people could not bear the loss of religion.

But in adhering to faith,

they sacrificed reason.*5

Lowenstein agreed with many of Weber's arguments,

but did

not think that abandoning religion necessarily had to lead
to disenchantment:
Life, history, nature offers the eyes and the heart an
unending abundance of possibilities and opportunities.
We should absolutely not shrink from these occasions.
Elevation and sacredness are not special privileges of
the churches, on the contrary.***

*3GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 37 B d .
VII, pp. B-9, letter to the Prussian House of Deputies, May
21, 1914.
**"Fur die weltliche Schule", Vorwar ts . September 27,
1920.
*5Weber,

"Science as a Vocation",

**Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 15B.

pp. 139, 155.
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Sigmund Freud also believed in the march of science and
rationalism, although he did not believe that this was
necessarily progress.

Religion, he wrote,

arisen from a sense of helplessness.47

had originally

As humans learned

more about the environment and how to control it, the less
they needed religion.
tale.

Religion, Freud thought, was a fairy

And contrary to what its supporters thought,

not a necessary f i c t i o n . F r e u d

it was

believed that retaining

religious illusion was more dangerous than giving it up,
quite simply because religious instruction impeded the
development of reason.
Because religion did not promote morality, and even
inhibited development of a moral sense, and because
religion was irrational, Lowenstein rejected the arguments
that insisted on its necessity.

Religion only posed an

obstacle in the task of educating the new generation of
German youth.

The school of the "developing society",

Lowenstein insisted, could only be the secular school.
SOCIALISM AND THE SECULAR SCHOOL
Lowenstein argued that "the state is a secular power,
therefore the separation of church and state is necessary;

^Si g m u n d Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans.
James Strachey (New York and London:
W.W, Norton and
Company, 1961;
original German 1927), p. 23.

^ I bid., p. 36.
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the state school must be a secular school,

He defined

a secular school as one that offered absolutely no reli
gious instruction nor any references to Sod in the form of
school prayers, songs, reading material, or holiday cele
brations .
Many socialists debated the definition of the secular
school.

Could it be considered a Weltanschauung school, as

its critics charged?915

If so, secular schools were special

schools, no different from a Moslem school,

for example.

Lowenstein strongly rejected the notion of the secular
school as a Weitanschauung school — the secular school was
meant for all youth, not only those holding a particular
ou 11o o k .
Lowenstein believed that the secular school was the
school of the proletariat.

But this did not make it a

special-interest or Weitanschauung school.

Rather,

it was

the true community school,951 the school type favored by the
constitution;

mast contemporaries considered the term

“community school" to refer to the liberals'
inter-confessional school.

ideal of an

Lowenstein insisted that the

proletariat was the core of the "developing society" or the

49Lijwenstein, Das Kind, pp. 142-143.
^ ’GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXV, pp. 65-70, pamphlet by the Bishop of Paderborn.
W1 "Sozia1demokratischer Kulturtag", Vorwarts. March
25, 1921.

so
community.

As such,

the interests of this class were the

interests of the whole future society.==
Lowenstein disagreed that the German "soul" was funda
mentally religious;

on the contrary,

it was secular, and

so the community school should be secular too. ”

He wrote,

Secularization seems to many as only a negative
attitude to church and religion, but secularization has
a greater positive content;
it provides the new inner
structure for the developing society.5"
Opponents claimed that a school of the proletariat was
none other than a party school— a socialist party school.85
In these schools, a religious in terpretation of history was
replaced by the socialists'

economic interpretation.

The

socialist secular school was no less dogmatic than any of
the traditional denominational schools— the secular school,
was inr fact, a confessional school.514*

Lowenstein hotly

denied the comparison:
Christian education can only be binding for the circle
of believers who belong to the religious community. . .
Therefore, Christian education can never become a
'“ GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. IB-I Nr. 60 B d .
Ill, p. 18 and "Bundestag der weltlichen.
Die Freien
Gesellschaften versammeln sich", Vorwarts. May 27, 1931.
53"Gemeinschaftschule in gefahr!", Vorwarts. March 13,
1923.
^Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 159.
ss"Burgerliche Kampf gegen die weltliche Schule.
Ein
Stadtverordnetenbesuch fordert mehr Erwerblosenfursorge",
Vorwarts. October 27, 1922.
“^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXV, p. BO, "Die Parteien sind in Stellung", Die Schulfrage. an Evangelical newspaper, November 30, 1921.
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general demand in our time*
socialist education alone
can lay claim to this right.
Defenders of the secular school insisted that their schools
were not political;

in class, socialism was never

mentioned— since the evolutionary path to socialism was
inevitable it was not necessary to drum it into students.”
The constitution of 1919 gave parents the right to
choose their children's school.

Lowenstein saw his task,

and his party's, as one of consciousness-raising.
wrote,

He

"We who have confidence, we who have the firm belief

in the necessity of socialism, we should press on with the
work of enlightenment."

Enlightenment meant educating

parents on the necessity of choosing the secular school as
the appropriate school

for workers.

Like many members of the socialist movement, Lowenstein
began the decade with high hopes;

as the 1920s wore on,

however, his articles began to express an increasing mood
of exasperation.

Parents were not responding to his

appea1s .
Lowenstein insisted that children were not the property
of their parents;

parents could not do exactly as they

chose with their offspring.

The needs of the whole society

overrode the wishes of individual parents.

Lowenstein

97Lowenstein, Das Kind, p. 46.
90"Sozia 1demokratischer Kulturtag", Vorwarts. March
25, 1921.

82
pointed to the restriction of child labor in factories and
mandatory inoculation as examples of how the needs of
society and state took precedence.aw
Many socialists viewed the patriarchal family as a
conservative institution that inhibited change.

Since many

parents tried to use education to advance the interests of
their own children,

the state, as the representative of the

whole society's interests, should have the final say in
educational matters.*'5

Lowenstein disliked the educa

tional clauses of the Weimar Constitution that gave parents
choice of school types.
The constitution had provided for the creation of demo
cratically elected parents' councils to aid the work of the
schools.
ment,

Originally intended to promote parental involve

these councils soon became weapons in partisan

strife.

Indeed, many came to be dominated by reactionary

and religious groups.

Socialists were outraged when

Catholics and Protestants united forces and captured
control of many of the parents' councils,61

They felt that

this was a blatant misuse of an institution meant to

^Lowenstein,

Das Kind, pp. 18, 20.

^■’"Die Neuordnung der Volksschullehrerbildung in
Preuf3en", Sozialistische Monatshefte (September 7, 1925):
548-552.
'“ "Ein neues Ku1turinstrument. Die Bedeutung der
Elternbeiratswahlen", Vorwarts. May 27, 1922 and "Schul—
kampf und E 1ternbeiratswah1", June IB, 1924.
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promote

democratization.

rouse w D r k i n g - c l a s s
education.
more

to

They

promote

proletariat

parents

hoped

that

interest

could

Socialist

capture

from
the

educators

their
party

apathy

tried

to

to p u b l i c

leadership Mould

in e d u c a t i o n a l

issues

so

do

th e

t h e s e c o u n c i l s .62

The leadership of the SPD, however, did not offer much
help;

it could not exert the necessary leadership because

it was worried about maintaining good relations with the
Center.

Lowenstein and others were free to express their

positions on these issues, but the party would not take an
active role in promoting the secularization of education.
While both Catholics and Protestants actively pursued the
goals of protecting religion,

the family, and the confes

sional segregation of education, the socialists were
hampered by lack of organization and their inability to
offer workable alternatives.

As a result,

the school

system remained confessiona11y divided and retained
religious instruction.
Lowenstein insisted that the promotion of the interests
of the proletariat was not the promotion of special inter
ests.

He tried to support his contention by identifying

the interests of the proletariat with those of the future
society.

But Lowenstein could not convince those who did

42"Unsere Elternbeirate", Vorwarts. September 22,
1922;
"El tern, merk es euch!", Hay 31, 1924;
and "Von
christ1ich-unpo1itischer Kampfesweise", June 20, 1924.
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not accept the premises of his arguments.

To them,

Marxist ideology was no more scientific than the Bible.
Socialist ideology offered a substitute religion for some
whose Christian faith was shaken by the war.
Although Lowenstein was not oblivious to the reality
around him, his insistence on interpreting everything with
reference to the "developing society" made it impossible
for him to judge the present accurately.

Lowenstein's

influence on Prussian education was limited by his inabi
lity to deal with the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in
his new faith, problems the party leadership also chose to
ignore.

CHAPTER FIVE
THE INTEGRATION OF EDUCATION:
THE REFORM IDEAS OF PAUL OESTREICH
The issue of integration excited less debate than did
the problem of secularization of the schools.

Neverthe

less, a discussion of socialist attitudes to educational
reform would be incomplete without considering the S P D '5
position on integration.
Paul Oestreich vehemently objected to occupational
specialization of the post-elementary schools.

He believed

that such segregation was inherently unfair to the working
class.

Furthermore, he maintained that the talents of each

individual were better cultivated when all children were
educated together.

Not only the working class,

but the

whole community would benefit if education were integrated.
Like Lowenstein, Oestreich failed to secure the support
of the party's leadership.

In addition, although he penned

numerous pamphlets, books, and articles, Oestreich was
unable to communicate effectively with workers who were, on
the whole, simply indifferent to cultural issues.
A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Paul Hermann August Oestreich was born March 30, 1B78
in Kolberg,

the son of a carpenter.1

His education began

i0estreich's private papers are located in the Institut fur Padagogik at the Universitat Wurzburg.
Plans to
move these documents to the University Library were to be
carried out late summer 1994.
Basic biographical material
taken from Biooraphisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Reoublik.
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in the local

ValksschuJe;

Gymnasium in Kolberg.

Oestreich then attended the

This was quite unusual at the time—

Gymnasium students were primarily drawn from exclusive
private preparatory schools.

Volksschule students were

admitted only after passing a difficult entrance examina
tion, a test not required of private school students.
Young Paul felt isolated in the Gymnasium.

He lived in

a working-class neighborhood in which most children
attended other schools.
impression on him.

This early experience made a great

He later remarked that the humanistic

education he received seemed far removed from the practical
demands of daily life.=

He wondered if the exclusivity of

the Gymnasium really served to protect and promote Get—
many's, rich cultural heritage, as its defenders claimed;3,
from his personal experience,

he concluded that the real

purpose was to maintain the privileges of the elite and
perpetuate class segregation.

Oestreich's subsequent

attendance at the even more exclusive university,

first in

e d . Wolfgang Benz and Hermann Graml (Munich:
Verlag C.H.
Beck, 19BB), p. 242.
Another invaluable source on Oest
reich is Winifred Bohm, Kulturpolitik und Padagooik Paul
Qestreichs (Bad Hei1brunn\Obb: Verlag Julius Klinkhardt,
1973), pp. 48-60 for Oestreich's personal biography.
^Paul Oestreich, Menschenbildung. Ziele und Weoe der
entschiedenen Schulreform (Berlin:
Ernst Oldenburg Verlag,
1922), p. 194.
The abstract nature of modern education was
criticized by many reformers, including non-socialist
educators.

3Ringer, p. 78.
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Berlin,

then Greifswald, only intensified his feelings of

isolation and estrangement.

The problem of class segrega

tion continued to agitate Oestreich throughout his life.
In 1900, Oestreich passed the state examination for
Gymnasium teachers, the pro facuJtate docendi, in the
fields of math, chemistry, physics, and mineralogy.
Although he chose the practical and modern field of
science, as a member of the educated class he received a
thorough grounding in the classics and humanities.

After

serving as a student teacher for two years, he obtained a
position in an exclusive boarding school in Ilfeld.

This

experience only intensified his feelings of class exclu
sion.

He taught briefly in Barmen until 1905 and then

obtained a position in a Berlin Gymnasium, where he taught
until 1933.*
During the World War, Oestreich remained on the home
front.

Soldiers and civilians alike were deeply affected

by the catastrophe,
reorientation;

leading many of them to a political

the war proved to be the catalyst that

turned Oestreich from liberalism to socialism.

Unlike

Lowenstein however, Oestreich chose to join the Social
Democrats, rather than the Independents.

He remained true

to the socialist movement for the rest of his life.

'‘Bohrn, pp. 62-63.

8B
Early in 1933 Oestreich joined Thomas Mann and Kathe
Kollwitz in signing a petition asking, in vain, for the SPD
and KPD to unite to fight the rise of Hitler.®

Soon after

the Nazis came to power, Oestreich was arrested and impris
oned.

An old colleague with connections to the national

ists managed to secure his release.

For the remainder of

the Nazi period, Oestreich was free, but barred from
teaching and publishing.

He nevertheless continued to

develop his school reform theories, in anticipation of the
end of the Thousand Year Reich.

Oestreich was determined

that if the socialists ever held power again, the mistakes
of the vacillating SPD in 1918-19 would not be repeated.
In April 1946 Oestreich j'oined the Socialist Unity
Party, a combination of the old KPD and S P D .** He finally
saw his cherished ideal of a comprehensive school system
implemented by the Soviet dominated East German government.
What the Weimar Social Democrats had been unwilling to
implement by fiat in 1918-19 and unable to obtain later by
compromise was now a reality.
Commitment to socialist ideals prompted Oestreich's
activities in the 1920s.

His understanding of Marxist

ideology affected his relationship with the SPD and shaped
his educational reform plans.
issues is in order.
“Ibid., pp. 153-176.
bid., p . 158.

A consideration of these

B9
OESTREICH AND THE SOCIALIST MOVEMENT
Before the war, Oestreich had been associated with the
liberal, Friedrich Naumann, who in 1919 helped establish
the Democratic Party.^

Oestreich declined to join the DDP,

opting instead for the Social Democrats.
defense of capitalism alienated Oestreich;

The liberals'
he had come to

believe that capitalist competition was a major cause of
the World War.

As a militant pacificist, Oestreich

embraced Marxism because he thought a socialist system
would better serve the preservation of peace.®
Marxism also attracted Oestreich because he thought
socialism could restore meaning to human life by restoring
meaning to work.

Unlike Lowenstein, who was attracted to

M a r x ’s criticism of religion, Oestreich was especially
drawn to Marx's description of man as the producing animal.
According to Marx, humans are distinguished from animals in
that humans "produce their means of subsistence.

. . ." **

7For more on Naumann, see Peter Theiner, Sozialer
Liberalismus und deutsche Weltpolitik;
Friedrich Naumann
im W i 1helminischen Deutschland (1B60-1919) (Baden-Baden:
Nomos V e r 1agsgesel1schaft, 1983).
Also see Frye, pp. 1315; Jones, pp. 8-10.
Naumann died shortly thereafter.
Many observers lamented his loss, speculating that the DDP
was crippled from the start by the deaths of some of its
key leaders, among them Naumann and Max Weber.
BBohm, p. 89.
After World War II, Oestreich disliked
the West German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, because of his
rearmament policies.
’Marx, "The German Ideology", p. 150.
Marx often
stressed certain words and phrases— all italics appear in
the origina1.
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Marx wrote that "as individuals expressed their life, so
they are.

What they are, therefore, coincides with their

production, both with what they produce and with how they
produce . " 1 0
According to Marx, capitalist economy subverted the
natural order of things by emphasizing the consumption of
products rather than the process of production.

Worse yet,

however, capitalism depended on the exploitation of the
worker's labor power.

Since human essence lies in

productivity, capitalism dehumanized workers by robbing
them of the very activity that separated them from the rest
of the animal kingdom, the very activity that made them
human.

Capitalism,

in short, was both inhuman and

unnatural.
Unlike supporters

Df

capitalism, Oestreich was

interested in work as a process, as an end in itself, not
as a means to the goal of making money.
materialism of capitalism,
the spirit:

Protesting the

he believed in the primacy of

"The spirit should form the material, the idea

should penetrate the daily!"ii

Elaborating on the theme of

anti-materialism, Oestreich claimed that machines now ruled

i0Ibid.
A contrast to Feuerbach's materialism:
"One
is what one eats."
("Man ist, was man iftt.")
Marx might
be paraphrased thus:
"One is what one does."
11Paul Oestreich, Aus dem Leben eine Politischen
Padagnqen. Selbstbiographie (Berlin:
Volk und Wissen
Verlags Gmbh, n.d.), p. 7.
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man, not man the machines.12

We need to stop and ask

ourselves why we are producing more and more, Oestreich
insisted.

The process of work shaped humanity— that was

the true value of work, not the material goods produced.13
The capitalist system devalued humanity by worshipping
commodities, something the Hungarian Georg Luk£cs called
reification . x*
Oestreich's concern with work as a process (as opposed
to the usual concern with wages and hours) was not unusual
among socialist intellectuals.

The monthly party journal

Sozialistische Monatshefte was a forum for socialists like
Lowenstein and Oestreich who were concerned with cultural
problems.

Fritz Karsen, a socialist school reformer noted

for his involvement in pilot schools, equated the process
of work with the process of self-realization.

When work

became meaningless, as it did in industrial capitalism,
life became meaningless.1®

Martin Weise, a colleague of

1=Right-wing reactionaries also had mixed feelings
about technology.
See Geoffrey Herf, Reactionary Modern
ism.
Technology. Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the
Third Reich (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984).
13Paul Oestreich, Die Produktionsschu1e als Nothaus
und Neubau:
Elastische Einheits-. Lebens-. Berufs-. und
Volkskulturschule (Berlin:
C.A. Schwetschke und So h n ,
1924), pp. 223-235.
1'ftKol akowski, pp. 275-276.
1BIngrid Neuner, Der Bund entschiedener Schu1reformer
1919-1933.
Proqrammatik und Realisation (Bad HeilbrunnS
Obb:
Verlag Julius Klinkhardt, 1980), pp. 165-166.
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Oestreich's, concurred— work brought about the process of
self-transformation.

In other words, one attained humanity

through work.w
A socialist school reformer active in the state of
Thuringia, Anna Siemsen, protested against the German
tendency to over— emphasize work and occupation.

The

English, she wrote, knew how to balance their lives between
work and leisure.
them.17

The Germans could learn something from

For their part, foreign observers admired German

vocational training for its efficiency.1®
Oestreich rejected liberalism because its support of
capitalism made it too materialistic.
SPD, however,

Why did he join the

rather than the USPD or KPD?

Like Lowenstein

^M a r t i n Weise, Paul Oestreich und die Entschiedene
Schulreform (Leipzig:
Kurr'sche Buchhand1u n g , 1928).
17Anna Siemsen, "Schu1prob1erne in England und bei
uns", Sozialistische Monatshefte (November 9, 1925):
693-697.
For a completely different view of the English see
Oswald Spengler, Preussentum und Sozialismus (Munich:
C.H.
Beck'sche Ver1agsbuchhand1u n g , 1924;
manuscript written
late 1919).
Spengler detested the English view of work.
The English, he wrote, viewed work only as a means to money
and status, whereas the German, and specifically the Prus
sian, saw work as an end in itself.
Spengler did not like
capitalism, but he did not like Marxism either.
He thought
that Marx had spent too much time in England.
ieGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1 B d .
IX, pp. 241-242, Liverpool Ec h o . April 24, 1928, "The Key
to Success", manuscript draft sent to the Education Mini
stry from the author, Mr. F.B. Brown, chairman of the
Liverpool Education Committee.
He had been a delegate to
the first International Education Conference held in
Berlin.
He waxed ecstatic about the wonders of German
vocational training.
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and many other socialists, Oestreich abhorred the Commu
nists because he believed them to be violent revolution
aries.

As a passionate pacifist, Oestreich Mould not

consider revolution a viable option;

revolution destroyed

more than it built, he t h o u g h t . O e s t r e i c h also opposed
the Communists'

position that social and economic changes

had to precede educational reform.®5
Oestreich rejected the Independents because he thought
the USPD did not give the need for school reform sufficient
emphasis.

The SPD proved to be disappointing in this

regard as well, and although Oestreich remained in the
party, his attitude to parliamentary politics and political
parties was generally hostile.
Preferring to maintain his freedom from party dicta
tion, Oestreich established an independent organization,
the Alliance of Decided School Reformers (Bund entschied&ne
Schulrefarmer or BESCH) in October 1919.
remained independent of SPD control,
socialists;

Although BESCH

it consisted mostly of

Adolf Grimme, although a Democrat at this

time, was an exception.

Oestreich defined the organiza

tion's relationship to political parties:
[BESCH] is not party political, but its individual
members are members of parties;
only they cannot

i,?Bdhm, p. 237.
®*’Paul Oestreich, Unabhangige Ku 1 tur d o 1 iti k . Vom
oraden UJea eines "Disz i p 1in 1osen " . Gesammelte Aufsatze
(Leipzig: Ernst Oldenburg Verlag, 1924), pp. 9-12.
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become a tool of a party, can never see in a party
anything other than an instrument.sx
Consonant with its founder's beliefs, BESCH affirmed
its commitment to the democratic republic, promoted social
change, and denied violent revolution as a valid means to
these ends.

Instead, the Decided School Reformers believed

change would result peacefully,

through the gentle art of

persuasion, an "intellectual revolution".

In the early

years BESCH members often accepted official administrative
positions, so they could exert influence on the system from
within.

But Oestreich began to disapprove of this tactic,

writing that,
Whoever believes that individuals in secure positions
can take decisive and energetic action against economic
and political powers is in error.
We need, I say it
again and again, scorn for the petty and personal daily
advantages. . . .==:
Many members were angered by Oestreich's dictatorial
behavior and left BESCH.
Oestreich's outspoken criticism of the SPD angered many
party comrades.

Like Ldwenstein, Oestreich protested vehe

mently against SPD participation in coalition governents.

2iPaul Oestreich, "Mitten im Kam p f [", Die Neue
Erziehuna (January, 1921):
8-10.
“ Ibid .
=3Paul Oestreich, "Der Minister und der entschiedene
schulreformer", Die Neue Erziehuna (October 1919): 721-726;
"Neuland oder versumpfung?" (January 1922):
1-6;
and
"Rettet das Zentrum" (April 1925):
235-241.
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Oestreich's attitude to the party, however, was more
sharply critical than Lowenstein's because Oestreich
objected not only to caalitian politics, but to party
politics.

How did Oestreich conceive of politics then?

And how did he link the realms of politics and the cultural
life of the nation?
KULTURPOLITIK AND MODERNITY
The term "culture" is used here to mean the traditional
culture of the educated class in Germany.

Fears of cul

tural decline began around 1B90, when the effects of indus
trialization first began to be felt in Germany.

After the

war, complaints became increasingly strident.M
Oestreich shared these concerns.

He too felt that

Germany's culture was endangered, but his solution was
radically opposed to the prescriptions of the conservative
"mandarins".

While the latter group wanted to protect

culture by maintaining its exclusivity, Oestreich thought
culture could be invigorated only by broadening access to
it, permitting the participation of the whole nation,
irrespective of socio-economic position.

The recovery of

the nation would accompany the rejuvenation of its culture.
But what does the second part of the word,
mean?

"politik"

Oestreich contrasted cultural politics to party

politics.

Party politicians,

he insisted,

^Ringer, pp. 1-3, 253-256.

represented
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special interest groups.

A Kulturpolitiker, however,

represented the interests of the whole nation.

(Compare to

Lowenstein's insistence that representing the interests of
the workers should not be considered as a special or class
interest, but a national interest.)

Furthermore, members

of the socialist movement would be the new guardians of
culture because only they understood that culture was the
concrete external expression of human productivity or
creativity.

For Oestreich,

to be a socialist was to be a

defender of culture and hence of the nation.
The socialist Education Minister, Konrad Haenisch,
advanced similar ideas.

He hoped to promote the image of

the SPD as the party of culture.

To do so, the Social

Democrats needed to demonstrate their goodwill to academics
by supporting state expenditure on books and journals
needed by scholars.

Rising costs had forced libraries to

discontinue subscriptions to scholarly journals.

German

scholarship would suffer when academics were isolated.

The

S P D 's support of their interests would win many academics
over to the socialist banner.

The party would then break

out of its role as representative of special interests and
truly be a people's party.
29Konrad Haenisch, Die Not der oeistiaen Arbeiter.
Ein Alarmruf (Leipzig:
Verlag von Dr. Werner Klinkhardt,
c. 1920).
Also, see Haenisch's book Kulturpolitische
Aufoaben (Berlin:
Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Staatsburgerliche und Wirtschaft1iche Bildung, 1919).
Haenisch first
expressed many of these ideas in the Prussian Assembly,
April 11, 1919.
See GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, Preufi.
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Although Haenisch and Oestreich agreed on the necessity
of protecting culture, Haenisch and many other socialists
branded Oestreich as a utopian dreamer.

This phrase echoed

Marx's derision of various eighteenth and nineteenth cen
tury socialists as U t o p i a n s . ^
writing that,

Oestreich defended himself,

"The creative, active human must have ideals

before he can create reality."327'
Oestreich's constant criticism of party politics was
not completely unfounded.

Although the political scene in

Prussia was not as tumultuous as on the national

level,

parliamentary politics nevertheless earned a bad reputa
tion, one not completely undeserved.

Oestreich's aversion

to party politics was shared by many during Weimar, all
along the political spectrum.

Thomas Mann's Reflections of

an Unpolitical M a n 720 is one instance of an expression of
distaste for politics.

Oswald Spengler joined in the

Landtag, x c , C 2 , Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der
Schule, Ldtg. B d . 1:
1919-27.
^ U n t i t l e d articles, Vorwarts. October 9, 17, and 18,
1919;
"Ku1turpolitik und Koalition", November 24, 1921.
Oestreich defended himself in his book, Es reut mich nichti
Schulpolitische Kampfe zwischen Revolution und Kapp Putsch.
Gesammelte Aufsatze. Leipzig:
Ernst Oldenburg Verlag,
1923.
The common argument throughout these essays is
Oestreich's insistence that his ideas were not impract
ical;
many could be easily implemented.
^ P a u l Oestreich, "Die Voraussetzung als Ziel", Die
Neue Erziehuna (November 1922):
347—350.
2GThomas Mann, Reflections of an Nonoolitical M a n .
trans. Walter D. Morris (New York:
Frederick Ungar, 1983).
The original German appeared in 1918.

98
attack an the new republic in his book of 1919, Preuflenturn
und gozialismus.

These criticisms are perhaps not so

surprising, since artists and intellectuals tend to pride
themselves on the "divine nature of the muses" and quite
often scorn such materialistic realms as politics and
finance.
But it is surprising to find that even some politicians
dissociated themselves from party politics.

Hans Luther,

Reich chancellor in 1925, entitled his memoirs Politician
without Party.30

Other educational reformers, such as Carl

Becker, who served as Prussian Minister of Education from
1925 to 1930, shared in the distaste for modern parlia
mentary political parties and refused to join a political
party *
Oestreich shared many of these attitudes.

When his

party comrades charged him with being too inflammatory,
Oestreich responded,
I want to be provocative, against imperfection, mental
laziness, satisfied affects, even in my own 'estate*
and party. . . . Criticism is the beginning [of
c hange].31
Oestreich saw his role as raising the consciousness of the

“’Gay and Laqueur both make these points.
■'•’Hans Luther, Politiker ohne Partei
Deutsche Ver1ags-flnsta1t , 1960).

(Stuttgart:

51Paul Oestreich, "Die Voraussetzung als Ziel", Die
Neue Erziehuna (November 1922):
347-350.
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voters and keeping school reform issues in the public eye,
even if this made some socialists uncomfortable.3=2
Many of his contemporaries agreed that culture was in
danger in the modern world.

Max Weber believed that

increasing specialization was part of the modern trend of
increasing rationalization.33

Oestreich believed that the

increasing specialization of the modern world posed the
greatest threat to culture.

His solution:

a broader type

of education, one not defined narrowly by occupation.
Critics on the right wing of the political spectrum could
agree with this solution.

What made Oestreich different?

He was different in that he insisted that all of the
nation's youth should share in this broader education.

He

was resuscitating Fichte's ideas following a last war a
century before.
Oestreich thought that educational reform would revive
culture;

cultural revival was synonomous with national

revival.

Germany would recover from the war and could then

make its unique contributions to humanity.
quite a world historical task to perform;

And Germany had
according to

Oestreich:
We have but one mission:
to conquer the earth for
humanity! . . . To banish hell from the world, the hell
of baseness through the heaven of joyful pain!
To
outlaw the use of force!
To make love manly and
’“ Paul Oestreich, "Parteidienst oder Bundesarbeit",
Neue Erziehuna (1924):
66-69.
“ Weber,

"Science as a Vocation", p. 135.

100
aggressive1
. We have a mission and an adventure without
end, a trip of discovery into the infinite!3*
Oestreich insisted that divisions in the nation's
school system only served to divide its people and hindered
performance of its national task.

Furthermore, education

for a specific occupation was unjust in that it led to
inequality.

While a favored minority received an education

which led to satisfying careers free from exploitation
(professional jobs),

the education of the masses ensured

that they would continue in pool— paying,

low-status jobs

that offered scant opportunity for personal growth.

Segre

gated education only served to maintain the positions of
the middle and upper classes.

An integrated school system,

Oestreich believed, would serve the whole nation, not
particular class interests.3*

Just what did Oestreich mean

by the integration of education?
THE INTEGRATION DF EDUCATION
Before 1919, it was possible for a child from a wealthy
family to attend school without having ever had a class
with children of working-class parents.

The Weimar Consti

tution changed this by providing that the first four years

^ P a u l Oestreich, "Wir sind Deutsche!", Die Neue
Erziehuna (June 1922):
161-163.
Such poetic language was
not unusual in Oestreich's articles and books.
3*Ibid. and Die Produktionsschu1e . pp. 236-241.
Oestreich differed from right-wing nationalists who desired
regeneration so Germany could avenge itself on the West.
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of schooling would be common for all children.

Beginning

with grade five, however, students were still separated,
ostensibly according to inclination and ability,
ferent tracks.

Because the child was only nine years of

age, the decision was made by parents,
teachers.

into dif

in consultation with

Many socialist educators believed that the

division of students should begin at a later age.

This

would allow a more accurate assessment of the child's
abilities, as well as permitting a greater decision-making
role for the student.3*
Although the constitution forbade the parents'

socio

economic or religious affiliation from determining which
track was pursued, Oestreich insisted that only an inte
grated system of elementary, middle, and high schools could
assure the realization of these constitutional provisions.
He proposed a system similar to that of the United States,
in which all students attended a free common school
throughout their education.
People differed, Oestreich acknowledged, but their
differences should not result in inequality.37
view, talents were not natural,
contact with the environment.
John Locke's

In his

but developed through
Oestreich could point to

tabula rasa for support.

Closer to his own

“ "Gedanken zur Einheitsschule", Sozialistische
Monatshef te (May 1919):
448-455.
37Paul Oestreich, Aus dem Leben. pp. 40-58.
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field,

the educators Maria Montessori and John Dewey both

advanced similar ideas.3®

Oestreich thought that any

intelligence or talent that one might exhibit were the
result of an environment that had cultivated those talents.
Since environment was the key factor, Oestreich believed
that the only way to ensure equal opportunity for all youth
was to give them the same advantages early in life.
In order to ensure that all youth shared roughly the
same environment, Oestreich insisted that kindergarten must
be mandatory for all children,

rich and poor.3,1

The first

kindergarten, a German invention as the word implies, was
opened in

1837 by the educational reformer

Froebel.

Its purpose was not intellectual development,

socialization of the child. ^

Friedrich
but

Oestreich adopted these

ideas— he

thought attendance by all the nation's totswould

lower the

barriers between rich and poor.

?sMaria Montessori, Spontaneous Activity in Education
(New York:
Schocken Books, 1965), p. 160.
Montessori said
that the same environment produced different individuals
only because their inclinations, not their talents dif
fered .
John Dewey, Liberalism and Social ftction. The PageBarbour Lectures (New York:
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935).
Dewey believed that intelligence was not natural, but
shaped by society.
Hence, social planning was necessary.
Dewey was not a socialist, however, but a liberal reformer
of the activist, rather than laissez-faire variety.
3S,Bdhm, p. 262.
‘‘*°The reactionary Prussian government banned it as a
subversive institution in 1851;
the ban was lifted ten
years later and the popularity of the kindergarten began to
grow.
See Gutek, pp. 225-231.
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Basic elementary education would begin at age seven;
there would be a gradual transition from the play of
kindergarten to more disciplined w o r k .41

The middle level,

would gradually introduce students aged eleven to sixteen
to more advanced studies.

This level would also include

both manual and intellectual training, combining practical
and theoretical work.

Oestreich believed that an education

which combined both of these elements would result in a
more balanced,

harmonious individual.

The dangers of one

sided intel1ectualization of the traditional
would be avoided.

Gymnasium

He wrote,

We must struggle tirelessly against the inte11ectua1ism
of the old schools, in order to achieve full humanity,
which is attainable only through the training of all
aptitudes in the community.42
Criticism of traditional abstract book-learning was not
uniquely socialist.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau began the revolt

with his novel Emile;

the lead character learned more from

his experiences in life and from nature than he ever could
from a book.**

The German novelist Hermann Hesse included

similar characters in his stories.44

The Swiss educational

41"Ein Schulprogramm", Vorwarts. February 23, 1921.
4SPaul Oestreich,
Erziehuna (May 1921):
'43Gutek, p. 206;

"Ku1turerziehung", Die Neue
129-131.
Hayward, p. 25.

44Hermann Hesse, Tales of Student Lif e , e d . Theodore
Ziolkowski, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York:
Farrar, Straus
and Giroux, 1976).
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reformer Heinrich Pestalozzi expressed the same sentiments
and emphasized the importance of concrete sense experience
as opposed to abstract book learning.49

Later in the nine

teenth century, Julius Langbehn's best seller, Rembrandt as
Educator. expressed the belief that art education could
counteract the stultifying effects of too much booklearning.

While foreigners admired the German Gymnasium

for providing an excellent intellectual education, these
schools were criticized at the same time for ignoring
physical education."4"7

Finally, John Dewey criticized

abstract theoretical knowledge because of its distance from
life and growth.40

The constitution of 1919 had provided

that "Arbeitsunterricht" or "work instruction" would be as
the preferred method in education.
Socialist educators welcomed this provision.
schools had emphasized learning from books;
tion meant using one's hands as well.

4SGutek, p. 200;

The old

work instruc

A more well-rounded

Hayward, pp. 3B-40.

44*A 1bisetti , p. 151.
A-7Ibid. , pp. 37-43.
^ J D h n Dewey, Democracy and Education. An Introduction
to the Philosophy of Education (New York:
The Macmillan
Company, 1916).
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student with character would be the r e s u l t . O n

a more

practical note, implementation of "work instruction"
allowed students to produce some of the school's needs,
saving the hard-pressed state money. 8,5
Oestreich maintained that if work were to become
meaningful and joyful once again, it had to be self
initiated, a cardinal point in his thinking.
be no goal outside of the activity itself.

There could
Although

Oestreich drew these ideas from his understanding of
Marxist ideology, we again see that non-socialist educators
had been advancing the same principles for some time.
Froebel, of kindergarten fame, stressed the importance
of self-activity of the child;

the self-activity of a

child is play.

In this way, the child learned about the

environment.01

Montessori also recognized the importance

of play.

Her concern was how to channel the child's

spontaneity.

Spontaneity could be both encouraged yet

disciplined by controlling the environment.

Children did

^"Gedanken zur Einheitsschule", Sozialistische
Monatshef te (May 1919):
448-455; "Sozia1demokratische
Schulreform" (March 8, 1920):
194-196;
and "Der
Gemeinschaftsgedanke in der Neuen Schule" (October 19,
1923):
602-607.
®°G5tA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 Oil neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 61, B d .
II, pp 64-66, "Richtlinien zur Aufstellung von Lehrplanen
fur die oberen Jahrgange der Volksschule", 15. Oktober
1922.
For instance, book binding taught students a skill
as well as providing textbooks for the school.

01Gutek, pp. 225-231.
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not shun work, but would choose to do work spontaneously,
if it interested them, even when outsiders were unable to
see a purpose or goal in the activity,83

She added that

active intervention by adults did not produce a positive
result that did not already reside in the child's innate
spirit.“
Dealing with older students, Oestreich believed that
occupational segregation should occur only in the final
stage of education, when students ranged in ages from
sixteen to twenty.
practical,
scholarly.

Three tracks would be offered!

technica1-industrial, and intellectualIn all levels, including the final stage,

education would be completely free, supported by a
progressive income tax.54
"elastic integrated school"

Oestreich called his school an
(elastische Einheitsschule), a

school that he believed combined discipline with freedom,
unity with individuality.

It did so by offering a basic

core curriculum which provided a sound foundation common to

“ Maria Montessori, Childhood Education
Henry Regnery Col., 1949), p. 58.

(Chicago:

“ Montessori, Spontaneous Activity, p. 6.
®^"Die Schulgeldfrage", Vorwarts. February 12, 1921;
Paul Oestreich, "Fordert die Schu1steuer!", Neue Erziehuna
(1922):
211-214.
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all students, while also allowing students to choose a
certain number of electives.”
Oestreich criticized the traditional practice of
requiring the study of foreign languages.

In his ideal

school,
Ancient and modern languages are pursued precisely and
thoroughly if one needs them as a teacher, traveller,
interpreter, translator, etc.
For those specialties,
education can begin around age eighteen.
Basic educa
tion has nothing to do with learning foreign
languages. ”
He thought that Latin and Greek had been required in the
past only as a method of maintaining upper class exclu
sivity.

There was no compelling pedagogical reason,

however,

to retain mandatory study of these languages.”

Many non-SDcialists agreed.
social Darwinist,

Herbert Spencer,

the

thought dead languages did nothing to aid

one in the struggle for survival;
was more useful in modern society.”

study of the sciences
Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm

" P a u l Oestreich, Die elastische Einheitsschule;
Lebens- und Produktionsschule (Berlin:
C.A. Schwetschke
und Sohn, 1921).
This work is a 61 page pamphlet in which
Oestreich outlines his idea of the comprehensive school.
See also his article, "Die elastische Oberstufe", Neue
Erziehuna (1921):
287-292 and untitle article, Vorwarts.
June 20, 1920.
” Paul Oestreich, "Die Schu1reform", Die Neue
Erziehuna (1919):
659-661.
"Oestreich had a particular fondness for Esperanto;
other than this personal preference, he thought language
learning should be connected to utility.
Bdhm, p. 265.
***Gutek , p . 260 .
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also shared an aversion for the ancient languages.w
Montessori's position was most similar to Oestreich’s in
that she maintained that a child learned a language from
his or her environment.

Possession of language did not

signify special talent, only that one had been exposed to
it.*0
Many socialist pedagogues agreed that foreign language
study had been over-emphasized in the past.

Even those who

wanted to retain foreign language study suggested modifica
tions.

For example,

the elementary shools should offer

languages— this made good pedagogical sense and also served
to break the upper— class monopoly on the subject.*1

Anna

Siemsen believed that learning modern languages was just as
valuable as learning Latin or Greek— what one studied was
not as important as how one studied it.*=
If elementary, middle, and high schools were to be
integrated as Oestreich called for, then teacher training
needed to be integrated too.*3

Oestreich called for all

*^1 bid., p. 328.
“ Montessori, Childhood Education, pp. 81-88.
61"Prinzipielles zur Umwandlung der Berliner Realschulen", Sozialistisches Monatshefte (March 2, 1925):
151-155.
“ "Humanismus und Gegenwartsschule", Sozialistisches
Monatshefte (June 24, 1924):
381-386.
*3 "Studentenschaft und Hochschulreform", Vorwarts.
December 9, 1919.
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teachers to receive a general humanistic education in the
university, along with preparation for their intended
future position in either the lower or upper grades.

In

Oestreich, elementary teachers at long last found a
champion of their demands for equality with middle and high
school teachers.
Although many middle-class educational reformers may
have supported the integration of the different levels of
the school system, many Weimar politicians rejected these
ideas.

One Prussian Landtag deputy made a very revealing

comment about the German attitude towards education when he
said,

"The Volksschule is for life,

pare for scholarly studies.

the high schools pre

Therefore the transfer from

one to the other is hardly passible without d i f f i c u l t y . " ^
Notice that pursuit of scholarship was contrasted to life.
This was precisely the point that reformers made when they
criticized the high schools for being too abstract— they
were useless because they were unconnected with life.
Conservatives nevertheless insisted that the elementary
schools must not become preparatory schools for higher
education— scholarship would only suffer as a result.
Educators who supported segregation in the upper grades
insisted that different types of high schools were neces
sary in order to deal with the multiplicity of culture.

^ G S t A (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I Nr. 1, B d .
VIII, p. 12, Sitzung am 20. Januar 1917.
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Only different kinds of high school, with their unique
specialties, could prevent the overburdening of the student
in the modern age of information.

Without different high

school types, depth of knowledge would be sacrificed and
superficial knowledge would result.

The different types

should be co-ordinated but not abol ished.***

Different

school types did not necessarily imply inequality;

each of

the four main types was equal to the others. “
Opponents criticized Oestreich's idea for an elastic
comprehensive school because they thought the students were
offered too many choices;
freedom.

the student simply had too much

It would be passible to graduate without being

properly educated.

This kind of school would not integrate

education, but would rather fragment it, because when
students were left to choose,

they would all study

different subjects,67
Oestreich's own party comrades tended to agree with him
on the integration of the various types of high school.
As long as the high schools remained divided, however,

the

ASGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I, Nr. 1, B d .
VIII, pp. 349-379, Education Ministry pamphlet of 1924.
See also The Reorganization of Education in Prussia, trans.
I.L. Kandel and Thomas Alexander (New York:
Teachers Col
lege, Columbia University, 1927).
^GStA
A3, B d . 1:

(Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preullischer Landtag, xf,
1919-28, December 13, 1921 Landtag speech.

t7GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt. 1B-I, Nr. 1, B d .
VIII, pp. 349-379, Education Ministry pamphlet of 1924.
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question arose of whether proletarian children should
attend them.

The debate centered around what was known as

the "rise of the gifted".

One position held that if

workers'

children attended high schools in increasing

numbers,

integration would be achieved de facto.

Another

view was that by allowing gifted but poor children the
opportunity to rise, the whole class and the whole society
would benefit.

Others disputed this, saying that these

gifted children quickly adopted the mores of their new
environment and abandoned their poorer brethern,

further

impoverishing the working class, by robbing it of its
brightest members.60
The issue of how to determine which students were
talented also excited debate.

Critics of the traditional

system believed that tests which supposedly determined
intelligence were rigged to.favor the middle and upper
classes;

these tests only confirmed what the testers

wanted to find.

They only measured socio-economic

differences, not differences in inte11igence.^

The idea

of the "rise of the gifted" was a bourgeois idea, based on

“ "SozialdemDkratische Schulreform", Sozialistische
Monatshefte (March 8, 1920):
194-196.
^ " P s y c h o l o g i e " , S 0 2 i a 1istische Monatshefte (December
29, 1919):
1235-1239 and "Prinzipielles zur Umwandlung der
Berliner Realschulen" (March 2, 1925):
151-155.
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selfish individualism, which only divided the community.70
Oestreich's position was that "We want to replace ranking
through tests by . . .

estimation of personal indivi

duality in the service of the community."7,1

Who did the

estimating and on what basis was not specified.
Oestreich,

like Lowenstein,

insisted that he repre

sented the best interests of the nation,
itself,

indeed of humanity

rather than merely advancing the cause of a special

interest group.

Oestreich's ideas excited a certain amount

of debate among Social Democrats interested in educational
and cultural problems but made no discernible impact on the
Prussian school system.
Oestreich's ideas were intended to benefit blue-collar
workers.

This group, however, remained unresponsive.

Issues connected with education and culture seemed to have
little to do with their daily lives;

workers tended to

regard these problems with indifference.

Furthermore,

the

leadership of the SPD would not take an active part in
promoting Oestreich’s plans because to do so would only
antagonize the S P D 's relationship with the middle class.
It made no political sense to antagonize its coalition
partners for a cause that was not popular with its

7,’"Die Sozial istische Schule", Sozial istische Monats
hefte (September 29, 1919):
903-908 and "We 1taufgaben der
Erziehung" (May 17, 1920):
381-388.
71Paul Oestreich, "Stufung Oder G 1iederung", Die Neue
Erziehuno (August 1922):
243-245.

constituency and would not earn it any votes.

The

discussion of the integration of post—elementary school
remained largely restricted to socialist intellectuals.

CHAPTER SIX
ADOLF GRIMME AND SOCIALIST SCHOOL REFORM
Adolf Grimme joined the Social Democratic Party after a
brief membership in the DDP;

as a religious socialist, he

belonged to the right wing of his new party.

While Ldwen-

stein wanted to accelerate the modern trend of seculariza
tion and Oestreich aimed at retarding the modern trend of
specialization, Grimme focussed less on the present and the
future.

He was more interested in the past, in preserving

what was valuable in traditional culture.
Grimme reconciled the teachings of Jesus Christ with
those of Karl Marx.

Such a synthesis, he thought, pre

served religion, which was valuable, while eliminating
corruptions of the true faith.

Grimme was also interested

in promoting the welfare of the whole nation by promoting
the rise of talented individuals.

He believed that the

ideal of equality was compatible with a promotion of
talented individuals who could ably lead the community.
Education was the key to both the preservation of true
religion and the cultivation of ‘’personalities" who would
become the nation's leaders.
Grimme's position on religion and individualism led him
to arrive at interpretations of the party planks calling
for the secularization and integration of education very
different from those of Lowenstein and Oestreich.

Unlike

these reformers, Grimme enjoyed the party leadership's
114

115
support, which culminated in his appointment as Education
Minister in 1930.

His rise illustrates that the SPD was

truly a moderate party that offered few fresh or viable
approaches to the problem of reforming the schools.
A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY
Adolf Berthold Ludwig Grimme was born on December 31,
1889 in Goslar, son of a roya1 stationmaster.1

He attended

the local elementary school for the first four years,

then

enrolled in the Gymnasium in 1900, earning the Abitur in
1908.

From 190B to 1914, he studied in the universities in

Halle, Munich, and Gottingen.

After passing qualifying

examinations in philosophy, German studies, French, and
religion in 1914, he secured a position in a Gymnasium in
Leer, where he taught until 1919.
Under the new republic, Grimme transferred to a
Gymnasium in Hannover.

A year after joining the Social

Democratic Party, he began his career as an administrator
in the school system, serving first on Hannover's
provincial school board from 1923 to 1924 and then as

1Grimme's papers are to be found at the Geheimes
Staatsarchiv der Stiftung PreuRischer Kulturbesitz in
Ber1in-Dah1e m . Biographical information from Bioaraphisches Lexikon zur Weimarer Republik. e d . Wolfgang Benz and
Hermann Graml
(Munich:
Verlag C.H. Beck, 19BB), p. Ill;
Biooraphisches Staatshandbuch:
Lexikon der Politik. Presse
und Publizistik (Bern:
Francke Verlag, 1963), pp. 424-425;
Who's Who in Germany, e d . Horst G. Kliemann and Stephen S.
Taylor (Munich:
R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1956), p. 417.
Unfortunately, none of these sources, nor Grimme's own
writings, offers much information on his personal life.
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district superintendent in Magdeburg until 1927.

The

following year he joined the staff of the Education Min
istry.

From 1929 to 1930, he was vice-president of the

provincial school board for Berlin and Brandenburg.
For a socialist to hold such high administrative
positions was quite unusual in the 1920s.3

Right-wing

politicians insisted that socialist officials in the school
system antagonized Christian parents, who had a right to
insist that, since the schools were religiously identifi
able, the educational personnel should be as well.

Since

many socialist politicians were negative towards or indif
ferent to religion, Grimme's outspoken identification with
Christianity, attested to by numerous speeches and news
paper articles,

led middle-class cirles to trust him in

public office, despite his party orientation.
In February 1930, Grimme's rapid rise in office culmi
nated in his appointment as Minister of Education in Prus
sia, the first socialist to hold the post since Konrad
Haenisch's resignation in 1921.

He headed the ministry

until Reich Chancellor Franz von Papen dissolved the
Prussian government on July 20, 1932.

When Hitler came to

a"Kulturpolitik und Koalition", Vorwarts. November 24,
1921;
"Militarappel1 fur Schuldirektoren", January 13,
1922;
"Der Kampf urn die Schule", January 14, 1922;
"Schulreaktion in Berlin", November 23, 1922;
"Radaustatt
Kulturdebatte", November 4, 1925.
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power six months later, Grimme had to retire from public
life.

In 1942 he was arrested for consorting with an oppo

sition movement and spent the rest of the war years in
jail

.
In the immediate post-war period, Grimme participated

in the reconstruction of German education in the western
sector, serving as Education Minister of the new state of
Lower Saxony.

In 1940 he embarked on a new career, be

coming General Director of the Northwest German Radio, a
position he held until his retirement in 1956.

He died on

August 27, 1963 at Brannenburg/Inn.
GRIMME AND THE POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM, TO 1922
Grimme's political activity began in 1919, with the
establishment of the democratic republic.
spoke or wrote much about his personal

Grimme never

life so we cannot be

certain about the reasons for his new-found interest in
politics.

We can surmise,

however,

that Grimme,

like many

others of his generation, was so shocked by the catastrophe
of the war that he felt impelled to become involved in
public life in order to help create a better world so that
such a disaster could never happen again.35
These beliefs led Grimme to join the German Democratic
Party in 1919.

He was attracted to the DDP because it

championed the ideals of freedom and democracy,

3See note two in chapter four.

ideals that
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he believed expressed the true yearnings of the German
soul.

He defended the new constitution— it was neither

unnatural, nor un-German, as its critics charged.4

Nor was

it merely an abstract intellectual construction divorced
from reality,

but a natural development for a nation which

had produced Immanuel Kant.

The ideal of democracy in

Germany, Grimme asserted, had its roots in Kant's insis
tence that the individual was responsible for the whole
community;®

the new constitution provided the framework

for realization of this ideal.*
Grimme initially viewed the SPD as too materialistic;
he was interested in reviving spirituality.

The D D P 's

favorable attitude towards religion, combined with its
criticism of the established churches, parallelled Grimme's
beliefs. Even during his

brief stint as a Democrat

the party after a year),

however, Grimme displayed

socialist leanings.

example, he welcomed the Revolu

For

tion of 191B, because he

(he

left

believed it was a spiritual

revolution.7. He also cultivated personal contacts with

*GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Glanzende
Kundgebung der SPD", Landsbero. August 29, 1930.
®Ibid., 45\1, "Grimme in Osnabruck", unidentified and
undated newspaper clipping.
*Ibid., 547, "Politik und Intellektuellen", Leerer
Anzeioeblatt. November 29, 1929.
7Ibid., unidentified newspaper clipping from December
1918.
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many socialists.

In 1919, Grimme established a regional

chapter of the Bund entschiendener Schu1reformer in
Hannover.

Although not part of the S P D , its membership

consisted primarily of socialists.

The Hannover chapter's

program called for "a school without confessional ties
which educates religious humans."®

The program also con

tained demands for an integrated school system in which
tracks would differ only by students'

inclinations and

abi1i ties.^
Grimme left the Democratic Party in 1920;

for two

years he remained unaffiliated with any political party.
Although we have no direct evidence, a newspaper article of
May 1920 provides a clue to his reasons for temporarily
abandoning politics.10

In this article, Grimme expressed

disillusionment with the election campaigns of all the
parties.

He believed that Germany desperately needed a

leader in its time of crisis, but the party system did not
seem to be producing one.

Like Oestreich, but for

different reasons, Grimme was disillusioned with party
po1i tics.

sIbid., 22, "Programm Entwurf der Ortsgruppe Hannover
des Bundes entschiedener Sch u 1reformer", June 25, d.J.
[1919].
^Ibid.
Although Oestreich later changed his mind,
originally he too had favored "rise of the talented".
l0Ibid., "Wolken am Horizent", Leerer Anzeigeblatt.
May 22, 1920.
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After two years, however, Grimme was once again engaged
in party politics,

this time as a socialist.

Why would a

devout Christian and ardent champion of the rights of the
individual choose to join the Social Democrats, a party
with an ideology ostensibly hostile to religion and indi
vidual ism?
GRIMME BECOMES A SOCIAL DEMOCRAT
Upon entering the SPD in 1922, Grimme abandoned neither
his religiosity nor his strong belief in individualism.
Ironic as it may seem, it was his very commitment to both
Christian ideals and individualism that provoked him to
join the Social Democrats.
Although Grimme continued to harbor reservations about
the ability of parliamentary political parties to produce
the leadership Germany so desperately needed,

the assasina-

tion of Walther Rathenau in 1922 provoked him to join the
SPD.

Terror and violence could be combated only by working

within the system.

The citizen had a duty to participate

in the public life of the nation;

passivity was an unac

ceptable position.
Grimme believed that religion and politics were con
nected.

Religion cultivated feelings of responsibility for

the whole society;

the new democracy needed individuals

conscious of their duties to the community.
teachings could aid in civic training.

Religious
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When Grimme became Education Minister in 1930, he
hastened to assure his fellow Social Democrats in the
legislature that he was one of them.

He pointed at

independent Carl Becker, Grimme's predecessor in the
education ministry, as an example of the last of the
individuals.
the masses.

The modern age, Grimme said, was an age of
He did not abandon his belief in the necessity

of cultivating individuality;

he only insisted that it

could be attained only within the framework of the larger
group.

Becker's fall from power, Grimme insisted, resulted

from his refusal to affiliate himself with a political
party.

The individual alone was too weak to survive in

party politcs.

Security lay only in the larger group.11

Despite the common perception of socialism as antireligious and anti-individua 1 istic, Grimme found a ready
reception in the SPD for his ideas.

Although maintaining

coalition with the Democrats and the Center may have
influenced the party leadership in a more moderate
direction, political considerations do not completely
explain the party's acceptance of Grimme and his rapid rise
in the ranks.
socialists.

His ideas were very similar to many other
For Grimme,

the important topics of religious

socialism and attitudes to individualism were linked.
“ Ibid., "Die Koaltionsverhandlungen in PreuBen",
Frankfurter Zeituna. January 29, 1930;
"Die grof3e PreuBenKoalition gescheitert!", General Anzeioer. January 31,
1920;
"Vor der Krise in PreuBen?", unidentified and
undated newspaper clipping.
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RELIGIOUS SOCIALISM
As chapter four showed, many socialists took Marx's
criticism of religion literally.

His characterization of

religion as "the opium of the people"i= only confirmed the
position of this group.

The SPD's party planks calling for

separation of church and state and its insistence that
religion was a private matter gave the impression that the
party was hostile to religion.

Some socialists, however,

reconciled Marxist ideology with Christian teachings.
Religious socialists were anxious to emphasize Marxism's
idealistic heritage.
Opposition to materialism predated the War.

The

classic studies by Fritz Ringer and Fritz Stern discussed
the antipathy which many intellectuals felt for the modern
industrial age and mass production that had led to an
alleged over-emphasis on material prosperity.

Indeed,

"mandarins", along with the majority of the nation,
welcomed the outbreak of the War in 1914 because they
thought it would sweep away this "English disease".13
Cultural critics before the war criticized bourgeois

1=Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy of Right; Introduction", p. 54.
13Ringer, pp. 18B-1B9;
7 B , 79.

Spengler,

pp. 40, 45, 4B-49,
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capitalism because they believed that it deadened the
spirit.
But while conservative cultural critics have received
the attention of scholars, anti-material ism in the
socialist movement has attracted less notice.

Perhaps this

is due to the fact that Marxist ideology is commonly
considered to be centered around "historical materialism".
Even in the 19th century,

however, some socialists had

rejected this centerpiece of Marxist ideology and attempted
to return Marxism to its Idealist heritage. i=>
"Ethical" or idealist Marxism was quite developed
during the 1920s and appears to have had many adherents,
even if they did not always define themselves in these
terms.

Marxists concerned with theoretical purity have

spilled much ink over the question of defining orthodoxy
and deviation.

Suffice it to say that using the measuring

rod of materialism as the standard for determining
orthodoxy is no longer a useful way to think about
social ism.
One recent scholar has suggested that Marx strongly
emphasized materialism only because he was trying to refute

14Stern, p . xi x .
lsThomas E. Willey, Back to Kant (Detroit:
State University Press), pp. 116-117.

Wayne
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the dominant ideology of idealism. 16

He described the

attempts of Ernst Bloch (1885-1977) to reinstate the
idealistic, utopian elements of Marxism.

Both the emphasis

on ethics and belief in utopia are found in the religious
socialism of the 1920s.
Party journals often printed articles which expressed
positive attitudes to religion.

Most parents continued to

send their children to confessional schools and declined to
exercise their constitutional right to abstain from
religious instruction.

We must conclude that religious

beliefs were more prevalent in the socialist movement than
previously believed.
Religious socialists distinguished themselves from
their .more secu1a r 1y-oriented comrades by insisting that
Marxism consisted of more than a materialist interpretation
of history.

Rather,

spiritual movement.

it was a moral and ethical, even a
Like Spengler and other cultural

critics traditionally associated with conservatism,

they

thought that materialism was one of the defining features
of the 19th century— and a sickness to be overcome.17
Grimme agreed.

Striving for profit could never be a

meaningful or satisfying goal to pursue.

The core of

1AJohn Joseph Marsden, Marxian and Christian
Utopianism.
Toward a Socialist Political Theology (New
York:
Monthly Review Press, 1991), p. 40.
17"bkonomi5cher und Religioser Sozialismus",
Sozia1istische Monatshefte (May 3, 1920):
338—341.
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Marxist ideology did not concern materialism, Grimme
believed, but spirituality.

Socialism could restore

meaning in human life, the meaning which had been robbed by
materialistic capitalism and called into question by the
experience of the war.10

Grimme,

like Oestreich, thought

that the purpose of work was not merely production of
commodities;

Grimme thought that the very process of work

shaped the individual engaged.
of a purely materialist outlook.

He preached the dangers
What was valuable about

Marx was his recognition of the true nature and meaning of
work.20
Many religious socialists disagreed with Lowenstein's
contention that religion served no purpose in the modern
rationalized and increasingly secularized society.

On the

contrary, reason did not, and could not banish the realm of
feeling.

There were limits to reason;

where reason ended.21

religion began

Religion cultivated the feeling that

everything was inter-connected;

this was not a subject of

iaGStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 557, "Kampf und
Frieden", unidentified newspaper dated December 23, 1930.
^ A d o l f Grimme, Auf freiem Grund mit freiem Volk.
Ansprachen und Aufsatze (Berlin:
J.H.W. Dietz, 1932),
Sinn der Arbeit", pp. 71-77.

"Vom

^■’GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 557, "Gedanken
uber Kultur und Wirtschaft", unidentified newspaper dated
June 5, 1930.
21"Denken und Andacht.
Ein Beitrag Hum religibsen
Problem", Sozia1istische Monatshefte (October 31, 1921):
953.
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knowledge, not subject to proof.33

Lowenstein's attempt to

reduce everything to reason was fruitless;

the totality of

man would not allow itself to be so contained.

Grimme

asserted that,
One incorrectly understands knowledge as exclusively
that which is subject to proof and everything else is
readily labelled a matter of faith. . . . But there is
also an unproveable knowledge.
One may call this
"belief" . . . But the basis of science is not less a
matter of faith than the fundamental idea that we have
an earthly mission because one is not less proveable
than the other.23
A clergyman writing for Vorwarts appealed to the
workers to realize that reason and religion could be
reconciled.24

Theologians such as Karl Barth disagreed.

He thought that if one combined faith with reason and
science,

religion would be profaned,

Grimme, however,

become too worldly.

thought just the opposite— he wanted to

make religion a daily affair, not restricted to Sundays.
For him, meaningful work was the link between the objective
material world and the subjective spiritual inner world of
the individual.

By removing capitalist exploitation, work

became meaningful, or spiritual, even holy— God's kingdom
realized on earth.

“ "Religion und Wirtschaft", Sozialistische Monatshefte (March 6, 1922):
225-229.
=3Adolf Grimme, Per religiose Mensch.
Eine Zielsetzunq fur die neue Schule (Berlin:
C.A. Schwetschke und
Sohn, 1923), p . 9.
24"Arbeiterschaft und Kirche", Vorwarts. June 25,
1920.
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The reformer Anna Siemsen agreed with many of these
ideas.

She thought that complete secularization was

impossible because absolute knowledge was impossible— the
process of learning would never be complete.29

As long as

there was a realm of the unknown, religion would be
necessary.

The rational secular realm and the realm of

faith or religion were not enemies, Siemsen insisted, but
complementary aspects of the total human condition.
position was echoed by others.

She warned,

Her

however,

about the dangers of over— emphasizing the importance of
feeling;

subject neither to rational argument nor

empirical proof,
irrational i s m .

the domination of feeling could lead to
Irrational ism posed a danger if it was

expressed in acts.

Romantics like Rousseau and Nietzsche

were wrong in stressing the realm of irrational feeling too
muc h .
Religious socialists believed that while reason
divided, socialism unified, by recognizing the underlying
common soul in reality.

Socialism had its roots in reason

and materialism— it had begun as a political and economic

=BAnna Siemsen, Erziehuna im Gemeinschaftsoeist
(Stuttgart!
Ernst Heinrich Moritz, 1921).
26"Zum Religionsproblem", Sozialistische Monatshefte
(June 1919):
544-549.
27"Das rationale und das irrationale Element in der
Religion", Sozia1istische Monatshefte (December 15, 1921):
1106-1115.
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program.

But it had now developed into a cultural-

historical movement,

in which the realms of reason and

feeling could become o n e . 2 8

Religion combined the

subjectivity of the observer to the objectivity of reality,
which combined the spiritual and the material.^
was the source of culture;
spirit united . 3 0

Spirit

materialism divided while

Socialism would reunite spirit and

matter, which had become separated in the capitalist,
materialist dominated world . 3 1
Socialists of this persuasion argued that Marx was not
just a materialist;
an integral

the Kantian or Fichtean "should" was

part of his ideology.

ethical and spiritual . 3 3

Socialism was, in fact,

Historical materialism precluded

individual responsibility necessary for moral behavior—
youth must be trained to shoulder responsibility . 3'3

For

“ "Sozialismus, Religion und Kirche", Sozia1istische
Monatshef te (April 1919):
334-342.
^ " D e r Religiose", Sozialistische Monatshefte (July 7,
1919):
642-645;
"Okonomischer und Religioser Sozialismus"
(May 3, 1920):
338-341.
3 0 "physische Gewalt und geistige Kraft", Soz ia1istische Monatshefte (June 6 , 1921):
473-475.

3i"Aktivismus und Sozialismus", Sozialistische Mon
atshefte (December 20, 1920):
1089-1091.
3 = "Dialektik, Geschieht1iche V o 1ksbi1dung, Geschichtsphilosophie, Positivismus", Sozialistische Monatshefte
(June 27, 1921):
573-577.

'^"Zur gesitigen Erziehung der Arbeiterklasse",
Sozia1istische Monatshefte (August 29, 1921):
751-757.
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Grimme,

responsibi1ity played a key role.

Capitalism

encouraged the exploitation, not the respect, of one's
fellows.

This encouraged an attitude of "every man for

himself".

Now that Germany had adopted democracy,

assumption of responsibility was even more critically
important than ever before.

Only when Germans pooled their

resources and cooperated with one another could Germany be
rebuilt.

Grimme’s ideas an responsibility will be dealt

with in greater detail in the next section,

because

responsibility was the link between the individual and the
commun i t y .
When religious socialists turned their attention to
Jesus's place in modern life,

they generally tended to

emphasize the Jesus who delivered the Sermon on the Mount.
If this aspect of his teaching was revived,

the corruptions

of the established churches would become obvious.

Puri

fied, Jesus' message could once again live in the human
heart.34

Grimme echoed these ideas.

The message of the

Sermon on the Mount was that of brotherly love.

Capitalist

society could not realize Jesus' message— while it taught
love as the ideal, the system depended on its members
violating Jesus'

injunction to love others.

Socialism

^"Sozialismus und Jesus", Sozia1istisc he Monatshefte
(September 19, 1921):
816-818.
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would allow the unity of theory and practice— one would
finally be able to truly live a Christian life.3®
To religious socialists,

the religion of the

established churches was not true religion because these
churches were too secular and materia 1istic — they
worshipped things, degrading humanity.3**
religion corresponded to capitalism;
into material commodities.37

This type of

both turned humans

Proletarian religion,

however, restored the central position of humanity, which
would result in true brotherly love.
Religious socialists did agree with Lowenstein and
other “secular" socialists that the established churches
had used religion as a tool of class oppression.343

But

while.for Lowenstein this discredited religion and
Christianity, for religious socialists this misuse only
discredited the churches.

They had deviated from Jesus'

message of brotherly love.
had lost their meaning;

Old forms of religious worship

if they continued to be used, only

3=Grimme, Per religiose Mensch. pp. 2B-29 and GStA
(Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 380, rough draft for a speech,
dated August 30, 1931.
^ " D i e Religion des Arbeiter", Sozialistische Monats
hefte (November 22, 1920):
1007-1009.
37Kolakowski, pp. 274-275.
^"Zuin Rel igionsproblem" , Soz ia 1is tisc he Monatshefte
(June 1919):
544—549 and "Christentum und Sozialismus"
(January 26, 1920):
61-63.
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hypocrisy could result.3’

In his day, Luther had broken

with the Catholic Church precisely because the old forms no
longer stimulated belief and feeling which led to right
action.

find this is exactly the same reason socialists

were breaking with the established churches now— in order
to revive true rel igiosi t y . 40

On a more practical note

Vorwarts advised workers to retain their church membership
and try to change them from within.41

Grimme echoed these

*
42
ideas.
_i

For many religious socialists,

religion alone was

useless if it did not promote activity and channel it to
positive ends.

In its hour of need, Germany needed to tap

every source of energy in order to rebuild and recuperate
from the war.

Religion, Christianity specifically, was

indispensable in cultivating the necessary attitudes.

True

religion did not lead to passivity, religious socialists
maintained.

Traditional religion did— it tended to focus

on the afterlife.

But religious socialism was different in

that it attempted to realize God's kingdom here on earth.43

w "Neue Religion", Sozialistische Monatshefte (August
25, 1919):
BIO—816.
40Ibid

.

4i,,Religion und Sozialdemokratie" , Vorwarts. Feburary
28, 1920 and "Arbeiterschaft und Kirche", June 25, 1920.
4=Grimme, Per relgiose Mensch. pp. 28-29.
43"Die Befehle Gottes", Sozia1istische Monatshefte
(January 26, 1920):
44-48.
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Grimme expressed this eloquently:

"Our high-spirited

mission, the task of the community of all nations is:

to

be God's collaborator in the victorious erection of his
kingdom on earth."44

He added,

"There are no two worlds in

the sense that one is for humans and the other entirely for
G o d ."48

Religious socialists believed that the future

utopia could be realized in the present.46
To Grimme, true Christianity was not flight from the
world, but immersion in it.

In his own words:

is not submission, religion is task.""4-7
added, did concern inwardness;

Religion, Grimme

but it was useless unless

this inwardness was outwardly expressed.40
individual subjectivity;

"Religion

Inwardness was

outward expression meant activity

and activity meant work— not the alienated labor of the
capitalist economy,

but socially useful work that contri

buted to both the individual and the community.

The needs

of the individual and the community were not opposed,

but

mutually beneficial.
^Grimme, Per religiose Mensch. p. 37.
**I bid. , p . 38.
“^"Religion und Sozialismus", Sozialistische Monats
hefte (May 15, 1922):
442-447.
'"GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 560, "Frieden der
Menschen auf Erden, die guten Wiliens s i n d !", Der Leuchturm. December 25, 1931.
4SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. pp. 44-45.
Although
Grimme was a practicing Protestant, he attempted to correct
a major problem with Lutheran theology— its passivity,
particularly regarding the state.
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CONCEPTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL, COMMUNITY AND NATION
In the early years of the Republic, Grimme Mas sus
picious of the Social Democratic Party not only because of
its materia1istic orientation,

but also because he was

concerned with the extension of individual freedom.
Socialist ideology had at least a partially deserved
reputation for wanting to level society.

Such levelling

was usually seen as a levelling down, as the restriction of
individual opportunity.
Reformers like Oestreich, with ideas of radical egali
tarianism, seemed to confirm this opinion.

Many people

believed that all individuals deserved equal opportunity,
but that actual talents were unequally distributed.
Indeed, we have seen that even articles in the normally
moderate SPD journal, SoziaIistische Monatshefte often
protested against the "rise of the talented", agreeing with
Oestreich on this point.

What these socialists really

objected tD, however, was not recognition that aptitudes
were unequal;

what they objected to was that the measures

used to determine aptitudes were not fair because they were

“^GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme 546, "Was soli nun
werden?", Rede des Studienassessors Grimme aus Leer in den
Salen der Stadthalle zu Osnabruck am 7. Januar 1919 auf
Einladung der DDP, pp. 1-7.
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skewed to favor the middle and upper c l a s s e s . I n
these socialists parted company with Oestreich,

effect,

in that

while he denied the existence of natural inequality, they
only called for more objective,
mining ability.

fairer means for deter—

Grimme belonged to this group.

His ideas

on the nature of individuality and the functions of com
munity and nation all came together and are linked to his
religious ideas.
Grimme insisted that all
Ranking,

life was intrinsically equal.

however, did occur, at the supra-individual

or in the community.

level

Grimme wrote,

The more a person shapes his life, the more a per
sonality is he.
Higher than mere existence . . .
stands the developed person, the personality . . . A
person is more human to the extent that he develops
into a living persona1ity.Si
Ranking based on amount of possessions was improper because
amount of wealth does not indicate talent beneficial
the whole community.

For Grimme,

for

the inner worth of the

individual and external ranking by one's ability to
contribute to the community were linked by the individual's
capability to shape him or herself as a personality.

The

more one was able to do so, the more talent one developed
in the process, hence the more one had to give to others.

“‘■’"Gedanken zur Einheitsschule" , Sozia 1istische
Monatshefte (May 1919):
448-455;
"Die Sozia1istische
Schule" (September 1919):
903-908;
"Psychologie"
(December 1919):
1235-1239.
slGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 13.
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The very shaping of one's personality was the only
meaningful goal worth striving for. 892
These ideas were not unique to Grimme.

The philosopher

Karl Jaspers believed in equality of opportunity,
what your were.
person;

to become

But what people were varied from person to

all people were not equally endowed with special

gifts.83

The success of democracy depended on selection of

the best in all areas of life, according to Jaspers.
The constant "becoming" or shaping of the individual
was not merely a matter for self-congratulation,
to Grimme.

according

He reconciled the individual's interests with

the interests of the community in a way that should be
familiar way— by asserting

that the individual became an

individual only in service to the community.84

Grimme

believed he had advanced beyond the one-sided focus on the
individual characteristic of the bourgeois capitalism, by
re-introducing the element of community.

Grimme put it

thus:
I risk the assertion that a socialism which effaced the
personality would have forgotten its purpose.
But I
hear you protest, is it not exactly the mark of our
time that the individual only thinks of himself?
Is
not socialism the assault against this curse?”

“ Ibid., p. 12.
“ Karl Jaspers, Was ist Erziehuno? Ein Lesebuch. e d .
Hermann Horn (Munich:
Piper, 1977, 1992), pp. 324-327.
M Grimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 20.

“ Ibid. , p. 14.
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Grimme insisted that his concept of personality was not
that of the self-seeking ego.
dual become a herd animal.

Neither should the indivi

Instead, one became an indivi

dual in the community.
Others agreed.
sized community. *“■

Martin Buber's ideas similarly empha
Buber thought that the realization of

self could occur only in relationship with another.
Inwardness of the individual was realized only when it was
shared with another.

Life was something to be worked at;

individuality was not a given.

Buber was careful to avoid

both the radical isolation characteristic of Kierkegaard's
philosophy, as well as the complete immersion in the group,
which would extinguish true individuality.

Buber called

this third possibility the realm of the "Between".57,

While

the collective annihilated the individuality and the
possibility of responsibi1ity, the community exalted
personality and included freedom and responsibility.5®
There are obvious parallels here with Grimme's ideas.
Indeed, while Buber disapproved of "materialist" socialism

^ A d i r Cohen, The Educational Phlosophy of Martin
Buber (Rutherford:
Farleigh Dickinson University Press,
1983).
571b id . , p. 83.
^Bu b e r ' s use of the terms "collectivity" and "commu
nity" parallels Ferdinand Tonnies' distinction between
"society" and "community".
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because he thought it would result in stifling over
regulation, he favored "religious" socialism.
The capitalist notion that everyone was but a
replaceable cog was a mistaken idea, Grimme said.

We all

have our own unique talents and should be treated as
individuals, not merely part of a homogenized, undiffer—
entiated mass.

Parents and teachers had to recognize the

differences in children, rather than ignoring their pecul
iarities.

Democracy did not have to lead to mediocrity, or

worse yet, a levelling down.

It should lead to cultiva

tion of the most talented leaders.

Equality was not

necessarily incompatible with the development of indivi
duals into personalities.

Grimme wrote,

"Democracy need

not be the sworn enemy of personal individuality."^’ He
expanded on the theme:
I suggest, moreover, . . . that an organization of the
people can never wipe out the distinction between
leaders and followers. . . . Genuine democracy wants
that those should lead who best understand how to lead.
It [democracy] wants that each will be placed where he
can most productively serve the whole.61
Spengler too had called for an aristocracy of talent.
the English,

Only

he said, measured value by the amount of goods

“’Cohen,
^Grimme,

p. 97.
Der relioiose Mensch. p. 21.

6,1 Ibid., p. 22.
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one possessed;

the Germans, on the other hand, measured

value by achievement and ability.
The yearning for a strong leader to end division pre
dated the w a r .65

This longing was magnified by the

enormity of the problems of the post-war world.

What

Germany needed, many thought, were not politicians beholden
to their party organizations, unable to be creative and
bold, but real lead e r s . ^

The Nazis are infamous for their

exaltation of the leadership principle.
alone in calling for a strong leader;

But they were not
Stefan George, Ernst

Junger, Gustav Stresemann, Max Weber, and Ernst Kantorowicz
were among notable public figures who shared this yearning.
Parallels between Grimme and non-socialists can also be
seen in their concepts of the nation.

Grimme thought that

all nations were different from one another, and all were
irreplaceable.

He maintained that it was sinful to want to

be other than what you were.
individuality.

One must accept one's own

This applied to nations as well.

consciousness of a people made them a nation.
nation was superior to another;
different,

The self-

No one

they were indeed all

but nevertheless equal.

Each had their own

“ Spengler, p. 102.
^ S tern,

p. xxviii.

^ D e t l e v J.K. Peukert, Die Weimarer Republik.
Krisenjahre der Klassischen Moderne (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1987),
p. 21B.
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God-given mission, specific to the peculiar strengths of
that p e o p l e . A n d

that mission was "to be G o d ’s co

workers in the victorious erection of his rule on earth." 6’6>
A few socialists thought that Germany should follow the
Bolsheviks’ lead in instituting the brotherhood of mankind.
Grimme insisted that Germany must remain independent of
both the spiritual imperialism of the East, as well as the
economic imperialism of the West.

Germany's unique task

was to emphasize the worth of the individual.

And Germany

could best represent this idea by combining the ideas of
religion and those of socialism.

Germany could never be a

true nation in the sense of being a united Volk until
The owner overcomes his ego and through his example
promotes the idea that, higher than his own interests
is his love for the nation . . . [and] to prove this
love through the renunciation of property.67
He added,
We will no longer fail to recognize that nationalism
and socialism are opposites.
They have the same
source;
they are only two forms of the same mani
festation of love:
the will to brotherhood.
This
source is Christianity.6*0
What does all this have to da with education?

Grimme,

like Lowenstein and Oestreich, was more concerned with
larger political and social problems;

he did, however,

6SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. pp. 24-25.
6*6>Ibid., p . 37.
** Ib id . , p . 59.
Ibid . , p . 56.
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provide a broad outline on haw education should be
structured to produce the kind of society he envisioned.
GRIMME GN THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
Although Grimme was a religious socialist and Lowenstein was a free-thinker,

the two reformers shared many of

the same attitudes towards the established churches and
their links to the school system.
best expressed in his own words:

Grimme's attitude is
"The history of Christ

ianity is the history of the constant falsification of its
pure teachings through the churches of both confessions. "6,?
Grimme maintained that there was a big difference between
Jesus'

teachings and those of the representatives of the

churches who had supported the state in the World War.
Grimme,

To

the churches did not display true Christianity—

socialism was the best expression of Jesus'

teachings of

brotherhood.
Grimme believed religious education was important,

but

his definition of the term was so broad as to almost empty
it of its meaning.

Religious instruction would not be

divided by denomination.

Although he was often vague about

the content of his proposed course, he intended that it
would train youth in their duties to society, cultivate
their love of community, and provide an insight to the

^ G S t A (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Besitz ist
Schuld!", unidentified newspaper clipping of Ap r i 1 5, 1930.
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meaning of life, a critical part of education in the modern
nihilistic age.70

Grimme equated religious education with

the study of phi losophy.
what was and what is;
could be.

He believed that history taught

philosophy, however,

taught one what

Although some people thought philosophy had no

connection with daily life, Grimme thought that it did,
that it could enrich everyday life and infuse work with
joy.

The study of philosophy was the way to an ever

greater clarity.
In the same pamphlet, Grimme anticipated the objec
tions of religious authorities,

that philosophical ques

tioning might result in a loss of respect for religion.
replied that true religion was more durable,
survive the questioning.
churches was over;
all authority.

He

that it could

The age of blind obedience to the

youth today must be taught to question

Although it might be true that philoso

phical questioning would arouse skepticism, such ques
tioning was also the only cure for growing skepticism.
Grimme insisted that the study of philosophy was not an
escape from this world;

rather "We are the eternal seekers

after the connection between world and spirit." ”

By

equating philosophy with religious education, Grimme could

’'''Grimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 62.
riGStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Wozu Philosophie?" undated 31 page pamphlet by Grimme.
Ib id .
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reassure his fellow socialists that he supported the
socialist party planks respecting education,

including the

demand that it be secularized.73
Many non-socialists were confused— how could someone
who claimed to be religious support a secular school?

They

concluded that it must be a political ruse, a smokescreen,
in order to camouflage a socialist take-over of the
schools.7'4

Other opponents maintained that even if Grimme

were sincerely devoted to Christianity, as a socialist he
could never hope to successfully oppose the free-thinking
atheistic elements, men like Lowenstein,

that dominated the

SPD. 7'“
One did not have to be a socialist to oppose the
prevailing practice of religious segregation.

While still

a Democrat, Grimme had formed a BESCH chapter in Hannover.
Its program provides a good account of Grimme's specific
reform ideas.

In the list of goals of the schools is the

demand for “a school which desires to educate religious

^ G S t A (Dahlem) 1HA Rep. 92 Grimme, "Ein sozialistisches B i 1dungsprogramm", unindentified newspaper
clipping of April 5, 1930.
^Ibid., "Die sittliche Einstellung des preuf3ischen
Kultusminister", unidentified and undated newspaper
c 1i pping.
7’®Ibid., "Ehrendes Mifltrauen.
Reaktionarer Vorstofl
gegen den Kultusminister Grimme", Vorwarts. November 26,
1931 .
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persons, but without denominational connections."74

Grimme

agreed with Lowenstein that denominational division only
sustained division of the community.

He disagreed with

Lowenstein, however, in his insistence that all children,
even those of dissidents, must take religious
instruction."7"7

Grimme is worth quoting at length on the

subj ec t :
The religious human is socialist . . . The struggle
against the confessional school is a struggle for the
religious school . . . the struggle for a churchfree school should make the way clear for the school
of the true church . . . It is a school for the world,
a secular [weltliche] school, which to call godless is
done in evil or folly."7B
Turning to the problem of integrating education, Grimme
agreed with Oestreich that class privileges in pursuit of a
higher education must be abolished.

Grimme differed from

Oestreich in that he believed specia1ization and branching
were necessary.

The different branches, however, should be

better co-ordinated and access to each open to all stu
dents."7"7

This would result in an integrated system.®1’

^ I bid., "Programm Entwurf der Ortsgruppe Hannover des
Bundes entschiedener Schu1reformer".
7^Ibid.» "Volksversammlung der deutschen dem. Partei” ,
Ostfriesische Zeitung. December 17, 1918.
7SGrimme, Der religiose Mensch. p. 44.
7"pIb id . , p. 61.
^ ‘GStA (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme, 546, "Was soil
nun werden", unidentified and undated newspaper clipping of
1919.
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Like Oestreich, Grimme adamantly rejected any organization
of the educational system that would allow unfair advantage
to the propertied.

A student's education and profession

would be decided solely on the students'

inclinations.01

It was not the organization of education that was of
primary importance to Grimme;
its content.

he was concerned more with

As Education Minister during the Depression,

he had to consider how problems of education were linked
with employment.

As unemployment increased,

the various

types of schools all scrambled to secure special privileges
for its graduates.

Grimme criticized this as selfishness;

the crisis could be overcome only when individuals assumed
responsibility and thought about the needs of the whole
society, not just their own special interests.®3
With large numbers of unemployed, employers raised
standards in their hiring decisions;

this often resulted

in good positions being reserved for secondary school
graduates, even when the nature of the job did not
specifically require that type of p r e paration.^
criticized this practice;

Grimme

he thought that a good basic

education in the Volksschule was often more suitable than

eiIbid., "Programm Entwurf

(BESCH)".

°3 Ibid., "Minister Grimme gegen die 'KnopflochGesinnung' und gegen das Zeugnisunwesen", unidentified
newspaper clipping, March 31, 1930.

“ Ringer, p. 32.
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an interrupted course of study in a higher institution.
Command of Latin did not make one person better qualified
for a job than the applicant who lacked this mostly useless
skill.
Like Grimme, university mandarins deplored the numbers
of students enrolled in the university who were motivated
by the desire for social mobility,
titles.

for privileges and

The mandarins wanted to restrict the numbers of

those admitted to these institutions.

While they insisted

that their position was based on their concern for main
taining high standards of scholarship, their real motiva
tion seemed to be to maintain their exclusivity.08
Grimme disagreed— he thought that only greater access to
higher education could result in the true "rise of the
talented".
While Grimme rejected socio-economic position of the
student as the measure of value, he failed to offer a
workable substitute.

Although he thought that moral and

spiritual qualities should be decisive, neither he nor
other socialists were able to offer a standard for
measuring these elusive qualities.
standard of judgment,

Lacking an abjective

the yearning for a strong leader was

decided by irrational, or at least non-rational feeling.

^ G S t A (Dahlem) 1 HA Rep. 92 Grimme,
Grimmes", Volkswacht. April 1, 1930.

e=1Ringer, p. 287.
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Hitler came to power and socialist attempts to build
society were at an end, at least for the time being.

new

CHAPTER SEVEN
WEIMAR POLITICS REVISITED
Despite the best efforts of Lbwenstein, Oestreich, and
Grimme to develop a practical program of educational reform
consistent with Marxist principles as they understood them,
the three theorists made little impact on either their
party or the schools.

This becomes apparent when attention

is shifted from theoretical debate to the actual political
situation in the 1920s.
THE NATIONAL SCHOOL CONFERENCE OF 1920
In 1917, the Social Democrats had proposed a national
conference to discuss educational issues after the war.
This suggestion was adopted by the government;

on March 6,

1920 the national Minister of the Interior formally an
nounced that the conference would meet in Berlin in June.
It was intended to be a non-partisan discussion conducted
by pedagogical professionals in order to publicize the
issues and problems of the schools.

SPD leaders agreed

with the Interior Minister that party politics should not
play any part in this public discussion of experts.1

The

hope was that an open, non-partisan discussion of the
issues would allow both parents and politicians to make
informed decisions concerning the school system.

^■"Die Reichsschul konf erenz " , Vorwarts. June 11, 1920.
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In order to keep the conference from becoming engaged
in political issues,

the socialist Heinrich Schulz, head of

the Division of Culture in the Interior Ministry,
issue of religion off the agenda.=

Instead,

kept the

the delegates

focussed on issues such as the proper number of grades for
the elementary school, work education as a method of in
struction,

the role of the newly created parents' councils,

and teacher training.

Not only were the sensitive issues

of religious instruction, confessional segregation, and the
proper role of the established churches in the schools
ignored, but the issue of integration of the high schools
was also kept off the agenda.

As a consequence, even the

modest intentions of educating the public and influencing
politicians were unrealized.
Even though both Oestreich and Lbwenstein objected to
the proceedings, the majority of the delegates leaned to
the left.3

Lbwenstein objected to the inclusion of any

non-socialist educators— -he completely rejected cooperation
with other political parties and quoted Karl Marx's dictum
that only the proletariat could free itself.'1 Oestreich's
complaints were similar— he thought that reactionaries,

'“"Die Reichsschulkonferenz" , Vorwarts ■ June 20, 1920.
3"Die Reichsschulkonferenz.
Vorwarts. June 15, 1920.

4. Tag:

Lehrerbi1dung",

"FES, 3.3.1, 639-681, unidentified and undated
newspaper clipping of 1920.
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miffed at left-wing domination, had stooped to obstructive
tactics to wreck the conference.3
The conference made no discernible impact on education.
Intended to be non-partisan, it degenerated into petty
squabbling between would-be reformers and conservatives.
The arguments had no effect on politicians in power, who
were more concerned with the intricacies of conducting
politics in the new republic than in the theoretical
debates of peripheral issues and the bickering of peda
gogues.

The decisive and meaningful debates could only be

partisan, occurring each time a legislative proposal for
the national school

law promised by the constitution was

ma d e .
PROPOSED LEGISLATION FOR THE NATIONAL EDUCATION LAW
Four pieces of legislation for the promised national
education law were proposed in the 1920s.

Each time,

the

issue of the relationship between the established churches
and the elementary schools was the central issue.

Since

secular schools had not existed during Wilhelmian Germany,
their legitimacy was brought into question by article 174
of the constitution,

the "status quo" provision.

One would

expect a political party that publicly insisted on

3"Die Reichsschulkonferenz.
Fortsetzung der Ausschuflberichte. Erklarungen iiber Erklarungen" and "Die
Reichsschulkonferenz.
Ein Verzweif1ungsakt der Reaktion",
Vorwarts. June IB, 1920.
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separation of church and state and which supported the
establishment of secular schools to be active in trying to
get a national

law passed.

Yet not one of these four

legislative proposals originated with the SPD or enjoyed
socialist support— the SPD voted against every one of these
proposals, yet offered none of its own.

Unable to agree on

a common direction for educational reform, the SPD was
incapable of introducing its own proposals;

it could only

reject bills proposed by the other parties.
The first proposal was the only one that the SPD even
considered.

Offered in 1921, it would have given secular

schools full

legal equality with the confessional school

type.

The legislation thus permitted both secular and

confessional schools;

although it weakly repeated the

constitution's preference for the community school,
nothing to promote this type.

it did

The legislation further

provided that the individual states would have wide
latitude in deciding what fit the definition of "orderly
school operation" provided for in article 146 of the
constitution.
Both the SPD and DDP objected to the proposed legis
lation.

The Democrats objected because they believed that

only mixed religious schools could promote solidarity of
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the community;

confessional schools destroyed unity,6

The

Democrats also maintained that only the churches, not the
parents, really wanted confessional segregation.7
In its objections, the SPD repeated its assertion that
separation of state and church meant the separation of
church and school.
constitution,

The community school referred to in the

the party maintained, was actually the

secular school,

the only type of school in which the rights

of freedom of thought and conscience could actually be
realized.®

The S P D 's party program of 1921 repeated its

standard position,

that "religion is a private matter, of

inner conviction, not a party or state matter:
of church and state."9
secular,

separation

The program went on to call for a

free, and integrated school system.

Since the

proposed legislation violated these principles, many
socialists rejected this proposal.
Lbwenstein, speaking for the USPD, dismissed the
legislation as part of the Independents'

rejection of

participation in any compromise which made concessions to

^GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preu|3ischer Landtag, xc
C2, Die Konfessionelle Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfessions- Simultanschule), Ldtg. B d . 1:
1919-27, Berlin, den
7. Juni 1921.
7Ibid., xc C3, Der Religionsunterricht Allgemein Ldtg.
B d . 1:
1919-33, 30. Sitzung am 12. Juli 1921.
°Ibid .

’’Treue, p. 105.
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the Center.

Always ready with his acid wit, the Inde

pendent "Ten Commandments" Hoffmann claimed that Schulz
would not be happy until

the pope ruled Berlin.*0

Schulz

replied that negotiating with moderates in the Center Party
undercut the position of Catholic reactionaries.

Besides,

this legislation deserved consideration because it would at
least legalize the secular schools.11

The SPD-USPD dis

agreement ended when the USPD dissolved itself in 1922;
the majority of the party joined the Communist Party, while
about one-third,
SPD.

including Lbwenstein, chose to join the

Lbwenstein nevertheless continued to criticize the

propriety of a socia1ist-Catholic coalition and warned that
the Center could not be trusted.
The first piece of legislation was finally shelved in
1924.

The second proposal came in 1925.

Before it was

made, the SPD adopted a new program at its yearly confer—
ence in Heidelberg that year.

The new program was neces

sary to cement the SPD-USPD reunification.

It reflected

the leftward push the USPD members gave the party.

Not

only must church and religious influence in the schools be
struggled against, stated the program,

but "no expenditure

of public funds for church and religious goals" should be

lu"Die Schuldebatte des Reichstags", Vorwarts. January
25, 1922.

11 Ibid.
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The usual affirmation for a secular,

free, and

integrated school system was repeated.
The 1925 proposal was a DNVP-sponsored bill supporting
confessional segregation.

It was of short duration because

the national government at the time was so unstable;
the government fell, the proposal was dropped.
DDP-sponsored bill was offered.
ating on this proposal.

when

In 1926, a

The SPD considered negoti

But this government was unstable

too and the legislation was shelved when the govnerment
fell.

Both of these bills would have implemented the D D P 's

favored type of school of mixed denominations.
The final legislative proposal for the national educa
tion law illustrated the problem of a SPD-Center coalition
— that their differences were irreconci1iab1e as many
socialists,

including Lbwenstein had been maintaining for a

long time.

It is known as the Marx-Keudell bill after its

authors, Wilhelm Marx, prominent Center politician and head
of the Catholic School Association, and Herr von Keudell, a
reactionary German Nationalist.

Their proposal, while

ostensibly claiming to grant equality to confessional,
secular, and community schools, actually favored the
confessional schools by providing that not only would all
teachers and non-religious subjects in the curriculum be
oriented to the school's confession, but that all of that

1=Treue, p. 109.
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school's inspectors would share the same religion.

In

addition, religious instruction would be required, not
voluntary,

in schools of mixed confession.13

The bill seemed to vindicate members of the SPD, such
as Lowenstein, who had always maintained that the Center
could not be trusted.

The provisions in the Marx-Keudell

Bill not only favored the confessional school but actually
tried to reverse rights granted by the constitution, rights
the SPD especially cherished.

Administrators had always

attempted to match the religion of the teacher with that of
the school,

in order to minimize conflict.

But for the

Center and DNVP to insist that school inspectors also had
to be of that religion seemed outrageous.

Even more out

rageous was the infringement on the right of a student to
abstain from religious instruction.

Dissidents had been

persecuted before and during the World War.

This provision

seemed to signal a return to the coercion of Imperial days.
Lbwenstein viewed the bill as a renewal of the class
struggle, disguising itself in the cloak of religion and
morality.

Other party members agreed with him.

Schulz

felt betrayed by the Center alliance with the DIWP.

The

SPD had patiently co-operated with the Center, only to be
betrayed by Catholic reactionaries.

Schulz nevertheless

13"Das Reichsschulgetsz und die Verfassungsparteien",
Sozia1istische Monatshefte (August 8, 1927):
613-618 and
Dietrich Orlow, Weimar Prussia, vol. 2, pp. 35-66.
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insisted that opposition to the bill did not mean opposi
tion to religion or even the established churches, only
opposition to the churches'
power politics.

attempt to play the game of

The party conference that year in Kiel

passed a resolution which affirmed SPD support for the
secular schools and called for support of inter— confes
sional schools in places where secular schools did not yet
exist.
Indeed, although the Marx-Keudell Bill antagonized
relations between the SPD and the Center,

the coalition

between the two parties continued to flourish,
the federal

if not at

level of government, at least in Prussia.

Successful conclusion of a concordat, or treaty, with the
Pope in 1929 illustrated the SPD's commitment to compromise
with the Center, as Schulz consistently advocated and
Lbwenstein and Oestreich consistently criticized.
The failure of the Marx-Keudell Bill in November 1927
ended attempts to enact the constitutional provision that
promised a national education law.

In lieu of this law,

which was supposed to reconcile contradictory clauses of
the constitution, educational matters were left to state
governments to solve.

In Prussia,

led to a chaotic situation.

lack of the national

Since there was a lack of

14Heinrich Schulz, Kirchenschu1e oder Volksschule?
Ein Kampf gegen den Reichsschulgesetzentwurf der
Rechtskoalition (Berlin:
J.H. W. Dietz, 1927).
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legal precedents to refer to, quite often there were no
good answers to the very difficult problems.

Appeals to

Imperial law were disputed by socialists, but the SPD could
offer no alternative.
THE PRUSSIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 1920S AND THE ISSUE
□F SECULARIZATION
Prussian elementary schools during Imperial Germany
were divided by confession,

included religious instruction

in the curriculum, and were administered primarily by the
established churches.

The SPD was able to alter only the

third point, and even on this issue, the established
churches continued to successfully challenge state
authori ty.
Although education certainly was not secularized by the
constitution, positive steps were made in that direction:
school supervision was made a matter of the state, not the
churches, although the state was required to consult the
churches on religious instruction;

teachers were given all

the rights of state officials, one of which was that reli
gious denomination was not tD be considered unless this
were relevant to the office;

religious instruction and

participation in church ceremonies and holidays was no
longer compulsory but voluntary;
mentioned in the constitution,

secular schools were

implying their legitimacy;

and finally, care was to be taken to protect the
sensitivities of dissenters.
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Every one of these provisions proved difficult to
implement in practice.

A barrage of letters from local

officials to the Education Ministry requested advice an how
to apply these clauses in particularly difficult cases.
□ne might be amused at the ridiculous ways in which the
meanings of words could be stretched and distorted if the
end result had not been cynicism about government and
politicians.
The state had always retained authority over the
schools in principle, even during the 19th century;

the

state had only used the churches as administrators because
it was been convenient to do so.

Teachers resented super—

vision by clergymen not professionally trained as educa
tors.-

They preferred pedagogues as state officials in

overseeing the schools.

Their desires seemed to be

realized by articles 143 and 136 of the constitution.
Article 143 granted teachers all the "rights and duties of
state officials".15

Article 136 stipulated that the reli

gion of state officials was not to be a consideration,
unless the duties of the office were dependent on religious
membership.1'1’

Since teachers believed that the duties of

the teaching profession were not dependent on religious
confession but on professional training,

lsDie Verfassuno. p. 43.
Ibid.

they thought they

15B
were now free from church interference.

The leadership of

both the Catholic and Evangelical churches insisted othei—
wise;

the essence of the confessional school,

they main

tained, was that its lesson plans and school books must
reflect the spirit of that particular religion.1^

A

teacher of a different confession could not adequately
teach properly in such a school.

Jewish teachers as well

as dissidents were barred from the confessional school,18
And certainly Jewish educators could not serve as rector's
of Evangelical or Catholic schools.19

But not only did the

churches oppose the idea of Jewish administrators of
Christian schools;

they also insisted that all school

officials must belong to the religion of that s c h o o l . I f
a teacher left the church after securing employment in a
secular school,

then that teacher must be removed from the

confessional school.

The argument that a teacher had the

^ G S t A (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 61 B d .
I, p. 388, letter to Ku1tusministerium, January 27, 1922.
iBIbid., Nr. 2 B d . XXV, p. 351, letter from Education
Minister Boelitz to Provinzia1schu1ko 11 egium in BerlinLichterfelde, June 26, 1924.
1,?Ibid., p. 435, Ku 1tusmin isterium to BerlinLichterfelde, November 2B, 1924.
^■’Ibid, Nr. 2 B d . XXVI, p. 190, Evangelical church
official to the Kultusminister, May 31, 1930 and Nr. 60 B d .
I, p. 204, undated resolution of the Catholic School
Organization of Germany.
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constitutional right to freedom of belief and conscience
did not dissuade church authorities.31
Chronic financial problems of the period aggravated the
situation.

Whenever it became necessary to reduce the num

ber of personnel in the schools, supporters of the confes
sional school

insisted that the official's religion should

be a factor.

Their argument was that the remaining teach

ers would have to be prepared to teach all subjects,
cluding religion.33

in

But then where could a teacher who

chose to exercise the constitutiona1 right to abstain from
religion find employment, since the supporters of the con
fessional school also insisted that secular schools were
il legal?33
When proponents of confessional education insisted that
most teachers did not choose to abstain from religion be
cause they believed in its validity and necessity,

the USPD

insisted that if teachers were reluctant to exercise their

31"Katholischer Schu1streik", Vorwarts. June 20, 1920,
an interesting report on a school strike at a Westphalian
Catholic school, conducted by Catholic parents who demanded
the removal of four Catholic teachers who had left the
Church.
School strikes by both supporters of confessional
schools and of secular schools were quite common throughout
the decade.
The Education Minister was firm that local
authorities not capitulate to strikers or to the threat of
a strike.
^ G S t A (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 2, B d .
XXV, p. 331-332, Directive of Boelitz to the local govern
ments, March 1, 1924.
33Ibid., p. 381-363, unidentified newspaper clipping
of November 2, 1924.
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constitutional right to refrain from religion it was
because they were afraid they could neither obtain nor keep
their positions otherwise.24

Quite often non— religious

teachers were the first to be laid off, not only because
they would not teach religious instruction, but also be
cause, since the right to refrain from religion was so
recent, they tended to be the newest teachers.25

Religious

teachers might then fill these positions, even in schools
without religious instruction.

Proponents of confessional

education worried that religious teachers might be trans
ferred against their will to schools they considered to be
godless.

Education Minister Boelitz instructed local

officials not to violate the rights of teachers in confes
sional schools by transferring them to non-confessional
one s.
One attempt to address this problem was to assign
teachers to the schools of their religions whenever pos
sible, or in the case of non-religious teachers,

to secular

=4Ibid., p. 250, USPD speech in the Prussian Landtag,
March S, 1922.
25Ibid., Nr. 60 B d . Ill, pp. 39-40, teachers' petition
to the K u 1tusministerium, August 13, 1931.
Married teach
ers were usually targeted for early retirement as well;
the SPD tried to defend this group, while the Catholics
maintained that married teachers could not properly devote
themselves both to the profession and to their marital and
motherly duties.
3t,Ibid., B d . 1, p. 437, Ku 1tusminister Boelitz to
Provinzialschulkollegium in Ber1in-Lichterfelde, September
23, 1922.
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schools.^

The Education Minister also ruled that if a

teacher in a Catholic school converted to Protestantism,
that teacher would be transferred to the appropriate
school.

In addition,

that teacher could teach religious

instruction only after one year had elapsed since the
conversion and only after taking a state examination in
religious instruction.20

Most teachers, even those who

considered themselves personally religious,

resented what

they regarded as infringement by the churches into state
authority. "

Many insisted that the churches had no role

in public education, not even in religious instruction.30
Despite the protests of the teachers,

however,

the churches

continued to assert'their authority over the schools,

=,,Ibid., Nr. 2 B d . XXV, p. 478, Kul tusminister Becker
to Provinzialschulkollegium, April 8, 1926;
and GStA
(Potsdam) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, p. 117 Kultusminister
Grimme to Prussian Minister President Braun, October 17,
1930.
The problem with dissident teachers was that the
Teachers' Academies were also confessiona1ly segregated.
When he became Education Minister, Grimme insisted that the
academies had to accept dissidents too;
the government
would then try to assign them to schools which corresponded
to those beliefs.
Also see GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D
PreuRischer Landtag, xc J9 Die Dissidenten, Ldtg. B d . 1:
1920-33, March 17, 1931.
^ G S t A (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXVI, p. 131, Kultusminister to the Evangelical Church,
October 15, 1927.
^Ibid., p. 39, “Religionsunterricht und Kirche",
Alloemeine Deutsche Lehrerzeituna Nr. 16 (May, 1927).
3°Ibid., p. 218-220 and pp. 235-240, teachers'
petitions to the Ku1tusministerium August 1930.
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insisting that in the matter of religious instruction,
church officials were superior to civil servants.®1
Article 144 of the constitution made the entire school
system subject to state supervision.

Article 149 provided

that religious instruction was ordinarily a subject of the
schools (except for the secular schools) and added that it
would be "taught in accord with the principles of the con
cerned religious society without prejudice to the super—
visory rights of the state.’"32

This latter provision gave

the churches the right to involvement in the schools, a
right they used as a wedge to broaden their influence over
other areas of education whenever they could.
In a Landtag debate,

the Social Democrats insisted that

religious instruction in the schools was still subject to
state supervision and control — the constitution had not
intended that religious instruction would be dogmatic,
a more general type of religious instruction.

but

Confessional

religious education was actually incompatible with the con
stitutional provisions for freedom of belief.

The Demo

crats agreed that while dogma had to be avoided,

religious

instruction should remain confessional .

31Ibid., p. 190, Letter from an Evangelical church
official to the Ku1tusminister, May 31, 1930.
3:sDie Verfassuno. p. 45.
3"3GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preu(3ischer Landtag,
A3, B d . 1:
1919-28, Sitzung am September 13, 1923.
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Despite pressure from both churches,

the state

partially agreed with the SPD and insisted on limitations
on church interference in education.

When one Evangelical

church official attempted to pay a surprise visit to in
spect a religious instruction class,
away.

the school turned him

He responded by writing a letter of grievance to

local officials, claiming the church's right to inspect
those classes had been violated.

The Education Minister

rejected his complaint, supporting the school in this in
stance, stating that the requirement to give notice was a
reasonable o n e .34

The Education Minister also instructed

local officials that, although the churches might be con
sulted on matters pertaining to religious instruction,

it

was not mandatory to obtain their approval.35
One of the ways in which the churches tried to maximize
their influence over the schools was through an insistence
on their right to determine how many hours a week religious

®aGStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXVI, p. 246, Evangelical Office in Schlesien to Breslau
officials, December 30, 1930 and p. 247, Breslau local
officials reply of January 20, 1931.
For other instances
of the Evangelicals' insistence that religious instruction
was strictly a church matter see B d . XXIV, p. 428, a peti
tion to the Kultusministerium to this effect, dated April
6 , 1921.
The Catholic Church repeatedly made similar
claims— see B d . XXIV, p. 107, press clipping from the
Kolnischer Volkszeitung of November 13, 1919 and p. 259,
press clipping Germania. February 25, 1920 which forcefully
insisted that the state could not abridge the church's
right to supervise religious instruction.
3SIbid., Nr. 2 Vol XXV, p. 352, Kultusministerium to
Provinzia1schu1ko11 egi u m , June 26, 1924.
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instruction should be.

This was one of the few instances

in which the Evangelical Church was at odds with the Cath
olics, claiming that Catholics received more hours per week
of religious instruction than did Protestants.36

When the

Education Ministry attempted to mediate the dispute by
equalizing the number of hours of religious instruction,
the Bishop of Osanbruck protested that there were reasons
unique to Catholicism that necessitated more than the stip
ulated number of hours.37

The Kultusministerium believed

that if the number of hours was too high, students would
not take it and teachers would refuse to teach it.30
We have dealt with the problem of teachers and how they
could not really exercise their constitutional right to re
fuse to teach religious instruction.
tion with the students?

What was the situa

Article 149 again proved problem

atical in its stipulation that participation in religious
instruction depended on a "declaration of intent" by the
guardians of the student.

The constitution did not stipu

late the form, however— would students have to declare that

^Ibid., Nr. 61 B d . II, p. 160, unidentified report
dated January 1923.
^Ibid., p. 76, letter by the Bishop of Osnabriick to
the Ku1tusminister, September 21, 1922.
^ I b i d ., pp. 471-475, undated minutes of a meeting
between K u 1tusministerium, Evangelical church leaders,
school administrators, and teachers.
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they wanted religious instruction or the opposite?

The

issue aroused heated debate.
The Independent Socialists, Oestreich's organization
BESCH, and socialist teachers all insisted that the intent
of the constitution clearly was that the parent must speci
fically request religious instruction for the child, other—
wise none would be provided.3^

Representatives of the Cen

ter Party scoffed at this argument.

They maintained that

since the earlier part of article 149 had provided that
religious instruction was ordinarily part of a school's
curriculum,
abstention.

the declaration of intent surely must be one of
415

Furthermore,

the Center insisted, since the

majority desired religious instruction,

it would be ludi

crous to have them all make statements of intent.
Socialist Education Minister Haenisch hedged by
claiming that there was no stipulated form;

it could be

positive or negative, oral or written, as long as it was as

3-7GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXIV, p. 99, USPD and BESCH representatives' speeches in
the Prussian Constitutional Convention, October 17, 1919;
pp. 167-189, session of December 6, 1919;
and p. 172,
petition to the convention by a socialist teachers' organi
zation, September 30, 1919.
Also, see GStA (Merseburg)
Rep. 169D Preuf3ischer Landtag, xc, C3 Der Rel igionsunterricht Allgemein, Ldtg. B d . 1:
1919-33, October 20, 1919
and "Teilnahme am Religionsunterricht", Vorwarts. November
15, 1919, for BESCH's protests.
*,:,GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 2 B d .
XXIV, p. 189.
‘‘‘M b i d . , p. 100, Center representative speech at the
Prussian Constitutional Convention, October 17, 1919.
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simple as possible— officials could not purposely make the
process more complicated than necessary.

In addition, one

could not repeatedly change one's mind about whether to
participate in religious instruction or not.43
Haenisch's successor, Otto Boelitz, agreed with the
Center's position— if religion were an ordinary school sub
ject, surely the student should not have to specifically
request the course."43
Walter Koch agreed;

National Minister of the Interior
if parents sent their children to

confessional schools, they probably wanted them to receive
religious instruction, and it would be wasteful and timeconsuming to force them to make formal statements to that
effect.4"4

Applying this argument to the secular schools,

one would assume that a positive declaration of intent to
take religious instruction would be necessary at this type
of school . 4=1
Were the secular schools even constitutional?

Although

the secular school was mentioned in article 149, opponents

43:Ibid., Nr. 60 B d . I, p. 110, Kultusminister to the
local Coin government, January 19, 1921;
Nr. 2 B d . XXIV,
p. 126, unidentified newspaper clipping of December 6,
1919;
and pp. 13-15, letter from Haenisch to local
governments and Provinzialschulkollegium.
"43Ibid., Nr. 2 B d . XXV, pp. 301-320, letter from
Boelitz to the Reich Interior Minister, June 29, 1923.
"“"“Ibid., B d . XXIV, p. 272, unidentified and undated
documen t .
4= Ibid., Nr. 60 B d . I, p. 110, Haenisch to the local
government in Cologne, November 26, 1920.
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insisted that article 174, the status quo article, invali
dated the earlier provision until a national school law was
passed.

In the 1920s,

the Education Ministry dealt with

the problem by maintaining that secular schools did not
exist.

Instead there were "collection schools" or "coll

ection classes" or "Evangelical schools without religious
education".
The last term provoked outrage from Protestants.
school were Evangelical,

If a

then religious instruction was an

ordinary school subject— this meant that an "Evangelical
school without religious education" was a constitutional
impossibi1it y.

Although no school was ever designated a

"Catholic school without religious education", a Center
Landtag representative wanted to know if this, or a "Jewish
school without religious education" were possible.40
Education Minister Haenisch had to concede that those type

“^Ibid., Nr. 2 B d . XXIV, p. 258, Haenisch's address to
the Prussian Landtag, April 10, 1920 and B d . XXV, p. 12,
Ku1tusminister to Potsdam local officials, December 1921;
Nr. 60 B d . I, p. 138, Haenisch's address to the Prussian
Landtag, January 13, 1921;
p. 279, article in the Kolnische Volkszeituno. July 12, 1921;
p. 380 Boelitz to the
President of the Landtag, December 28, 1921.
“" ’Ibid., Nr. 60 B d . I, p. 40, letter from an
Evangelical church official to the Education Minister,
November 18, 1920;
p. 43, article in Deutsche Zeitunq.
November 4, 1920.
“^Considering the fluidity of language use, one can
almost imagine a "secular school with religious instruc
tion".
The proposal is not made in jest— it seems an apt
phrase to describe Grimme’s ideal school.
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of schools were indeed possible if the majority in that
type of school chose to refrain from taking religious
education.4,1

But the term was never used except in

reference to Protestant schools.
however,

Socialists insisted,

that use of the term was accurate;

these schools

still retained Evangelical books and teacher plans;

they

only omitted religious instruction.90
In practice, even supporters of confessional segrega
tion and religious instruction realized that the admini
stration of the schools was much more efficient when those
students who did not take religious instruction were "col
lected" into their own schools.

Although some of these

supporters argued that non-confessional moral instruction
should be held for these students while other students
attended confessional religious instruction, socialists
insisted that not even a non-confessional course could be
required.31

To prevent the chaos that would arise from

“^GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 60 B d .
I, p p . 29-30.
®°Ibid., p. 39, Haenisch letter of November 19, 1920;
pp. 432-433, Kultusminister to local government in Munster,
August 31, 1922 and GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D PreuPischer
Landtag xc C3, Der Religionsunterricht Allgemein, Ldtg. B d .
I: 1919-33, December 7, 1920, DNVP speech and Haenisch's
reply.
&1Ibid., Nr. 2 B d . XXV, p. 365, Division of Church and
School Affairs to the Ku 1tusminister, November 1, 1924;
p.
364, K u 1tusministerium response, December 4, 1924;
GStA
(Potsdam) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I B d . 8, p. 31, Haenisch
to local governments and Provinzia1schu1ko 11 egium, March
13, 1920.
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either dismissing those not participating in religious
instruction early or allowing them to arrive late, the
Education Ministry approved of the practice of "collecting"
these students in their own schools.82
Whatever these schools without religious instruction
were called,

there were very few of them;

less than two

per cent of the nation's youth received an education in a
"secular school" by the end of the period.33

Furthermore,

not even the principle of the secular school was accepted.
The socialist plank of secularization of education remained
un rea1i zed.
THE PRUSSIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE 1920S AND THE ISSUE
□F INTEGRATION
Although the issue of religion in the schools attracted
more time and attention from Prussian politicians and
educators, the issue of integration of the school system
was not entirely ignored.

Hopes for integrating the

educational systems of the various states to create a
uniform system throughout the nation became increasingly
dim as the 1920s wore on and chances for a national school

s=Ibid., Nr. 60 B d . I, p. 135, SPD representative
speech in the Prussian Landtag, January 13, 1921;
p. 379,
Landtag President to the Kultusminister, December 10, 1921.
33GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D, xd A 1 , B d . 1, Unterricht
und Erziehung Allgemein, Preuflische Statistik (Amtliches
Duellenwerk). herausgegeben in Zwanglosen Heften vom
Preu|3ischen Statistischen Landesamte in Berlin (Berlin:
Verlag des Preu|3ischen Statistischen Landesamtes, 1931).
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law being passed diminished.

Integration of education in

the sense of mixing the confessions not only failed,

but

introduction of Weltanschauung and secular schools further
divided the system.

Likewise,

the occupational segregation

of post-elementary education not only prevailed, but even
worsened during the 1920s, with the introduction of two new
types of high schools— the Aufbauschulen and the Deutsche
Oberschulen.

While these schools were intended to allow

greater flexibility, greater fragmentation resulted.'
The intent of several constitutional clauses was to
soften the, previously inflexible divisions of the upper
grades, a division that largely followed class lines.

The

constitution provided for eight years of free education,
followed by free occupational
turned eighteen years of age.

training until the student
All children were required

to attend a common elementary school;
laws set this for four years.

subsequent enabling

Before attending middle or

high schools, all students from all social classes were
required to attend this four year school.

Admission to

middle and high schools was to depend only on the student's
predisposition and inclination, not economic, social, or
religious background.

Private schools whose purpose was to

segregate the wealthy from others and ensure admission to
the high schools were abolished.

Financial aid for capable

but needy students was to be awarded in order to make
higher education accessible to the economically
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disadvantaged.

Every one of these articles was undermined

in one way or another throughout the 1920s.
Even during the war,

the issue of vertical integration

of Prussia's school system arose.

In 1916, a Prussian

legislative session considered the issue after the SPD
repeated its demand that education be secularized, inte
grated, and free.®4

Supporters of the status quo said that

free high schools would allow too many unprepared students
in these schools.

Since people differed in intelligence,

they could not be educated together;
necessary.

different tracks were

Even the Progressives insisted on maintenance

of different types of high schools.®®
In this debate, Haenisch maintained that students in
private schools should not enjoy special privileges.

He

called for greater access to high schools and universi
ties.®*

Adolph Hoffmann insisted that open admissions

would not result in hordes of unprepared students in the
high schools;

the SPD only wanted to make sure that

talented but poor students had the opportunity to attend
them. ®7

®*GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I, Nr. 1, B d .
VIII, p. 8B-101, Landtag session, March 16, 1916.
®®Ibid

.

Ibid . , p. 13.
^Ibid., pp. 88-101.
Landtag, March 15, 1916.

Hoffmann's address to the
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Those who supported the continuing division of the
upper grades, however,

insisted that this was necessary for

maintaining the country's great cultural heritage.

Educa

tion Minister Boelitz expressed this point of view in a
pamphlet of 1924.w

The only way to deal with the mult

iplicity of culture was to continue maintaining four dif
ferent high school types, each with its emphasis on a
different, but equally important aspect of culture.

This

way the students could re-experience a certain aspect of
culture in depth;

then they all worked together as an

educated community to maintain the entirety of culture.
But the different parts had to be co-ordinated, rather than
each concentrating solely on their respective special
ties .
Although the Center and the Social Democrats clashed on
the issue of religion in the schools,

both wanted the upper

grades better integrated with the elementary level.

During

the war, the Center joined the SPD in denouncing private
preparatory schools that served as class institutions,
ensuring their students admission into the exclusive high

“^Ibid, pp. 349-379, "Die Neuordnung des preu|3ischen
hoheren Schulwesens.
Denkschrift des Preu[3ischen Ministeriums fur Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung" (Berlin:
Weidmannsche Buchhand1u n g , 1924).
="5’GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D PreuRischer Landtag, xc
C2, Die Konfessione11e Verhaltnisse der Schule (Konfessions-, Simultanschule), Ldtg. B d . I:
1919-27, Boelitz's
address to the Landtag, May 8, 1923.
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schools. 4,0

Haenisch pointed out that the three-year

private school students were not as well prepared as
students who had attended a four year public elementary
school.

To support his contention, he pointed out that

areas which had no private schools sent students to the
high schools who did just as well, and very often better
than their private school counterparts.

The conservatives'

insistence that private schools were necessary to maintain
high standards was unjustified .4,1
When he became Education Minister, Haenisch was deter—
mined that the constitutional provision phasing out exist
ing private schools which served as class institutions
would be enforced.

He instructed local governments to

refuse permission for establishment of new private
schools.Despite

this,

Independents and Social Democrats

drew the Education Minister's attention to what they viewed
as violations of this provision.

In 1921, the USPD pro

tested that some private schools were continuing to send
their students to the high schools after three instead of
the required four years.

Boelitz was Education Minister by

^ ’GStA (Dahlem) Rep. 76 VII neu Sekt 1B-I Nr. 1, B d .
VIII, p. 42, discussion of a Center proposal in the
Landtag, January 20, 1917.
^Mbid,

pp. 11-13, Landtag session of January 29,

1917.
^Ibid., p. 121, Haenisch directive to local offi
cials, November 12, 1919.
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this time;

he said that this was permissible until the

1923-24 school year.*3
Despite these protests, and the constitution's position
on the issue, private preparatory schools kept their doors
open throughout the 1920s.
these schools,

The DNVP expressed support for

insisting that these students were so well-

prepared that they should be allowed to go to the high
schools after three years of elementary education.

The SPD

scoffed at this claim;

the DDP, although it believed in

"rise of the talented",

had to agree with the SPD on the

necessity of four years of elementary education.64
The DNVP offered a better case for retaining the
private schools when it asked the state how the public
system would deal with the dramatic and sudden increase in
enrollment if the private schools were closed.

And where

were all the newly unemployed teachers to find work?

Con

sidering that finances were a constant problem throughout
the period and lay-offs periodic,

these questions could not

just be brushed aside.*5

*3GStA (Merseburg) Rep. 169D Preufiischer Landtag xf,
Al, Die Volksschule Allgemein, Ldtg. B d . I: 1919-24, June
1921 .
^ I bid., adh 2, AusschuPverhand 1ungen zu den Akten
uber die Volksschule Allgemein, Ldtg. B d . II, March 1925
Landtag session.
*5 Ibid.
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Not only were all levels of the school system not inte
grated in the manner Oestreich called for, but even the
constitutional provision for a common four year elementary
education for all students proved difficult to implement.
One must conclude that integration of the school system by
any definition of the word was not realized in the course
of the 1920s.
*

#

#

Despite the earnest attempts of educational reformers,
Prussia's school system continued to be characterized by
class and religious segregation throughout the brief exis
tence of Germany's first republic.

Both the inability of

the Social Democrats to unite behind a common educational
reform program and the necessity of conducting coalition
politics with parties hostile to general socialist ideology
prevented the implementation of any meaningful changes.
Except for superficial alterations, schools during Weimar
were almost identical to those of Imperial Germany.

The

fragmentation of the schools reflected the fragmentation of
Weimar politics and society.
for unity,

It is ironic that in striving

fragmentation only increased.

CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSION
Prussian schools in 1932 were almost exactly as they
had been before 1918— confessionally divided at the ele
mentary level and occupationally divided in the upper
grades.

The only political party that professed a desire

to reform the system was the Social Democratic Party.

Cer—

tainly the necessity of political compromise in a coalition
government posed obstacles to the implementation of any
reforms.

A more important reason, however,

for the SPD's

inactivity in this area is that the party lacked a common
plan.

While there was no dearth of ideas, the leadership

could not agree to coordinate the forces in the party and
unite behind one program.

Quite simply,

the party proved

incapable of consistently applying Marxist principles to
the practical problem of reforming the schools.

Educators

in the party could not agree on the funadmental issues of
the role of religion in the modern world and the place of
the individual in society.
Following unification in 1871, Prussia's sizeable
Catholic minority hoped to protect their traditional way of
life in the predominantly Protestant Reich and formed a
political party to help them do so.

The Center was an

erstwhile defender of the confessional segregation of
elementary schools.

Middle-class liberals opposed the

public power of the established churches;
176

according to
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them, the power of the state should not be checked by any
outside power.

Since the schools were state institutions,

the state's authority over education was supreme.
their negative attitudes to the churches,
hostile to religion itself.

Despite

liberals were not

As an important part of Ger—

many's cultural heritage, religion could not be excluded
from the schools.

Furthermore,

the occupational segrega

tion of the upper grades was necessary for the transmission
of culture, education’s main task.

Neither Catholics nor

liberals contemplated major reforms of the state's schools.
In the years before the War, the Social Democratic
Party had grown rapidly.

While the party adopted the

liberals’ criticism of the established churches,
tion on religion appeared to be more negative.

its posi
Because the

SPD was excluded from power in the Second Empire,

however,

its commitment to its programs remained untested.

As long

as socialists were considered pariahs,

they could retain

the language of opposition that proved attractive to so
many of the nation's disaffected elements.

Ambiguities and

contradictions did not have to be resolved as long as the
party remained outside the halls of power.
When the socialists--the SPD, along with its offspring,
the USPD— unexpectedly found themselves in power in
November 1918, they were forced to make many difficult
decisions.

The SPD had already exhibited its collabora

tionist tendencies during the war when it supported the
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state.

At the war's end, the party went even further,

revealing its character as a liberal party, committed to
the realization of the liberal ideal of democracy.

The

USPD, on the other hand, was more radical— it wanted to
impose permanent changes on the prostrate nation immedi
ately, while the socialists were still exclusively in
power.

The viewpoint of the SPD prevailed, and elections

were held for the National Assembly.

If it wanted to

continue to rule, the Social Democrats had to form a
coalition with the liberal parties.
While the leadership of the SPD could justly claim that
the necessity of coalition politics inhibited the pursuit
of educational reform, the fact remains that the party
failed to unite behind a common plan.

Part of the problem

was that the SPD was more interested in issues that more
directly affected its constituency— wages and hours.
Socialists who were concerned with cultural issues often
expressed frustration at the party's indifference to these
problems.
But there was a more serious obstacle to forming a
common program of educational reform— quite simply,

the

Marxist ideology that underpinned the party's position
proved to be difficult,
actual situations.

if not impassible,

Specifically,

to apply tD

the party's positions on

both religion and individualism were unclear.

Three

different educators in the party attempted to work out

179
these contradictions and apply Marxist principles to
educational reform;

in the process, all came up with very

different theories.

The ideas of these reformers had very

little impact on the educational system because the assump
tions and attitudes embedded in their approaches lessened
their potential appeal.
Kurt Lowenstein tried to persuade both parents and the
leadership of his own party of the necessity of completely
eliminating religion from the public sphere.

Although his

arguments often had merit, his attitude of smug certitude
was grating.

His insistence on separation of church and

state originated with liberals.

His potential allies,

however, could not stomach his prophecies of the inevitable
triumph of the proletariat.

Lowenstein grew increasingly

disillusioned as the 1920s wore on;

he could not under—

stand why others were not as persuaded by the "truth
according to Marx" as he was.

Despite his belief that

Marxism was scientific, while religion was based merely on
faith, in the final analysis his behavior was no less
sectarian than his religious opponents,
Paul Oestreich focussed on the problem of integrating
the upper grades of the Prussian schools.

He was con

stantly obliged to combat the charge that his ideas were
impractical and utopian.

While he repeatedly defended

himself against these accusations, we must conclude that
his critics were correct.

Oestreich's ideas logically lead
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to the erroneous conclusion that if the schools were re
formed and all children received an equal education,

then

as adults they would never have to accept dull, unsatis
fying, exploitative employment;
tinctions would disappear.
implemented,

furthermore, status dis

Even had all of his ideas been

however, Oestreich’s vision of a society

without status distinctions could not have been realized.
Both Lowenstein and Destreich claimed the high moral
ground for their ideas.

Although they were primarily

interested in the welfare of blue-collar workers,

both

reformers identified service to this strata of the pop
ulation with service to the whole German nation.

Recovery

from the war could occur only when all vestiges of the old
authoritarian order, particularly religious and class
divisions, were abolished.

To fight the established

churches or undermine the exalted position of the upper
classes were not negative actions,

in Lowenstein's and

Destreich's eyes— they merely sought to create a better
future for all.

But unless one was already predisposed to

accept Marxist ideology,

these arguments lacked cogency.

Adolf Grimme rose rapidly through the party ranks
because he expressed a more moderate position on the issues
of religion and individualism.

As Education Minister, he

had a forum by which he could reach the public.
Oestreich,

But like

his ideas were too utopian, although for dif

ferent reasons.

Grimme wanted to realize God's Kingdom on
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Earth;

this was quite a grandiose dream for a nation which

had just suffered a major defeat.
however,

A more serious problem,

is that Grimme’s statements could be misleading.

When he wrote that "the secular is, in fact, religious",
confusion was inevitable.

While his approach might be

valid in the course of a philosophical or theological dis
cussion,

in the political arena it could only serve to

obscure the issues.
All three of these reformers participated actively in
politics.

Nevertheless,

the examination of their ideas

showed that, although they were more practical than "un
political" academic critics, quite often Lowenstein,
Oestreich, and Grimme were just as guilty of flights of
fancy*

(This generalization applies less to Lowenstein

than the other two.)

All three of them embraced socialism

partly because they thought it provided a more concrete way
of viewing the world than did liberalism.

But quite often,

in their attempts to justify their own beliefs,
sorted to extremely abstract arguments.

they re

In short, part of

the problem with Weimar politics was that not only its
detractors, but even its active participants could be
wildly impractical and unpolitical.

The blue-collar

constituency of the SPD was simply uninterested in the
message of white-collar political theorists in the party,
who discussed issues that seemed to have little relevance
far the citizen's daily life.

1B2
Disgust with politics was widespread throughout the
period.

The behavior of the SPD regarding the issue of

education provides an example of why so many turned away
from the system.

Much of the partisan debate over the

schools was restricted to semantics.

While politicians

quibbled about terminology, nothing really changed.

As

long as politicians could argue over things that did not
really matter,

they were able to ignore the real problems

of post-war Germany,
unresolveable.

problems that were intractable, almost

It seemed to be easier to escape into petty

squabbling than to acknowledge the enormity of the nation's
problems.

Despite the fact that the S P D 's very ideology,

Marxism, was based on "Reason",

the Social Democrats were

not immune from the emotional irrational ism that was ram
pant at the time.
The Social Democratic Party failed to define its funda
mental beliefs, other than a commitment to the realization
of democracy.

Its commitment to democracy forced the

leadership of the party to ensure the loyalty of its elec
toral base.

This necessity farced the SPD to act as a

specia1-interest party;

despite this, socialist theorists

preferred to think of the party as one above class.

Its

emphasis on social issues in the proletariat's interest
belied its moralistic claims.
In the ma_tter of education,
its position.

the party failed to define

Social Democracy could not offer a vision

183
behind which the whole party, much less the entire working
class, and even less so the entire nation, could unite.
□ur examination of the socialist theory and practice of
educational reform demonstrates that the party could exert
very little influence on the schools because its members
were only loosely united by an ideology subject to a
variety of interpretations, some of them contradictory.
Unable to define its mission, German Social Democracy in
the 1920s was paralyzed by its own inner contradictions.
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APPENDIX
LIST OF SCHOOL TYPES
I.
The ELEMENTARY or primary schools (Grundschu1e )
encompassed the first four years and could be designated by
the following terms:
Preparatory school (Vorschule), exclusive elementary
schools with high tuitions; they were abolished by the 1919
Consti tution.
Special schools (Sonderschulen), usually referred to
schools for those with handicaps, for example, schools for
the deaf.
Sometimes, however, used to refer to schools
with a unique character, also called Meltanschauungschulen.
Most Prussian Grundschulen were denominational schools
(Bekenntnisschulen).
A few were mixed confessional schools (Simultansc hu1en ) .
A very few were secular schools (weltliche Schulen).
Since these were technically unconstitutional, they were
sometimes called collective schools (Sammelschulen)—
schools that collected students without religious
instruction in one place, to prevent the confusion and
disorder of mixing students.
II.

Post-elementary education,

by specialty:

A continuation of the elementary school (V o 1ksschu1e ),
four more years, grades five through eight;
academic
training is now complete for these students.
Vocational
training begins.
The MIDDLE or intermediate school (Mittleschule) of six
years, grades five through ten;
these students generally
enter lower white collar professions.
The HIGHER schools (Hohere Schulen), nine year schools,
grades five through thirteen (Sexta through Oberprima).
Many different types:
Gymnasium, with a humanistic curriculum containing nine
years of Latin and six years of Greek.
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Realschule, with a curriculum emphasizing the study of
modern culture, with nine years of Latin and no Greek.
□berrealschule, concentrating on math and natural
science, with no Latin or Greek but two modern languages.
Deutsche Dberschule, centered on German culture, with
two foreign languages.
The Aufbauschule was considered a high school, though
it was only a six year school, which one attended after
seven years in the elementary school.
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